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     Scholars have long noted the role Greek tragedy plays in the articulation of 
Arendt’s claims about what she calls the “anti-political” tradition in Western thought, 
but no one has explored the ways Shakespeare bears on her political philosophy.  This 
is especially noticeable, given that Arendt recurs to Shakespeare in numerous books 
and essays, and in her personal correspondence.  Nevertheless, political scientists 
have overlooked Shakespeare in Arendt studies and equally absent from Shakespeare 
criticism have been Arendtian theories of the political that have much to tell us about 
Shakespeare’s work.  This dissertation makes visible the palimpsest-like quality of 
those Shakespearean texts whose anachronisms are conceptual rather than material.  
Their “rich and strange” pearls invite us to consider the history and transformation of 
some of the most fundamental concepts in Western political thought.  By layering 
Christian and classical notions of freedom in The Rape of Lucrece, a poem whose 
subject concerns the foundation of Roman political freedom, or by constellating in 
 
 
Coriolanus classical and early modern notions of what it means to be a citizen, 
Shakespeare allows us to see, as if for the first time, the fate of the modern political 
world and the anti-political impulses that often drive its metamorphoses.  My twin 
goals are to discover why Shakespeare and performance play such an important role 
in Arendt’s political philosophy, and to explore the saving power that the 
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Paul Kottman observes in the introduction to his anthology Philosophers on 
Shakespeare that while the influence of Greek drama on philosophy (in particular, 
nineteenth century German idealism) has been thoroughly investigated, the significant 
influence of Shakespeare is just beginning to be charted.  Given, for example, Hegel’s 
careful consideration of Macbeth in his early theological writings, might not 
Shakespeare have explained Sophocles to Hegel, rather than the other way round (5)?  
A similar situation exists in Arendt studies.  Scholars have long noted the role Greek 
tragedy plays in the articulation of Arendt’s claims about necessity and contingency, 
thought and action, and unity and plurality—about what she calls the “anti-political” 
tradition in Western thought—but no one has explored the ways Shakespeare bears on 
her political philosophy.
1
  This is especially noticeable, given that Arendt recurs to 
Shakespeare in Eichmann in Jerusalem, The Life of the Mind, Between Past and 
Future, in numerous essays, and in her correspondence with W. H. Auden.  
Nevertheless, political theorists have overlooked Shakespeare in Arendt studies and, 
until quite recently, equally absent from Shakespeare criticism have been Arendtian 
theories of the political that have much to tell us about Shakespeare’s work.
2
    
                                                 
1
 For the most comprehensive account of the role Greek tragedy plays in Arendt’s thought, see Robert 
Pirro, who makes the case that the theatrical metaphors that appear in Arendt “reflect the presence of a 
tragic framework” (37) and that the Greek polis represented for Arendt, “perhaps, the most compelling 
historical example of the public realm in its kinship with the theatrical stage” (38).  For a more detailed 
summary of the critical commentary regarding the image of the ancient Greek polis in Arendt, see 
footnote 7. 
2
 To date, there has been no scholarly attempt to fully account for Arendt’s interest in Shakespeare. 
Richard Halpern engages with Arendt in two recent articles; although Halpern has spent much of his 
career writing about Shakespeare, his contribution to the conversation follows the trend of 
contemporary studies of Arendt’s thought regarding the influence of drama, focusing as it does on the 




     When Auden reviewed Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition in 1959, he 
initiated an extended dialogue about politics and literature with Arendt, as well as a 
friendship, into which Shakespeare figured again and again.
3
  In his review, Auden 
proposes that we read Arendt’s book as if it were an etymological dictionary of 
political concepts.  If Arendt is a political philosopher, Auden writes, she offers no 
“saving solutions.”  Rather, “she merely asks us to think what we are doing [sic] 
which we can never manage unless we can first agree about the meaning of the words 
we think with, which, in its turn, requires that we all become aware of what these 
                                                                                                                                           
to Rancière,” Halpern provides a critical assessment of Arendt, asking of both Arendt and Rancière, 
“What are the theoretical consequences if Arendt’s and Rancière’s shared primal scene of 
democracy—and of theater—works otherwise than they claim?” (548).  Halpern begins with a 
provocatively-entitled section, “Hannah Arendt’s Antitheatrical Prejudice,” to explore the tension 
between Arendt’s dual claims for Greek drama,  as both a medium for representing spontaneous action 
and for recording and preserving the ephemeral quality of action.  Halpern claims that Arendt’s 
distinctions between action (praxis) and work (poesis) attempt to produce absolute boundaries between 
the space of the political and the modern encroachments of the economic and the social, but he 
neglects to note the moments where Arendt acknowledges traffic between these domains, as I will 
explore in some detail in Chapter 2.  More pertinent to my opening discussion here is that Halpern 
nowhere notes Arendt’s own engagement with Shakespeare.  He has read Shakespeare alongside 
Arendt, however, in “Eclipse of Action: Hamlet and the Political Economy of Playing”; here he 
concludes, as in his article on Arendt and Rancière, that the “The ‘mixed’ or contaminated status of 
political economy is something that Arendt feels compelled to fend off as a way of protecting the 
purity of political action from economic motives. Hamlet, by contrast, cannot imagine the state outside 
its dialectical relation with economy” (451).  In Thinking With Shakespeare, Julia Reinhardt Lupton’s 
interrogates the viability of Arendt’s distinction between action and labor (what she terms “politics and 
life”).  In choosing to “set the Shakespearean table with Arendt” (13), however, she adopts a stance 
that is, in relation to Halpern’s, “more creative-receptive than critical-cautionary” (12).  By reading 
Arendt alongside Shakespeare, Lupton ultimately argues for the universality of Shakespeare’s works, 
“not as a thesaurus of eternal messages but in their capacity to establish real connections with the 
successive worlds shared and sustained by actors and audiences over time” (18).  Her argument for the 
persistent relevance of Shakespeare is one with which Arendt might well have agreed; Arendt herself 
offers Shakespeare’s representations of buried political concepts like freedom as exemplars for modern 
readers to consider, and she expresses her own notion of the durability of concepts in an image derived 
from Shakespeare.  Yet Arendt also explores the limits and dangers of relying on previous thinkers 
(Shakespeare, in particular) for an understanding of the present, an aspect of her thought which Lupton 
does not treat.  The actions of individuals who had participated in the Holocaust, according to Arendt, 
shattered an entire tradition of thought and “clearly exploded our categories of political thought” 
(Essays in Understanding 310).  Arendt especially applied this claim to our inherited notions of evil.  
And as I explore in detail in Chapter 4, Arendt considered Shakespeare to be one of the primary 
representatives of a longstanding tradition of thinking about evil.  If from one perspective Shakespeare 
showcases the kind of political thinking that Arendt wanted to encourage, from another, he is a 
representative of a tradition whose authority has been shattered by the events of the twentieth century.  
3





words have meant in the past” (A Company of Readers 52-53).  It is perhaps 
unsurprising that Auden, who himself wrote and lectured extensively on Shakespeare, 
should seize on the Arendtian strategy for reading the history of political thought that 
Arendt herself found in Shakespeare.  For it was to Shakespeare’s works that she kept 
returning in order to shed light on the genealogies of political philosophy’s anti-
political “thought trains” (Arendt, Life of the Mind 154). 
     Fundamental to Arendt’s theory of political life are her concepts of plurality and 
natality.  According to Arendt, every human birth represents natality, a radical 
novelty insofar as each signals the entrance onto our political stage of another actor 
who possesses the freedom to initiate new enterprises.  As we will see, Arendt holds 
an equivocal view regarding Christianity’s impact on our ability to think politically, 
but she nevertheless finds in the story of the incarnation our most well-known 
conceptualization of natality.  The singularity of an event erupting into a present (“A 
child has been born unto us”) disrupts the classical understanding of political history 
as a mere repetition of natural cycles (The Human Condition 247).  And yet, first 
because she was sensitive to the potentially terrible consequences of any form of 
newness that relegates the Jewish tradition to an obsolete past, and second, because 
the power of action is a capacity that cannot entirely be denied to anyone who takes 
upon themselves its call to responsibility, Arendt expands the notion of natality, the 
singularity of a birth that heralds the singularity of a life’s actions, to every 
individual.  In “Introduction into Politics,” an essay in which Arendt deploys 
Shakespeare to introduce this universalized natality, she writes, “In the last analysis, 




potential immortality is always subject to the mortality of those who build it and the 
natality of those who come to live in it.  What Hamlet said is always true: ‘The time 
is out of joint; O cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it right!’” (The Promise of 
Politics 203).  
     If individually, as political agents who can act upon the political world, we 
manifest the phenomenon of natality, it is collectively, as agents who also think, 
judge, and form opinions from irreducibly particular perspectives regarding a world 
we share in common, that we reveal the epiphenomenon that Arendt calls plurality.  
Our experience of plurality—this living among a multitude of unique political agents, 
each with his or her own capacity for judgment—encourages us to think of politics 
spatially, as an opening that at once separates us from one another while relating each 
to all.  When Greek philosophy deigned to think upon the political at all, it dispensed 
with plurality altogether, pre-fabricating an ideal polis that was to be constructed by a 
sovereign philosopher-king rather than founded, preserved, and re-figured by the 
actions of multitudes.  Properly recognized, the very fact of plurality invalidates many 
of the claims that political philosophy has made regarding the ends of politics, 
revealing the political space as a space of opinion rather than one of truth.        
     In her Denktagebuch, a private thought journal she kept for more than two decades 
following the publication of the The Origins of Totalitarianism in 1951, Arendt 
begins one of the early notebooks with the heading: Experimental Notebook of a 
Political Scientist.  Its purpose, she writes, is to “reconsider all philosophical 
statements on Man under the assumption that men, and not Man, inhabit the earth.  




only in the plural…In this realm of plurality which is the political realm, one has to 
ask all the old questions, what is friendship, what is solitude, what is acting, thinking, 
but not the one question of philosophy: Who is man…” (295).  ”  From these two 
basic observations, natality and plurality, Arendt develops a corresponding ontology 
of praxis which stands in stark contrast to a Western philosophical tradition that has 
consistently elevated contemplation over action, being over becoming.
4
  Philosophy’s 
congenital inability to recognize the novelty inherent in our capacity to act and to 
reshape our political institutions has kept us from understanding the nature of politics 
and thus from developing the capacity adequately to judge new situations as they 
emerge in our world.  Moreover, its discomfort with the unpredictability and 
contingency that characterize action engendered a thoroughgoing contempt for the 
life of the polis.  Such anti-political habits are pervasive for Arendt, and they are 
shared by otherwise antagonistic thinkers like Plato, Hobbes, and Heidegger; the 
weight of their combined thought significantly contributes to background 
assumptions which continue to foster the contempt that modernity heaps upon 
political life.   
     In the interest of eradicating, or at least of reducing, the uncertainties associated 
with political life, philosophy subordinated the vita activa to the solitary 
contemplation of eternal Ideas that would serve as the ordering principles for all 
action.  One significant feature in the history of political theory is the interest 
philosophy has taken in displacing long-standing, deeply-rooted analogies between 
                                                 
4
 As Dana Villa has suggested, Arendt’s work gains power from its critical stance toward the Platonic-
Aristotelian philosophical tradition.  In one sense, “Arendt’s theory of action proceeds by lifting 
praxis, in ‘crystallized’ form, out of its philosophical context and resetting it in an existential one” 
(Arendt and Heidegger 11).   The result is a framework that can better accommodate the plurality that 




drama and political experience.
5
  For Arendt, recuperating these dramatic metaphors 
serves as an antidote for this tradition, providing an alternate, non-philosophical 
register through which to understand political life.  For Arendt, theater remains, “the 
political art par excellence”: “only there is the political sphere of human life 
transposed into art…it is the only art whose sole subject is man in his relationship to 
others” (Human Condition 188).
 6
  Drama and politics resemble one another insofar 
as both need an audience: “both need a publicly organized space for their ‘work,’ and 
both depend upon others for the performance itself” (Between Past and Future 154).  
Non-dramatic art forms, on the contrary, are characterized by a certain “[i]ndependent 
existence” that does not so readily illuminate how political life sustains itself through 
the actions of others; unlike these “products of making,” political institutions always 
“depend for continued existence upon acting men…utter dependence upon further 
acts to keep it in existence marks the state as a product of action” (Between Past and 
Future 153).   
     If the dramatic form can best represent both the plurality of perspectives that 
constitutes political life as well as the primacy of action over contemplation in 
political life, what could Shakespeare in particular offer Arendt that traditional 
political thought could not?  When Arendt suggests that something of Hamlet’s 
condition is “always true,” she seems to suggest that certain works of art, like 
Shakepeare’s, are “timeless.” By this she is not claiming, however, that they serve, 
                                                 
5
 In his book on Arendt and drama, Paul Kottman discusses at length philosophy’s strategy of 
expropriating the spectacle of “theater” on behalf of a “theory” that is designed to stabilize the 
uncertainties of political life; a contemplative inner gaze fixated upon the eternal Idea supplants the 
audience who witnesses the contingency of the “scene”; correspondingly, philosophy’s reliance on 
solitary thought subsumes the contingent, conditioned quality of both dramatic and of political action 
beneath the principles of an ordering rule (35). 
6
 As Paul Kottman argues, “…without plurality there is no drama: the simple fact that there must be 




like the Platonic Idea, as an enduring roadmap for political and ethical life.  
Accompanying our experience of natality, wherein agents interrupt automatic or 
habitual practices, is the possibility that radical novelty can be introduced into the 
world.  With opportunity for such novelty comes the need to recognize when our 
existing categories and patterns of thought are inadequate to the task of understanding 
our shared experiences.  And this recognition, in turn, requires each generation to 
accept the responsibility to think for themselves, or as Arendt puts it, to “discover and 
ploddingly pave anew the path of thought” in their own time (Thinking 210).  If 
Shakespeare’s works are “timeless,” then, it is because they offer us an exemplar of 
what Arendt refers to as the “timeless time” of thought (211).  With his manifest 
ability to collect together disparate and sometimes contradictory visions of political 
concepts, persistent amalgamations of the no more and the not yet, Shakespeare often 
crystallizes past and future into a single theatrical or poetic moment to discover their 
meaning in the present.   
     In her introduction to Walter Benjamin’s Illuminations, Arendt writes: “Any 
period to which its own past has become as questionable as it has to us must 
eventually come up against the phenomenon of language, thwarting all attempts to get 
rid of it once and for all.  The Greek polis will continue to exist at the bottom of our 
political existence—that is, at the bottom of the sea—for as long as we use the word 
‘politics’” (49).  Passages like this one have led Arendt scholars to make compelling 
arguments about the influence that ancient Greek political institutions and their 
representation in Greek tragedy have on her political theory.
7
  But they have missed 
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 So pervasive is this line of thought that only a sampling of relevant examples is possible here.  J. 




the fact that Arendt’s metaphor for understanding the afterlife of political concepts—
“the bottom of the sea”—is at bottom Shakespearean.  Arendt makes this evident 
when she goes on to describe what she calls “thinking poetically”: 
And this thinking, fed by the present, works with the ‘thought fragments’ it 
can wrest from the past and gather about itself.  Like a pearl diver who 
descends to the bottom of the sea, not to excavate the bottom and bring it to 
light but to pry loose the rich and strange, the pearls and the coral in the 
depths, and to carry them to the surface, this thinking delves into the depths of 
the past—but not in order to resuscitate it the way it was and to contribute to 
the renewal of extinct ages.  What guides this thinking is the conviction that 
although the living is subject to the ruin of time, the process of decay is at the 
same time a process of crystallization, that in the depth of the sea, into which 
sinks and is dissolved what was once alive, some things ‘suffer a sea-change’ 
and survive in new crystallized forms and shapes that remain immune to the 
elements, as though they waited only for the pearl diver who one day will 
                                                                                                                                           
of politics and action are [sic] suffused by the language and imagery of theater” (152).   
Acknowledging that Arendt seems unconcerned with what was irremediably antidemocratic about 
ancient Athens (“substantial social and economic inequalities, slavery and patriarchy, imperialist 
adventures, exclusive citizenship laws, the absence of rights…”) [149], Euben argues that Arendt is not 
attempting to recover the Greek polis wholesale, but to use it as a provocation: “to make the everyday 
seem anomalous, thereby opening up the present for real thinking if not for real political struggles” 
(163).   In her seminal treatment of Arendt’s political thought, Margaret Canovan argues in a similar 
vein that while the politics of ancient Athens did not in fact make what Arendt articulates about 
political freedom into a worldly reality, it nevertheless offers modern readers something distinctive in 
its discovery that basic political experiences emerge only between actors in a shared public space 
(Reinterpretation 115-116).  Dana Villa agrees with this mixed assessment, further pointing out that 
for Arendt “not even the Greeks (not even the Athenians!) possessed a robust sense of the public 
world” (Politics, Philosophy, Terror 208); the appeal of the Greek polis lay in its vision of political 
action that preceded the Greek philosophical and Christian traditions, which both turned the aim of the 
political into a means toward a predefined end.  And for Hannah Pitkin, what Arendt identifies in the 
Greek polis is an understanding that, contrary to the modern understanding of human rights as inherent 
or God-given, “people are not by nature equal but must be made so by human arrangements if they are 




come down to them and bring them up into the world of the living—as 
‘thought fragments,’ as something ‘rich and strange,’ and perhaps even as 
everlasting as Urphänomene.’ (50-51) 
This description of Benjamin’s historiography refers to all the fragments from the 
past that suddenly (“at a moment of danger,” 255) become legible in new and 
unexpected images produced by a dialogue between past and present.  But, of course, 
Arendt is also alluding to Ariel’s “full-fathom five” song from The Tempest, the full 
version of which Arendt quotes in the conclusion to the first volume of her The Life of 
the Mind.  There, she tells us that this Shakespearean song best captures the 
theoretical assumptions that undergird her own book (212).  Ariel’s song speaks to 
the strange persistence of dead political sovereigns (“Nothing…that doth fade / But 
doth suffer a sea-change” [1.2.400-1]), a persistence which for Arendt, extends as 
well to deeply imbedded notions of political sovereignty and alternative political 
worlds that were themselves once material realities on the earth.  Such phenomena, 
lying “full fathom five”, may not be present-at-hand but neither are they beyond the 
reach of thought, that strong swimmer who can with great effort wrench such 
transformed treasures back into the world of the living. 
     My dissertation demonstrates the value of reading Shakespeare’s corpus as a 
primer in this mode of political thought.  For while the genealogies of political 
concepts that Arendt developed in her work are undeniably indebted to Walter 
Benjamin and Martin Heidegger, her methodology is also distinctively 
Shakespearean.
8
  For example, Phyllis Rackin suggests that the use of anachronisms 
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 Dana Villa identifies the influence of both thinkers in Arendt’s critical approach to understanding 




in Shakespeare’s history plays—the insertion of unsettling early modern phenomena 
like military cannons and “commercial capitalism” into the English feudal past—
indicates a nostalgia for, and a sense of complicity in, the passing of a particular 
lifeworld that Shakespeare’s audience must have felt (128).  Focusing initially not on 
Shakespeare’s medieval homeland but his Rome, this dissertation makes visible the 
palimpsest-like quality of those Shakespearean texts whose anachronisms are 
conceptual rather than material.  Their “rich and strange” pearls are case studies in 
“thinking poetically” as Arendt describes it, inviting us as they do to consider the 
history and transformation of some of the most fundamental concepts in Western 
political thought. By layering Christian and classical notions of freedom in The Rape 
of Lucrece, a poem whose subject concerns the foundation of Roman political 
freedom, or by constellating in Coriolanus classical and early modern notions of what 
it means to be a citizen, Shakespeare allows us to see, as if for the first time, the fate 




                                                                                                                                           
“The task of destruction, as practiced by Arendt, Benjamin, and Heidegger, is never simply negative: it 
does not express the childish wish to ‘have done’ with the past.  It is undertaken precisely in order to 
gain access to primordial experiences whose very strangeness serves to shatter the complacency of the 
present.” (Arendt and Heidegger 9) 
9
 By exploring what Shakespeare’s plays can tell us about what Arendt would have called the “anti-
political” tendencies of Western culture, this dissertation reconsiders what we mean when we use the 
phrase “political Shakespeare.”  It will inevitably raise a familiar theoretical objection: in a post-
Foucauldian critical world, have we not agreed that the private is political?  Indeed, it is perhaps due in 
large part to the dominance of Foucault in New Historicist early modern literary studies that Arendt 
was eclipsed as a significant interlocutor.  The de-differentiation of texts and their cultural contexts ran 
parallel to the theoretical refusal to view the public and the private as distinct political spaces.  This is 
what leads Alexander Leggatt, in Shakespeare’s Political Drama, to acknowledge that there may be “a 
political dimension in the relations of the sexes in The Taming of the Shrew and As You Like It, or of 
parents and children in Romeo and Juliet and A Midsummer Night’s Dream” but to conclude that “if 
everything is political then nothing is, for the word has lost its edge” (ix).  Arendt made a similar but 
much more sustained diagnosis of New Historicism, avant la lettre.  Moreover, she would have added 
that any wholesale abandonment of classical conceptual distinctions between public and private 




     With this dissertation, I take seriously Arendt’s challenge to ask anew fundamental 
questions from the perspective of plurality, and to do so in my own right while 
considering how Arendt’s understanding of anti-political tendencies in the Western 
philosophical tradition (and our own, contemporary political moment), are informed 
by her encounters with Shakespeare’s provocative examinations of our most basic 
political perplexities.  Posing a fundamental political question in each of the chapters 
that follows—What is political freedom? What is political action? What is political 
friendship? What is political evil?—I also explore how Arendt’s reconceptualization 
of politics alters our own understanding of the Shakespearean corpus.  While I am 
concerned with the early modern reception of Shakespeare and am sympathetic to 
Lisa Jardine’s injunction that we read “Shakespeare Historically,” my main objective 
is instead to examine the fragmentary histories of the political that Shakespeare 
wrests from his source material, and those that Arendt, in turn, wrests from 
Shakespeare.  In focusing on how both Arendt and Shakespeare attend to the major 
sea-changes in the history of political thought, I here submit, then, a kind of 
experimental notebook of my own that treats Shakespeare’s literary works as if they 
were essays composed with Arendt’s questions in mind.   
Chapter 1, “Between Political Freedom and the Freedom of the Will in The 
 Rape of Lucrece and Julius Caesar,” begins by reading Shakespeare alongside 
Arendt to re-ask my first question: what is political freedom?  In “What is freedom?”, 
Arendt mines the Western philosophic tradition for its conceptual articulation of 
                                                                                                                                           
modernity.  In order, then, to grapple with what Arendt and, I will argue, Shakespeare intend by the 
“anti-political,” it is necessary provisionally to bracket the political as a distinct space wherein freedom 
can become a political reality only to the extent that there are institutions which guarantee political 





freedom.  From its virtual absence in the Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle that 
favored the contemplative life over the active life of the polis, freedom made its first 
major entrée into Western philosophical thought with St. Augustine, whose 
valorization of the will transposed freedom from the political domain of citizens to 
the moral domain of the individual.  For Arendt, this unfortunate analogy between the 
freedom of the individual will and the political freedom that subsists between citizens 
diminishes our collective ability to care for the common world of laws and 
institutions that afford the necessary public space for any sustained freedom to act 
and speak among citizens: for “without a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom 
lacks the worldly space to make its appearance” (“What is Freedom?” 149).  The 
ideal of an individual who is free to the extent that she can subject her desires to a 
higher will was fodder for the modern bourgeois conception of the sovereign 
individual that built a firewall between freedom and politics.  Arendt traces this 
modern conception of freedom to seventeenth-century thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, 
for whom freedom is measured by the extent to which citizens have freedom of 
individual movement to transact their own private business, that is to the extent that 
they have achieved a “freedom from politics” and have ceded political decisions to 
the will of the sovereign state.   
     Drawing on these observations in Arendt’s essay on freedom as well on her 
discussions of will and conscience in The Life of the Mind, my initial chapter mines 
the Shakespearean corpus for its reflections on these two notions of human freedom 
whose distinctions have become obscured.  Whereas Arendt locates the imminent 




Shakespeare is for her a poetic thinker who examines a constellation of freedoms, 
thereby emphasizing the occlusion of the political freedom to found, enact, and 
augment the shared spaces of a public world by the individual and ethical freedom of 
the liberum arbitrium.  Following Arendt’s lead, I will chart the very different 
conceptions of freedom articulated in Richard III and Julius Caesar.  The chief aim 
of the chapter, however, will be a political reading of The Rape of Lucrece.   
     With Lucrece, the only non-dramatic text under consideration in this dissertation 
and one that Arendt does not appear to have read, I offer a first example from 
Shakespeare of the poetic thinking that she finds so valuable for any examination of 
present political life, a present which is always a concretion of persistent historical 
concepts and thought-trains, and practices.  Lucrece explores the consequences of a 
move away from envisioning freedom as the shared responsibility of citizens who act 
and deliberate in public to an Augustinian model of freedom as freedom of the 
individual will.  Unsurprisingly, Augustine stands behind readings of Lucrece’s rape 
and suicide that dwell on questions of the will rather than on resistance to tyranny.  
Indeed, succeeding interpretations constitute an exemplary case study in Arendt’s 
genealogy of the concept of freedom (Donaldson 55).  Overlaying such accounts of 
Lucretia back onto Republican models of freedom, Shakespeare’s palimpsestic poem 
collects historical fragments from our shared experience of freedom and thereby 
reveals the impoverished nature of the political world we inhabit.    
     Chapter 2, “Homo Faber, Action Hero Manqué: Crafting the State in Coriolanus,” 
follows up the first chapter on political freedom to ask anew the question: what is 




fundamental contradiction that Arendt identifies in classical political philosophy: 
namely, that Plato and Aristotle, who “thought craftsmen not even worthy of full-
fledged citizenship, were the first to propose handling political matters and ruling 
political bodies in the mode of fabrication” (Human Condition 230).  They argued 
that participation in the banausic life, which involved the making of objects for sale 
in the market, should exclude one from citizenship.  Only virtuous political actions 
pursued for their own sake rather than as a means of exchange were worthy of a 
citizen.  In Coriolanus, Menenius gives voice to this perspective and the paradox that 
Arendt identifies when he attacks the plebeians, saying: “You have made fair hands, / 
You and your crafts! you have crafted fair!” (4.6.116-17).  His is the patrician’s 
contempt for craftsmen who would participate in the sphere of political action.  When 
he reduces their action to quotidian crafting, Menenius dismisses the plebeians’ 
attempt to leave the more solitary work of their shops so that they might act in concert 
in the political realm:  “What work’s, my countrymen, in hand? Where go you / With 
bats and clubs?” (1.1.55). 
     Menenius’s metaphorical language echoes the pervasive conceptual “substitution 
of making for acting” that Hannah Arendt identifies in Hellenistic political theory.  
Under Arendt’s tripartite ontology of labor, work, and action, labor is trapped in the 
endless life cycle of production and consumption that sustains bare life; work, the 
process of fabrication that starts with a preexisting eidos in the mind of the craftsman 
and ends with a wholly independent object, is the only human activity that can be said 
to have a definitive beginning and end; and action possesses a beginning but, in its 




that Arendt identifies is the tendency to view the political sphere from the perspective 
of the craftsman, or what she calls homo faber.  When this happens, the fabrication 
process offers an illusory model of control and mastery over the political, and the 
inherent uncertainty of praxis becomes obscured by metaphors of poesis.  The 
Martius who boasts that “Alone I fought in your Corioles walls, / And made what 
work I pleas’d” (1.8.8-9) is the craftsman par excellence, not the action hero he 
envisions himself.  Putatively legitimate political actors become part of a violent 
process of shaping the polis into a preconceived form while actual craftsmen are 
relegated to the making of objects for sale in the market.  The overall effect is to reify 
and thus to reduce our understanding of political action, the spontaneous human 
activity through which new forms of political space unpredictably emerge and are 
sustained. 
     Chapter 3, “Sovereign Fathers and Sovereign Friends in Hamlet,” attends to the 
question: what is political friendship?  In her acceptance speech for the Lessing Prize 
that she was awarded in 1959, Arendt posits friendship as a political category with a 
history that parallels the general fate of politics in modernity.  Unlike the ancients, 
argues Arendt, we moderns “are wont to see friendship solely as a phenomenon of 
intimacy, in which the friends open their hearts to each other unmolested by the world 
and its demands.”   This posture “conforms so well to the basic attitude of the modern 
individual, who in his alienation from the world can truly reveal himself only in 
privacy” (Men in Dark Times 24), and therefore risks losing track of the political 
relevance of friendship: namely, that one’s relatedness to others is determined by the 




     Recent early modern scholarship supports Arendt’s hypothesis while offering a 
more specific historical moment for the emergence of this now predominant mode of 
modern friendship.  When the discourses of ideal friendship in the Renaissance began 
to articulate forms of sovereignty distinct from monarchic rule and patriarchal 
authority, friendship could serve as a bulwark between public and private identities.  
Ideal friendship in the period followed classical precedent in one important regard: 
the friend was understood as “another self.”  Early modern writers supplemented this 
vision of friendship with the epithet “sovereign,” sometimes implying that such 
friendships could even develop their own limited polis and provide an escape from 
the political world of sovereignty.  
     To Hannah Arendt, all forms of sovereignty rely upon a denial of the irreducible 
plurality of public life:  all human action is fundamentally non-sovereign because its 
meaning emerges in the context of boundless language and is inevitably dependent on 
the unpredictable reactions of others.  In this chapter, I read Shakespeare’s Hamlet 
together with Michel de Montaigne’s essay “On Friendship,” exploring the pair of 
texts as essays that enable us to explore with Arendt how modern friendship is both 
symptom and support for notion of the sovereign individual.  As a discourse that 
distinguishes between public, political sovereignty and the private sovereignty of 
friendship, the notion of the sovereign, singular friend also shares with theories of 
political sovereignty an inability to recognize the world of plurality.      
      Chapter 4, “Beyond Shakespeare? Modernity and Thoughtlessness,” considers the 
question: what is political evil? If Arendt viewed Shakespeare as an exemplary 




transformations that have mediated the various regime forms of Western political life, 
she ultimately finds it necessary to look beyond Shakespeare to comprehend the 
bureaucratized, wholesale murder introduced to our world by totalitarianism.  For 
comprehension, Arendt argues, “does not mean denying the outrageous, deducing the 
unprecedented from precedents, or explaining phenomena by such analogies and 
generalities that the impact of reality and the shock of experience are no longer felt” 
(Origins viii).  While my first three chapters argue that Shakespeare was sensitive to 
Arendt’s concept of natality, totalitarianism, itself an unprecedented form of 
government, requires new ways of thinking about the problem of evil. 
     Chapter four, then, relies on Arendt’s personal library, archived at Bard College.  
Her readings in books on Shakespeare and on philosophers who read Shakespeare, as 
well as her epistolary discussions about Shakespeare, forgiveness, and punishment 
with W. H. Auden, enabled Arendt to articulate what she felt were the unprecedented 
characteristics of modern political evil.  Robert C. Pirro, for example, has identified 
Arendt’s critical engagement with Hegel’s theory of Greek tragedy; but Arendt also 
adopts Hegel as a key Shakespearean interlocutor.  Following the Holocaust, Arendt 
felt it was necessary to reevaluate our inherited concepts regarding transgression and 
punishment.  For Hegel, Macbeth is paradigmatic of a “causality of fate” through 
which the transgressor is punished in the very act of deforming an ethical world, 
which itself constitutes the relation of the self to the self as well as of the self toward 
others.  Shakespeare, not Greek tragedy, underwrites Hegel’s notion of modern 
ethical life predicated on an internalization of guilt.  But the problem of conscience in 




reading the contemporary problem of evil through Shakespearean texts.  In a section 
of The Origins of Totalitarianism aptly titled, “A Novel Form of Government,” 
Arendt urgently pleads with her readers to acknowledge the unprecedented nature of 
totalitarianism. She fears that if we rely on the “extraordinarily long-lived” categories 
of regime forms discovered by classical political philosophy, we will mistake 
totalitarianism as merely some “modern form of tyranny,” and so underestimate the 
unique challenges it poses for the possibility of genuine politics in the future (461).  
     Arendt became convinced that totalitarianism’s dual elimination of the public life 
that makes possible a shared world and the private spaces that enable solitary thought 
introduces an urgent need to face the possibility that Shakespeare’s representations of 
evil merely confirm the split between earlier experiences with evil and the 
unprecedented qualities of twentieth-century crimes (crimes that Arendt judged 
beyond the possibility of either punishment or forgiveness).  Totalitarianism’s 
transformation of the prohibition against murder present in all previous lifeworlds 
into an injunction poses a novel challenge.  “Thou shalt not kill” effectively became 
“thou shalt kill” (Eichmann 150).  Like Hegel, Arendt is not concerned with moral 
principles; the danger does not lie in the “bad persons” of philosophical discourse, 
those who could care less about whether or not they have consciences.  A far greater 
problem for modernity lies in what Arendt saw as the dependence of conventional 
morality (moralität) on institutionalized norms (sittlichkeit), which for her turn out to 
be little more than unreflective obedience to legal rules.  For if we lose the capacity to 
think—to quietly reflect on what we are doing so that the conscience is able to do its 




though she relentlessly emphasized the importance of widespread public deliberation 
by free and equal citizens for the possibility of a sustainable political existence, 
Arendt also saw that in a world in which terror and blind obedience to the law 
become the rule, the contemplative life emerges as a paradoxically radical form of 
political action.  For the real challenge in a time when Shakespeare’s vision of evil 
has little explanatory force and we can no longer rely upon the support of traditional 
forms of authority is to find a narrative that, first and foremost fully acknowledes the 





Shakespeare Between Past and Future: 
Political Freedom and the Freedom of the Will 
In her essay, “What is Freedom?” Arendt finds in Shakespeare a fellow pearl-diver, a 
poet apt to discover, collect, and differentiate among the “thought-trains” of various 
historical moments, and then to weigh their political consequences in his own time.  
Arendt is primarily concerned in this essay with what she views as Western 
philosophy’s profound misunderstanding of political freedom.  Utterly neglected by 
Plato and Aristotle despite the central role it played in the political world of the Greek 
polis, freedom did not even appear as a serious topic of philosophical inquiry until 
Augustine.  But under his sponsorship, political freedom was radically transformed 
into a Christian understanding of freedom as freedom of the will (Between Past and 
Future 151). 
      Thus buried at the bottom of our conceptual sea, political freedom was obscured 
from view, becoming irrecoverable as it once existed.  Nevertheless, the freedom of 
the polis subsists in our language, and we therefore can dredge up a story, a memory 
of how freedom understood as individual freedom of the will was derived from the 
experience of freedom that existed in Greek political life:  
….in spite of the great influence the concept of an inner, nonpolitical 
 freedom has exerted upon the tradition of thought, it seems safe to say that 
man would know nothing of inner freedom if he had not first experienced a 




of freedom or  its opposite in the intercourse with others, not in the intercourse 
with ourselves.  Before it became an attribute of thought or a quality of the 
will, freedom was understood to be the free man’s status, which enabled him 
to move, to get away from home, to go out into the world and meet other 
people in word and deed. (Past and Future 148) 
In the Greek polis, freedom was coeval with the opening up of a space in which a 
plurality of actors could encounter one another: “The life of a free man needed the 
presence of others. Freedom itself needed therefore a place where people could come 
together, - the agora, the market-place, or the polis, the political space, proper” (On 
Revolution 31).  But in the world we have inherited, Arendt suggests, this 
interdependence of politics and freedom has become much less obvious.  In reaction 
against totalitarianism and its near eradication of both a public realm of freely acting 
citizens and forms of privacy that the public realm is capable of supporting, the 
unlikely agreement between the absolutist political philosophy of Hobbes and the 
modern liberal democratic belief that politics is “compatible with freedom only 
because and insofar as it guarantees a possible freedom from politics” (Past and 
Future 149) has calcified into a general consensus.
1
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 In his essay “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Isaiah Berlin summarizes this seeming unanimity regarding 
what freedom is: “This is liberty as it has been conceived by liberals in the modern world from the 
days of Erasmus (some would say of Occam) to our own. Every plea for civil liberties and individual 
rights, every protest against exploitation and humiliation, against the encroachment of public authority, 
or the mass hypnosis of custom or organized propaganda, springs from this individualistic, and much 
disputed, conception of man” (200).  In On Revolution, Arendt attempts to disentangle a conflation of 
liberation and freedom.  Freedom of movement, freedom from restraint, coercion, and fear are negative 
forms of freedom; they may be “the results of liberation” but are not “the actual content of freedom” 
(32).  Active participation in public affairs that constitutes and renews the public sphere often goes 
unnoticed during revolutions, but any sustained freedom is only possible through the distinct act of 
forming anew the constitution of a government.  For Arendt, the American revolution supplies the key 
example of this two-fold enterprise: “The men of the eighteenth-century revolutions had a perfect right 
to this lack of clarity; it was in the very nature of their enterprise that they discovered their own 




     The atomistic, individual freedom that characterizes freedom of the will 
contributed mightily to the production of the sovereign individual.
2
  It provided a 
template for the predominant, modern conception of freedom that understands 
individuals to be free only to the extent that they can freely decide about the pursuit 
of their private interests.  Such a perspective preserves absolute individual freedom as 
an ideal, merely tolerating social contracts as necessary evils, security against the 
violence of all against all.  Even worse, it disengages us from the unavoidably plural 
quality of public action that sets into motion, modifies, and sustains the institutions 
and laws which themselves delimit the spaces where both public as well as private 
freedom are possible.  It effectively conceals from us the reality that political life 
depends upon a form of freedom whose defining feature is the ability to begin 
something new in the presence of others: 
The idea that freedom is identical with beginning, or again, to use the Kantian 
 term, with spontaneity, seems strange to us because, according to our tradition 
of conceptual thought and its categories, freedom is equated with freedom of 
the will, and we understand freedom of the will to be a choice between givens 
or, to put it crudely, between good and evil.  We do not see freedom as simply 
                                                                                                                                           
liberation. For the acts and deeds which liberation demanded from them threw them into public 
business, where, intentionally or more often unexpectedly, they began to constitute that space of 
appearances where freedom can unfold its charms and become a visible, tangible reality. Since they 
were not in the least prepared for these charms, they could hardly be expected to be fully aware of the 
new phenomenon. It was nothing less than the weight of the entire Christian tradition which prevented 
them from owning up to the rather obvious fact that they were enjoying what they were doing far 
beyond the call of duty” (33). 
2
 In her dissertation (Love and Saint Augustine), Arendt discusses the tendency of the Christian 
tradition since Augustine to put forward the sovereign individual as an ideal: “To the extent that 
Augustine, when speaking of the quest for and the love of the self, thinks in terms of the ideal of 
autarchy and self-sufficiency, he cannot but arrive at an ideal of absolute isolation and independence of 
the individual from everything ‘outside’ this self over which the self has no power.  And this ‘outside’ 
includes not only my ‘neighbors’ but also my own body.  This is an alienation from the world, which is 





wanting this or that to be changed in some way or other. (Promise of Politics 
113) 
Every newcomer who steps onto the political stage possesses the ability to initiate an 
unforeseeable series of events.  In the Greek word archein, to lead as well as to begin, 
Arendt finds the best evidence for her conviction that in the Greek political world, 
freedom of action was synonymous with beginning.  And among the Romans, too, 
freedom was linked with beginning through their memory of the city’s founding, ab 
urbe condita (126) [“from the founding of the city”].  For Arendt, Hamlet’s words, 
“The time is out of joint; O cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it right!” speak 
to the capacity for free action on the part of newcomers who are always interrupting 
the existing political scene as they step into it with their novel perspectives, taking up 
the identity of citizens when they act alongside and in concert with others (192).
3
   
     Supplied with historical and dramatic exemplars though we are, this experience of 
political freedom is, nevertheless, the rarest of phenomena.  In places where it once 
existed and subsequently evaporated, as in the collapse of republicanism in ancient 
Rome, the notion of an inner freedom may have served as a nostalgic substitute for it:   
This freedom which we take for granted in all political theory and which even 
those who praise tyranny must still take into account is the very opposite of 
“inner freedom,” the inward space in which men may escape external coercion 
and feel free.  The inner feeling remains without outer manifestations and 
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 In “The Crisis in Education,” Arendt finds a nihilistic quality in the overriding, conservative tradition 
of political thought that has tried to inoculate itself against the unpredictable quality of action. This 
perspective, “which accepts the world as it is, striving only to preserve the status quo[,] can only lead 
to destruction, because the world, in gross and in detail, is irrevocably delivered up to the ruin of time 
unless human beings are determined to intervene, to alter, to create what is new” (192).  In response, 
she once again offers Hamlet's words, which she claims “are more or less true for every new 
generation, although since the beginning of our century they have perhaps acquired a more persuasive 




hence by definition is politically irrelevant.  Whatever its legitimacy may be, 
and however eloquently it may have been described in late antiquity, it is 
historically a late phenomenon, and it was originally the result of an 
estrangement from the world in which worldly experiences were transformed 
into experiences within one’s own self. (146) 
Arendt thus associates the supercession of political freedom by freedom of the will 
with a sense of loss, with the privation of the public world that depends upon action 
for its renewal.  Arendt’s meditations on the concept of the will in Love and St. 
Augustine, in the essay “What is Freedom?” and in The Life of the Mind, all identify 
Augustine as the first thinker to make freedom a primary focus of philosophy.  
Because the Greek philosophy of Plato and Parmenides resolutely opposed the 
contemplative life to the freedom of the bios politikos, freedom could only enter this 
history of philosophy once Christianity, and Paul in particular, had discovered a form 
of freedom divorced from politics.  Arendt links the Stoic thought of Epictetus with 
the pre-Augustinian emergence of this conceptual translation of the freedom among 
citizens actively participating in politics into an inner freedom from politics.  The 
individual self, content to redefine freedom as freedom from desire, appeared to offer 
an effective bulwark against the “obvious decline of freedom in the late Roman 
Empire” (147).  By the time Augustine addressed the problem of the freedom of the 
will, then, a significant effort to dissociate freedom from politics was already 
underway. 
      Positing freedom from desire as the highest form of freedom, Augustine couples 




for an agent free from corporeal desire.  Here political freedom is understood as but 
another instance of cupiditas, the desire to "hold fast to things that can be called ours 
only for a time" (27).   And it must be subordinated to the freedom of the will, “quae 
quidem nulla vera est nisi beatorum et legi aeternae adherentium” (1.15.32.109) 
[“which is genuine only if it belongs to happy people who adhere to the eternal law” 
(27)].
4
  In this context, being deprived of freedom is understood not as banishment 
from the public political realm of action but, rather, as enslavement to individual 
desire: “For this very thing did I sigh, bound as I was, not by another’s irons but by 
my own iron will” (Confessions 188).  Seen through this lens, freedom comes under 
the purview of the individual moral agent, not the citizen, and the mark of freedom 
becomes self-sufficiency and sovereignty over one's moral actions. 
     If Augustine's inner freedom of the will adopts elements from Stoic thought, his 
more novel contemplation of the experience “I will” but “I cannot” reveals a 
disjunction that was largely unexplored in the classical Greek and Roman tradition 
prior to Christianity: a disjunction between the knowledge of the good and the will to 
perform it.  In his Confessions, Augustine explores this “will which is broken in 
itself” (Between Past and Future 159) that follows the logic of command-and-obey: 
imperat animus, ut velit animus, nec alter est nec facit tamen.  unde hoc 
monstrum? et quare istuc?  imperat, inquam, ut velit, qui non imperaret, nisi 
vellet, et non facit quod imperat.  sed non ex toto vult: non ergo ex toto 
imperat.  nam in tantum imperat, in quantum vult, et in tantum non fit quod 
imperat, in quantum non vult, quoniam voluntas imperat, ut sit voluntas, nec 
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 Augustine’s Latin text of De libero arbitrio is taken from Corpus christianorum series latina 29.   




alia, sed ipsa.  non itaque plena imperat; ideo non est, quod imperat.  nam si 
plena esset, nec imperaret, ut esset, quia iam esset. (Confessions 448)  
 
Mind commands mind to will: there is no difference here, but it does not do 
so.  Whence comes this monstrous state?  Why should it be?  I say that it 
commands itself to will a thing: it would not give this command unless it 
willed it, and yet it does not do what it wills. 
     It does not will it in its entirety: for this reason it does not give this 
command in its entirety.  For it commands a thing only insofar as it wills it, 
and in so far as what it commands is not done, to that extent it does not will it.  
For the will commands that there be a will, and that this be itself, and not 
something else.  But the complete will does not give the command, and 
therefore what it commands is not in being.  For if it were a complete will, it 
would not command it to be, since the thing would already be in being. 
(Confessions 197, emphasis mine).
5
 
While Arendt admits that Augustine’s phenomenological exploration of the will 
illuminated many of the paradoxes of human volition, she also emphasizes the 
consequences of identifying human freedom with the capacity or incapacity to will 
one existing choice among others.  Philosophy’s debilitating transposition of freedom 
from an arena of politics to “an inward domain of the will, where it would be open to 
self-inspection,” obscures rather than illuminates the experience of freedom as a 
phenomenon that exists only among a plurality of political actors (145).  About this, 
                                                 
5
 Augustine’s Latin text is taken from the Loeb Classical Library edition.   The English translation is 




Arendt is unequivocal: freedom “as related to politics is not a phenomenon of the 
will.” (Between Past and Future (151).        
     In Part 2 of “What Is Freedom?”, where Arendt sets out to recover what she argues 
has been repressed from classical notions of freedom, she turns not to classical 
sources but to Shakespeare, identifying two different conceptions of freedom in 
Richard III and Julius Caesar.  Before examining this direct appropriation of 
Shakespeare’s plays, however, it will be helpful to explore Arendt’s consideration of 
the historical relationship between freedom of the will and political freedom 
alongside Shakespeare’s Rape of Lucrece, a poem which anticipates Arendt’s 
diagnosis that our political fate in the modern world arises in part from the conceptual 
occlusion of political freedom by freedom of the will.   Shakespeare’s most 
comprehensive and subtle reflection on these two interrelated but ultimately opposed 
notions of human freedom, Lucrece constellates historical fragments from our shared 
experience of freedom to reveal the impoverished nature of the modern political 
world we inhabit.   
      
Re-finding Political Freedom in The Rape of Lucrece 
     Although a longstanding tradition of criticism discourages political readings of 
Lucrece, Annabel Patterson has disabused us of the notion that the poem deliberately 
avoids the subject of political revolution that is patently adumbrated by the myth of 
Lucrece.
6
  Even as she depreciates a critical tradition invested in “denying the 
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 For instance, a number of studies dispute Shakespeare’s role in the composition of the poem’s 
Argument; in particular, see James M. Tolbert, “The Argument to Shakespeare’s ‘Lucrece’: Its Sources 
and Authorship,” University of Texas Studies in English 29 (1950): 77-90, and Heather Dubrow, “The 




presence, let alone the dominance, of a republican thematics” in the poem, Patterson 
admits that Lucrece pushes Brutus to the periphery and focuses instead on Tarquin’s 
infected will.  She contends, however, that this meditation on freedom of the will is 
merely a “smoake of words,” a way to escape censorship.  But this feint hardly 
evacuates the poem of its anti-monarchic sentiments, which are rooted in Livy’s 
account of the Republican government that formed following Lucrece’s suicide 
(Reading Between the Lines 297).  After all, the “Argument” that frames the poem 
establishes tyrannical rule as its political context: Lucius Tarquinius was not king by 
election or by birth, but "contrary to the Roman laws and customs, not requiring or 
staying for the people’s suffrages, [he] had possessed himself of the kingdom" after 
murdering his father-in-law (1-5).  Patterson thus successfully extracts a political 
reading from the poem, but curiously, she dismisses the poem’s first 855 lines as 
“primarily psychological and rhetorical filler” (297).
7
    
     Ian Donaldson’s account of the poem, vulnerable though it may be to Patterson’s 
attack on apolitical readings, pays attention to the conceptually palimpsestic qualities 
of the poem that she ignores.  For instance, Donaldson observes how Lucrece shifts 
between Roman and Christian perspectives on the question of Lucrece's suicide 
without definitively prescribing one or the other: "It is as though Shakespeare had 
begun to Christianize the old story, begun to question in an Augustinian fashion the 
logic and wisdom of its central actions" (56).  Both of these readings, then, draw 
attention to the imposition of the largely Christian concept of freedom of the will onto 
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 See “What delays the reader for 855 lines is primarily psychological and rhetorical filler—along with 
twenty-nine stanzas devoted to an ecphrastic account of a painting of the siege of Troy and Lucrece’s 
meditation on the poem while she awaits her husband’s return” (297).  Patterson writes of the 
“shimmering superficiality” of the poem’s inquiry into Tarquin’s will.  I judge this material to be 




the ancient Roman story of Lucrece's rape and the founding of the Roman republic.  
But Patterson, in particular, underestimates the ways the poem’s peripheral 
Republicanism raises questions about our ability to experience and understand 
political freedom due to the emphasis philosophers have placed on individual 
freedom, an emphasis exemplified by the poem’s extended consideration of the 
freedom of the will. 
     When Shakespeare palimpsestically overlays Christian notions of moral freedom 
onto the myth of the founding of the Roman Republic, he calls attention to 
philosophy’s conceptual occlusion of political freedom by freedom of the will.   At 
the same time, the narrative trajectory of the poem—which begins with the private, 
individual considerations of conscience and revenge but ends with Lucrece’s 
individual will toward revenge being transmuted, malgré elle, into the new political 
community of the Roman Republic—hints at a possible recuperation of political 
action in spite of its historical eclipse.
8
  Lucrece thus makes a notable contribution to 
political philosophy by exploring the consequences of the historical shift from a 
classical Roman view of freedom (in which freedom was the collective responsibility 
of a body of politically active citizens) to a post-Augustinian focus on freedom as the 
freedom (or bondage) of the individual will.  The interpretative history of the myth of 
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 According to Arendt, the American Revolution contained a renewal of political freedom in precisely 
this sense.  While it was subsequently hampered by a longstanding anti-political tradition that favored 
the made constitution over the uncertainty of political action, the principle that inspired it relied on a 
“hitherto almost unknown emphasis on public freedom, an indication that they understood something 
very different from the free will or free thought the philosophers had known and discussed since 
Augustine.  Their public freedom was not an inner realm into which men might escape at will from the 
pressures of the world, nor was it the liberum arbitrium which makes the will choose between 
alternatives.  Freedom for them could exist only in public; it was a tangible, worldly reality, something 
created by men to be enjoyed by men rather than a gift or a capacity, it was the man-made public space 
or market-place which antiquity had known as the area where freedom appears and becomes visible to 




Lucrece was particularly suited to this exploration, as a story about political 
revolution turned into a story about the freedom of the will.   
     Shakespeare’s poem emphasizes this shift by extending the scope of Augustine’s 
exploration of the problem of the will.  The consideration of Lucrece and the question 
of her suicide in The City of God is supplemented in Shakespeare, who dwells as well 
upon Tarquin and his will to commit the crime of rape.  Livy, Shakespeare's chief 
source, gives us a Tarquin whose intention to rape Lucrece is untroubled by any inner 
resistance to the crime:  “Ubi exceptus benign ab ignaris consilii cust post cenam in 
hospitale cubiculum deductus esset, amore ardens, postquam satis tuta circa sopitque 
omnes videbantur, strict gladio ad dormientem Lucretiam” (200) [“He was graciously 
received by a household unaware of his purpose.  After supper he was led to the guest 
bedroom.  Burning with passion, once he saw that it was safe all around and everyone 
was asleep, he drew his sword and went to the sleeping Lucretia” (80)].
9
  Here, the 
few, uneventful moments of solitude that precede the rape of Lucretia are merely 
implied.  In Shakespeare’s poem, they become the subject of an exhaustive 
investigation into the problem of the will. In lines 127-735, Shakespeare’s Tarquin, 
caught “Tween frozen conscience and hot burning will” (246-47), better recalls  the 
“hot contention” of the soul that Augustine describes in his Confessions than the 
Tarquin in Livy who is more straight-forwardly “amore ardens” [“[b]urning with 
passion”].  
       According to Augustine it is in the condition of solitude that the problem of the 
will is most manifest.  Describing Augustine’s position, Arendt writes that “willing in 
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solitude is always velle and nolle, to will and not to will at the same time” (158).  
Lucrece's Tarquin exemplifies this division in the will when he contemplates rape; his 
“troubled mind" (126) and sleeplessness are symptomatic of the paralysis of the will 
experienced in solitude: 
As one of which doth Tarquin lie revolving 
 The sundry dangers of his will’s obtaining; 
 Yet ever to obtain his will resolving, 
 Though weak-built hopes persuade him to abstaining. (127-30) 
Generating its own counter-will, the will is split and, from the Pauline perspective, in 
need of being made whole.  But Shakespeare, like Augustine, allows no resolution for 
this will divided against itself.  "Madly tossed between desire and dread" (171), 
Tarquin both wills and does not will the rape he intends.   
     The poem represents the temporal logic of extended internal argument and 
counter-argument (“Had Collatinus killed my son or sire…But as he is my kinsman 
my dear friend, / The shame and fault finds no end” [232-38]) collapsing into the near 
simultaneity of phenomenal willing and nilling: “Hateful it is: there is no hate in 
loving. / I’ll beg her love: but she is not her own” (240-41).  Even as Tarquin 
advances toward Lucrece's chamber, he commands himself, and struggles with, but 
does not completely overcome the internal resistance to what he sets out to 
accomplish: 
Honest fear, bewitch'd with lust's foul charm, 
Doth too too oft betake him to retire, 




Despite these vacillations, Tarquin associates the possession of a sovereign, unified 
will with a virile masculinity ("My will is strong, past reason's weak removing" 
[243]) that eliminates debate from the theater of the mind:  “Then childish fear 
avaunt, debating die! / Respect and reason wait on wrinkled age!...My part is youth, 
and beats these from the stage” (274-78).  This assertive pep talk, a blustering attempt 
to banish second-guessing from the period of full manhood to the periphery of 
childhood and dotage, merely reaffirms the uncanniness of a will that is stubbornly 
multiple.  Even while he speaks to Lucrece just prior to the rape, Tarquin admits that 
he has deliberated about whether or not to commit the crime ("debated even in my 
soul” [498]) and claims that he has reached an unequivocal decision to perform it 
("nothing can affection's course control" [500]).  Still, all that he can finally assert is 
that he will "strive to embrace” his act and its consequences (“mine infamy” [504]).  
He cannot claim to be in possession of the unified will he desires.    
     Such attempts to silence the will that is at odds with itself may appear to be an 
individual struggle.  The aspiration toward self-sovereignty, however, also serves as 
an exemplar for the politics of sovereignty that pervades the poem. Whenever 
mastery of one over the many seems the only possible framework for action, the 
coexistence of a plurality of individual performers has little conceptual space in 
which to develop.  Unable to eradicate the nilling that accompanies his willing, 
Tarquin habitually projects the internal conflict of his will onto external objects.  
Standing between Tarquin and the rape he wills, for example, stands “each unwilling 
portal” (309).  Just as these obstacles give way to him, so too, he imagines, will 




enforced this desire / So Lucrece must I force to my desire" (181-82). But even as he 
moves past them, they unsympathetically recall the force of his divided will:  
The locks between her chamber and his will  
Each one by him enforced, retires his ward; 
But as they open they all rate his ill, 
Which drives the creeping thief to some regard. (302-05) 
Tarquin, then, externalizes the conflict of the will by imaginatively substituting the 
external world and Lucrece for the resistant other within.  The fantasy of her rape 
metamorphoses into a fantasy of self-mastery, a vain hope that rape can temporarily 
unify his will: "thou with patience must my will abide— / My will that marks thee for 
my earth's delight'” (486–87).   
     Lucrece, quite the contrary, laments the rape as a loss of sovereign will in a fallen 
world.  As early as Love and Saint Augustine, Arendt argues that the only model in 
Christianity of an agent in whom will and power are never at odds is the creator (87).  
By way of comparison with the creator, the individual encounters an ontological lack 
in itself through the experience of its broken will.  God’s law works through the 
operation of the individual conscience.  But as Arendt and Lucrece both testify, 
insofar as the will needs to command itself if it is to follow the dictates of conscience, 
it is ineluctably split between the will that wills and the will that is nilled.  God’s law 
thus represents both an external commandment and the will’s congenital incapacity to 
obey its infinite obligation (89).   
     Lucrece’s ideological attachment to monarchic rule depends upon the possibility 




Responding to Tarquin's aggression, Lucrece holds onto this hope that the sovereign 
can couple will with power and be absolutely self-governed: “Thou seem’st not what 
thou art, a god, a king; / For kings like gods should govern everything" (601-02). She 
consequently suffers from the inevitable disappointment of any vision of politics in 
which the sovereign must be both creature and creator. 
     Thus, while Tarquin's desires emerge from a concept of the sovereign self that 
freely imposes its arbitrary will upon others, Lucrece's vision of freedom depends on 
a different but related theory of the sovereign self.  Tarquin, who wants to rule over 
others, attempts to unify his broken will by representing its internal split as a split 
between the self and others; for her part, Lucrece wants Taquin to resolve his will into 
a unity by means of self-control and virtuous action.  He must rule over himself 
absolutely as a prerequisite to ruling over others: "Hast thou command? By him that 
gave it thee, / From a pure heart command thy rebel will” (624-25).  Disturbed by the 
constitutively broken will, Lucrece, like Tarquin, relies on sovereign control over 
inner dissension for the possibility of freedom: “So shall these slaves [evils] be king, 
and thou their slave, / Thou, nobly base; they, basely dignified” (659-60).  “It must 
appear strange indeed,” writes Arendt, “that the faculty of the will whose essential 
activity consists in dictate and command should be the harborer of freedom” (145).  
Whether understood from Tarquin's perspective as performing what one wishes 
without the intervention or consent of others, or from Lucrece's, as having the 
capacity to act free from an enslavement to individual desire, critical examination of 
the political forms of government that are undergirded by  notions of sovereignty 




     Such, at least, is Arendt's diagnosis of the problem: 
Politically, this identification of freedom with sovereignty is perhaps the most 
pernicious and dangerous consequence of the philosophical equation of 
freedom and free will.  For it leads either to a denial of human freedom—
namely, if it is realized that whatever men may be, they are never sovereign—
or to the insight that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic can 
be purchased only at the price of freedom, i.e., the sovereignty of all others.  
Within the conceptual framework of traditional philosophy, it is indeed very 
difficult to understand how freedom and non-sovereignty can exist together 
or, to put it another way, how freedom could have been given to men under 
the condition of non-sovereignty.  Actually it is as unrealistic to deny freedom 
because of the fact of human non-sovereignty as it is dangerous to believe that 
one can be free—as an individual or  as a group—only if he is sovereign. 
(Past and Future 164) 
Arendt's genealogy of the concept of freedom articulates the historical problem that 
Shakespeare's Lucrece probes.  When the problem of the freedom of the will is 
translated into the domain of political theory as a model for freedom there are "fatal 
consequences" for our ability to think about political life: “it was one of the causes 
why even today we almost automatically equate power with oppression or, at least, 
with rule over others” (162).  When philosophical thought shifted from “action to 
will-power, from freedom as a state of being manifest in action to the liberum 
arbitrium, the ideal of freedom ceased to be virtuosity in the sense we mentioned 




eventually prevailing against them” (Between Past and Future 163).  So it is that 
following her rape, Lucrece, like “the poor frighted deer that stands to gaze, / Wildly 
determining which way to fly,” seems to be limited to the liberum arbitrium of her 
attacker, a freedom that is a freedom of choice between two alternatives: “To live or 
die which of the twain were better, / When life is sham’d and death reproach’s 
debtor” (1154-55).   
     Augustine's significant reconceptualization of human freedom coincides with his 
equally decisive intervention in the interpretative history of the rape of Lucrece.  
Lucrece’s claim that her violated chastity required her suicide had gone largely 
unchallenged in the early Christian tradition prior to Augustine.  As a woman who 
valued her chastity above her life, she was most often considered a heroic martyr 
(Donaldson 25-27).  Augustine’s meditations on the freedom of the will led him to 
question this perspective.   
          Suicide, according to Augustine, is generally imagined by those who attempt it 
as a pathway to a freedom from the conflicted will that characterizes earthly 
existence: “Inquietudo enim uariat affections ut altera alteram perimat, quies autem 
habet constantium in qua maxime intelligitur quod dicitur Est” (3.8.23.83) [‘Being 
unsettled makes our emotions vacillate so that one destroys another. Peace, however, 
has the constancy in which we best understand what is called “being”’ (90)].  Respite 
from the conflict of the will is available only through the same grace that represents 
the highest possibility for any creature of God.  Suicide inevitably misfires because, 
despite its announced goal to achieve nothingness, its true aim is the attainment of 




Omnes itaque ille appetitus in voluntate mortis non ut qui moritur non sit sed 
ut requiescat intenditur.  Ita cum errore credit non se futurum, natura tamen 
quietus esse, hoc est, magis esse desiderat. Quapropter sicut nullo pacto fieri 
potest ut non esse aliquem libeat, ita, nullo pacto fieri oportet ut ex eo quod 
est quisque bonitati creatoris ingrates sit. (3.8.23.83) 
 
Thus, the whole of his pursuit in the wish for death is not meant so that the 
person who dies is not, but rather so that he is at rest.  Thus, although he 
believes in error that he is not going to be, he still desires by nature to be at 
peace, that is, to be to a greater extent.  Consequently, just as it cannot happen 
that anyone take delight in not being, so too it ought not happen that anayone 
be ungrateful to the good-ness of the Creator for the fact that he is. (90) 
Resembling Freud’s notion of the death drive, the desire for suicide according to 
Augustine emerges out of a desire to be most fully, leaving the earthly condition of 
the conflicted will behind. 
     In the case of Lucrece, Augustine questions the justifications for her self-inflicted 
death.  If her own will did not consent to the rape, if instead another’s will was 
imposed upon her, her virtue remained intact: “Quocirca proposito animi permanente, 
per quod etiam corpus sanctificari meruit, nec ipsi corpori aufert sanctitatem violentia 
libidinis alienae, quam servat perseverantia continentiae suae” (80) [“while the 
mind’s resolve endures, which gives the body its claim to chastity, the violence of 






  In short, Lucrece should not be admired for being unwilling to bear the 
public scrutiny of those who might not believe her innocence; the inner freedom from 
the pangs of conscience that the possibility of grace affords should have been 
sufficient to bolster a virtuous woman against self-murder (30).  Freedom, when 
understood as the freedom of the will, cannot be violated by the actions of external 
agents.     
     But Shakespeare’s palimpsestic Lucrece gives us a Lucrece who seems already to 
have read the Bishop of Hippo’s interpretation of her rape.  Upon first informing 
Collatine, she communicates her sense of the enduring subjection she faces following 
what happened in her bed: “From that (alas) thy Lucrece is not free” (1624).  This 
Lucrece next pleads that the men take Augustine’s position in order to persuade her 
that she is “free” from blame:   
 'O, teach me how to make mine own excuse! 
 Or at the least this refuge let me find; 
 Though my gross blood be stain'd with this abuse, 
 Immaculate and spotless is my mind; 
 That was not forc'd; that never was inclin'd 
 To accessary yieldings, but still pure 
 Doth in her poison'd closet yet endure.’ (1653-59) 
 …. 
 ‘May my pure mind with the foul act dispense, 
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 The Latin text is taken from the Loeb Classical Library edition; the English translation is from Henry 
Bettenson’s Penguin Edition.  Augustine seems to be elaborating here upon Lucrece’s own suggestion 
in Livy that hints at the possibility of including intention as part of the context for evaluating events: 
“ceterum corpus est tantum violatum, animus insons; mors testis erit” (202) [“But only my body has 




 My low-declined honour to advance? 
 May any terms acquit me from this chance? 
 The poison'd fountain clears itself again; 
 And why not I from this compelled stain?’ (1704-08) 
Ultimately, however, the Roman men’s affirmation of her sovereign, inner freedom 
(“With this, they all at once began to say, / Her body's stain her mind untainted 
clears” [1709-10]) is not enough to convince Lucrece who, committed to ending her 
life, “with a joyless smile… turns away” (1711).  But unlike Livy’s Lucrece, who 
commits suicide without any such protracted consideration regarding the inner 
domain of the will, Shakespeare’s fully considers and then rejects Augustine’s claim 
that inner freedom is sufficient.  She herself understands her rape to have bound her 
and Tarquin together irrevocably.  And she believes that his will still holds sway: 
“He, he, fair lords, ‘tis he / That guides this hand to give this wound to me” (1721-
22).  Rejecting the sovereignty of an inner will, she does not thereby manage to 
escape the suffocating framework of freedom understood as freedom of the will. 
          As a textual construction, Lucrece is herself a constellation of freedoms, a “rich 
and strange” pearl that Shakespeare brings to the surface so that his readers may 
explore the transformations to which history and political philosophy have subjected 
freedom.  As a representative woman in pre-Republican Rome, she embodies a 
female subjectivity deprived of freedom in a public, political space.  But this 
perception of her is unsettled by the history of Christian male subjectivity that 
suffuses the poem, and that she seems to harbor within herself when she responds to 




historic phases: first, the expulsion of Tarquin and the opening up of a public space of 
freedom in the Roman Republic; second, the contraction of this public sphere and a 
shift of emphasis away from public freedom to inner, Stoical freedom in the late 
Roman Republic; and finally, the emergence of the Augustinian  belief in the primacy 
of the freedom of the will.  As we have seen, the narrative telos of the poem, which 
centers on the political founding of the Republic, is sharply at odds with the rhetorical 
arguments posed within it.  Yet the layering of Lucrece’s pre-Republican female 
subjectivity with the early modern male subjectivity that she ventriloquizes (the one 
that sets aside public freedom for freedom of the will) also suggests certain affinities 
between them.   
     Understandably unable to imagine a form of political freedom that might exist 
through the creation of a space where she could act and speak in public among fellow 
citizens, and, following her rape, no longer able to find freedom in an internal, 
individual freedom of the will, she externalizes her will through suicide and revenge 
in what we should recognize as the poem’s final gesture toward the notion of a 
sovereign will.  In Lucrece’s representation of Lucrece’s state of mind as she begins 
to write, Shakespeare again taps into Augustine’s keen observations on the 
phenomenological experience of the broken will:   
 Her maid is gone, and she prepares to write,  
 First hovering o'er the paper with her quill.  
 Conceit and grief an eager combat fight;  
 What wit sets down is blotted straight with will;  




 Much like a press of people at a door,  
 Throng her inventions, which shall go before. (1296-1302) 
As we have seen, Tarquin imagines his struggle to perform the rape as a mortal 
combat between sovereign will and reason, and the narrative voice’s variation on this 
theme reads it the same way (“'Tween frozen conscience and hot-burning will" [246-
47]).  But the above stanza reminds us that in Augustine’s account of the will, its 
constitutive split does not depend upon the distinction between a good will and a bad 
one, between mind and will, or flesh and mind.  The conflict of the will manifests 
itself in any volitional move toward any action, even when all the alternatives before 
one’s mind appear good:  “quid? si ergo pariter delectent omnia simulque uno 
tempore, nonne diversae voluntates distendunt cor hominis, dum deliberatur, quid 
potissimum arripiamus? et omnes bonae sunt et certant secum, donec el eligatur 
unum, quo feriatur tota voluntas una, quae in plures dividebatur” (Confessions 454) 
[“If, therefore, all these offer delight at one and the same time, do not diverse wills 
perplex a man’s heart while it deliberates which thing we would seize upon before all 
others?  All of them are good, but all strive with one another, until one is chosen, and 
there is fixed upon it a single complete will, whereas it had been divided into many 
wills” (199)].  Likewise, the simile in Lucrece, “a press of people at the door,” 
emphasizes the moment of suspense that is characteristic of the deliberative capacity 
of the mind simultaneously to entertain contradictory perspectives.  Drawing on a 
passage from Duns Scotus, Arendt describes the experience that precedes the writing 




Will always wills and nills at the same time: [but] the mental activity in this case does 
not exclude its opposite” (Life of the Mind 102).  
     Understood in this way, writing as selection among an infinite variety of 
necessarily competing possibilities might seem to be the exemplary model for the 
form of freedom that Arendt wants to resurface, for what she describes as “the 
freedom to call something into being which did not exist before” (98 Between Past 
and Future).  But because Lucrece's only model of freedom, Tarquin's sovereign will, 
operates within the constraints of the individual freedom of the will, her vision of the 
relation between author and world continues to mirror Tarquin’s view of sovereign 
action.
11
  As Amy Greenstadt has suggested, Lucrece participates in a cultural fantasy 
emerging at the time that the author could determine the meaning of the works they 
sent into the world (46).
12
   Once she moves to externalize her individual will, her 
rhetorical maneuvers are designed to control the reactions of others and direct them 
toward predetermined ends: first to have them “clear her / From that suspicion which 
the world might bear her” (1320-21) and then, to revenge her rape with the death of 
Tarquin.   
     When we act, Arendt suggests, we always act among a plurality: “Since action acts 
upon beings who are capable of their own actions, reaction, apart from being a 
response, is always a new action that strikes out on its own and affects others.  Thus 
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 Donaldson notes that other versions of the myth, particularly those from the visual arts, depict 
Lucretia’s response to her rape as an “act which in some ways resembles, mocks, and counters the act 
that Tarquin himself has performed” (12).  Shakespeare makes this connection explicit. 
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 Greenstadt writes: “By drawing on the ideal of female chastity, Lucrece constructs a fantasy of 
authorship developing in this period—namely, the idea that the author's intentions or ‘will’ could 
condition the ultimate meaning and reception of his work.  While critics generally view ‘the Author’ 
that emerged in early modern England as inherently masculine, Lucrece instead suggests the ways that 
this figure—and, by extension, ideas of the modern individual—developed through an identification 




action and reaction among men never move in a closed circle and can never be 
reliably confined to two partners" (Human Condition 190).  Lucrece, like Tarquin, 
seems unable to acknowledge this; while she may solicit the aid of others, she intends 
that they merely act as the executors of a sovereign will that she alone will leave 
behind:  “This brief abridgement of my will I make” (1198).  According to Arendt, 
action that is free is not bounded by means-end rationality; unlike violence that 
transforms human beings into material that can be used for pre-scripted ends, action 
inspires the subsequent actions of other actors but never determines them.  
Prescribing the reaction that she desires (“Myself thy friend will kill myself thy foe, / 
And for my sake serve thou false Tarquin so” [1196-97]), Lucrece strives to confine 
her action to an economy of exchange between her attacker and herself, to a violent 
revenge inflicted upon him for her rape.   
     What Arendt ultimately tries to recover in “What is Freedom” and The Life of the 
Mind is a form of freedom that is not contained by the question of the freedom of the 
will, and Shakespeare's plays, as we will see, have a role to play in this recovery.  
Even though Lucrece deals primarily with the occlusion of alternate forms of freedom 
by freedom of the will and sovereign notions of action, it too explores the curious 
non-sovereign qualities of action that frustrate the aspiration toward a sovereign will. 
Lucrece’s assumption that she can become the sole author of a sovereign, meaning-
making will is undermined by the poem’s intimation about the structure of action. 
Shakespeare, like Arendt, understands that insofar as our actions emerge into a world 
of other actors who may interpret and react to what we do, they are programmatically 




letter she composes to transmit her will, she also expresses fears that it will be 
inadequate to this task, and therefore plans upon Collatine’s arrival to supplement her 
words with theatrical performance: “…the life and feeling of her passion / She 
hoards, to spend when he is by to hear her” (1317-18). 
     Subject to unanticipated consequences and the reactions of others as we are, what 
then can we know about the meaning of our actions and our role in the world?  For 
Arendt, “the perplexity is that in any series of events that together form a story with a 
unique meaning we can at best isolate the agent who set the whole process into 
motion” (The Human Condition 185).  Lucrece does not allow the reader to do even 
this with much confidence.  While Lucrece may intend to impose a sovereign 
authorial will, revenge itself is always reactive and necessarily a response to the 
perception of at least one other actor’s prior offense.  In Arendt’s estimation, while an 
“agent frequently remains the subject, the ‘hero’ of the story, we can never point 
unequivocally to him as the author of the eventual outcome” (The Human Condition 
185).  When the Roman men set out to “publish Tarquin’s foul offense” (1852), we 
are left with the irresolvable question whether what they “publish” is their authorial 
work, or Tarquin’s, or Lucrece’s.  If what they make public is Lucrece’s legacy alone, 
an imprint of her sovereign will, why do the Roman men suddenly elect to banish 
Tarquin rather than to murder him?  Since the poem provides no explanatory 
commentary, the reader is left to grapple with the disjunction between Lucrece’s will 





     And yet, this disconnection between intention and result points up another 
observation of Arendt’s—that if actions are “weak” in one sense, they are curiously 
powerful in another.  Insofar as they have the ability to inspire future actions and to 
set into motion a series of events, they can tear asunder established boundaries and 
conventions.  Even an action that may initially seem utterly insignificant “bears the 
seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, and sometimes one word, suffices 
to change every constellation” (Human Condition 190).  From this perspective, 
Lucrece does both more and less than she intends.   
     We see this when we consider the additional interpretive complications raised by 
the poem’s subtle treatment of the political consequences of Lucrece’s rape.  
Following Lucrece’s suicide, Lucretius and Collatinus enter into a kind of rivalry in 
grief, each claiming to suffer more than the other from the loss of Lucrece:  “The one 
doth call her his, the other his, / Yet neither may possess the claim they lay”  (1793-
94).  When Brutus interrupts this display of aristocratic “emulation” (1808) by 
plucking “the knife from Lucrece’s side” (1807), his very involvement broadens the 
number and type of perspectives that are brought to bear on the matter of Lucrece’s 
rape, extracting it from the private concerns of familial honor to claim it as an event 
exemplary of “abominations” that presently affect all Romans (1832).  According to 
Brutus, “Rome herself in them doth stand disgraced” (1833).  Urging that such crimes 
must, as a general principle, be “from forth her fair streets chased” (1834), he recalls 
the otherwise disconnected commentary in the poem's Argument about the violation 
of popular consent that Tarquinius Superbus’ rise to power entailed.  Brutus seems 




argues for the same form of revenge but claims it as his own: “Thy wretched wife 
mistook the matter so / To slay herself that should have slain her foe” (1826-27).  
Advocating that they act to preserve “all our country rights in Rome” (1838), Brutus 
gains the support of the other noblemen present, who vow along with him to support 
this course of action. 
     And yet, in this ever-expanding circle of actors, Brutus’ call to action, like 
Lucrece’s will before it, gives way in the final stanza to others heretofore unseen or 
heard: 
 When they had sworn to this advised doom, 
 They did conclude to bear dead Lucrece thence, 
 To show her bleeding body thorough Rome, 
 And so to publish Tarquin’s foul offence; 
 Which being done, with speedy diligence, 
 The Romans plausibly did give consent, 
 To Tarquins’s everlasting banishment. (1849-55) 
Reading that this indeterminate but presumably larger group of “Romans,” having 
learned of the rape through the “show” of Lucrece’s “bleeding body,” has “give[n] 
consent, / To Tarquins’ everlasting banishment,” we must be struck by what they 
have not given consent to:  his death.  Here again, the poem suggests that freedom of 
action in a public space, while often initiated by an individual, can never, except 
under conditions of tyranny, be a matter of individual will.  The very question of the 
freedom of the will, which had hitherto monopolized the poem’s consideration of 




freedom that gains strength when the individual acts of agents are mediated and 
redirected by those of others.  And so if what Lucrece performed in calling for 
revenge cannot be called properly political because it relied on the freedom of the will 
as its paradigm, nevertheless it may have paved the way for the political action to 
come.  The poem’s final words—“everlasting banishment”—recall the Argument’s 
framing of the poem as one in which a new political paradigm will be set into motion: 
the result of the people’s actions is that “the state government changed from kings to 
consuls” (41-42).  In its final lines, then, the poem moves decisively away from its 
focus on revenge and sovereign will to action oriented by a principle of mutual 
consent, and to publically inspired action that can be the foundation of something 
new.   
     As I have tried to argue, critics of Shakespeare’s Lucrece have identified, on the 
one hand, the juxtaposition in the poem of classical with Christian contexts and 
concepts, and on the other, the political, Republican resonances of its framing 
devices.  Reading the poem through Arendt enables us to see the relation between 
these two elements, to see how the poem enacts the conceptual constellation of 
freedom we have inherited, and how it shares Arendt’s concern for the influence that 
Western philosophical discourse has had on our ability to think about political 
matters.  Ending as it does with a movement toward Republican freedom, the poem 
also suggests that we moderns have lost sight of something, something the figures in 
the poem do not quite realize that they hope to gain.  Because the historically prior 
world of the poem subsequently has been saturated with our own perspectives on 




legacy of freedom at the very moment when we read that the Republic is being 
founded. 
 
Beyond the Liberum Arbitrium in Julius Caesar 
      Having explored in the first part of “What is Freedom?” the history of 
philosophical thought that had unraveled any meaningful connection between 
freedom and politics, Arendt turns to Shakespearean drama as a “non-philosophical” 
register that allows her to articulate the experience of freedom, not as “an attribute of 
the will but an accessory of doing and acting” (165).  As I will explore in more detail 
in the next chapter, Arendt diagnoses the work of seventeenth-century philosophers 
like Thomas Hobbes as symptomatic of the eclipse of political action in modern 
thought.  In Shakespeare, however, Arendt finds a historical thinker who preserves 
the cultural memory of political action as well as the conceptual distinctions she 
wants to make visible: 
We deal here not with the liberum arbitrium, a freedom of choice that 
arbitrates and decides between two given things, one good and one evil, and 
whose choice is predetermined by motive which has only to be argued to start 
its operation—“And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover, / To entertain 
these fair well-spoken days, / I am determined to prove a villain, / And hate 
the idle pleasures of these days.”  Rather it is, to remain with Shakespeare, the 
freedom of Brutus: “That this shall be or we will fall for it,” that is, the 
freedom to call something into being which did not exist before, which was 




therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known.  Action, to be free, must be 
free from motive on one side, from its intended goal as a predictable effect on 
the other. This is not to say that motives and aims are not important factors in 
every single act, but they are not its determining factors, and action is free to 
the extent that it is able to transcend them. (151)    
Unlike the individual will, which is impelled by motives or goals, the freedom to 
begin something new among others that Arendt identifies in Julius Caesar instead 
"springs from" principles.
13
  Without an understanding of what Arendt means by 
principle, however, it certainly appears difficult to accept the argument that Brutus 
can so readily be contrasted with Richard III on the grounds that he is free from both 
motive and goal.  When Brutus concludes that “it must be by his death” (2.1.10) and 
then moves toward Caesar’s assassination, does he not begin the pursuit of something 
like a goal?   
Arendt’s theory of political principles can only be grasped through wider 
exploration of her corpus, but already in “What is Freedom?” she elaborates on the 
concept, using Shakespeare as a guide.  Unlike the freedom of Richard III, who 
affirms “in his intercourse with himself” (160) the choices he wills, actions inspired 
by principle, as I will explore shortly, do not emerge from “‘within the self as motives 
do—‘mine own deformity’ or my ‘fair proportion’—but inspire, as it were from 
without” (152).  The opening lines of Richard III highlight as well a related problem 
that Arendt raises in “What is Freedom?”  It is the same problem that modern 
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psychology confronts when it evaluates freedom from the perspective of individual 
motive, again from the framework of the individual will.  From the perspective of the 
agent, an individual may experience what she performs as freely chosen, but when 
she takes on the perspective of an external observer, that same individual may come 
to see her actions as forced moves, inevitable; even though individual motives may be 
less open to inspection than other phenomena because of the enormity of possible 
factors at play, they too appear to be just as determined as free (144-45).  Richard III 
underscores this irresolvable aporia regarding individual freedom almost as soon as 
its protagonist, who is the only Shakespearean character to begin a play with a 
soliloquy, enters “solus”—alone.  When Richard explains that his natural conditions 
at birth—the physical deformities that he claims make him ill-suited for peace-time 
recreations—have left him “determined to prove a villain,” he insinuates that his 
Machiavellian role-playing is freely chosen.  But as a host of critics have suggested, it 
is equally possible to read these lines ironically, and to locate other underlying 
causes—whether physiological, psychological, or divinely inspired will—that have 
motivated, and thus “determined,” Richard’s actions behind his back, as it were.
14
   
     However it is that he is “determined,” Richard does not demonstrate the capacity 
to experience the freedom of beginning anew, a freedom that necessarily requires 
inspiration “from without”: a concern for a public world that will outlast the 
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  Thus whatever his will-to-power leads him to perform cannot be 
understood in terms of political principles.
16
 As Arendt writes elsewhere, political 
principles like "(f)ear, honor, and virtue are not merely psychological motives, but are 
the deep convictions of a community of individuals that establish relations between 
them and serve as the criteria according to which all public life is led and judged” 
(Essays in Understanding 331-32).  One fundamental distinction between individual 
motive and principle is that while motives require no audience, principles inspire 
inter-subjectively oriented actions that rely on others to judge them, remember them, 
and reclaim them through future action.  Much like objects judged beautiful in Kant’s 
aesthetic theory, principles can only ever make their appearance through particular 
examples, by revealing themselves through exemplary individual actions.  Unlike 
motive, principles thus must appear to others in order to have any reality at all.  And 
because they appear in and through action, there can be no exhaustive list of 
principles; with the capacity to begin something new, agents conjure novel principles 
alongside the political communities they enact.    As appearances, principles make 
claims to a universality that can never be exhausted by the satisfaction of desires (as 
with motives), or even by the actions through which they manifest themselves; acts 
inspired by them disclose a world stage that can be erected anew by subsequent 
actors, even when dislocated by historical moment or individual condition.  It is this 
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self-revealing characteristic of political principles that makes them one of the most 
recognizable phenomena of shared political experiences.   
     Of concern to Arendt is that modern analyses of political action have been unduly 
concerned with what remains individual and ultimately invisible about an actor’s 
motive at the expense of what action discloses (a principle) when it enters into the 
public world.  In On Revolution, she writes:    
To be sure, every deed has its motives as it has its goal and its principle; but 
the act itself, though it proclaims its goal and makes manifest its principle, 
does not reveal the innermost motivation of the agent. His motives remain 
dark, they do not shine but are hidden not only from others but, most of the 
time, from himself, from his self-inspection, as well. Hence, the search for 
motives, the demand that everybody display in public his innermost 
motivation, since it actually demands the impossible, transforms all actors into 
hypocrites; the moment the display of motives begins, hypocrisy begins to 
poison all human relations…In politics, more than anywhere else, we have no 
possibility of distinguishing between being and appearance. In the realm of 
human affairs, being and appearance are indeed one and the same. (On 
Revolution 98) 
The distinctions that Arendt makes here between the indeterminate in motive and the 
apparent in principle will help to elucidate what is at stake when she claims in “What 
is Freedom” that Brutus' actions are inspired by principle.  When Arendt asserts that 
actions inspired by principle must be free from both motive and goal, she is not 




of a political action, its meaning will necessarily exceed any particular goal or 
motive; the generality of principles and the actions they inspire establish or renew 
relations between individuals, a fact that frustrates interpretations of such actions 
which are solely based either on the individual motive that impels it or on the 
successful achievement of any goal that orients it in a particular instance.  Arendt’s 
concern is that it is precisely the ubiquity of individual motives, and the role they play 
in nearly all human actions (both those inspired by principle and those that are not) 
that so promotes aggressive investigation of them.  This tendency, however, both in 
Shakespearean criticism and in everyday life, attempts to make visible what is most 
inscrutable about an action, and does so at the cost of ignoring, or at best placing 
under a preemptive hermeneutics of suspicion, the most apparent feature of actions 
inspired by care for the common world: principle.  While Arendt may have overstated 
her claim about the examination of motives “transforming all actors into hypocrites,” 
she rightly suggests that under such scrutiny, all agents fall under at least the 
suspicion of hypocrisy.   
     In Arendt’s personal copy of Shakespearean Tragedy, we find evidence (in the 
form of underlining and marginal notes), that her attention was drawn to A. C. 
Bradley’s discussion of the pervasive “motive-hunting” that Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
had identified in Iago (182-84); Arendt’s familiarity with these suggestive remarks 
indicates that her phrase the “search for motives” in On Revolution may thus be tied 
more closely to Shakespearean criticism than might at first appear.
17
  And indeed, 
Iago does present an interesting portrait of an agent whose motives for action are 
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overdetermined and therefore to a large degree opaque, even (or especially) to 
himself, just as Arendt describes.  We might briefly recall the catalog of self-
diagnosed motivations that Iago articulates over the course of the play:  resentment at 
having been passed over for promotion, despite his superior military experience 
(1.1.7-32); xenophobia, against Othello (his “Moorship” [1.1.32]) and Cassio the 
“Florentine” (1.1.19); revulsion at Othello’s military and romantic successes (1.1.32, 
88-91, 110-16); and a belief that Othello has made him a cuckold (“I hate the Moor, / 
And it is thought abroad that ’twixt my sheets / He’s done my office” [1.3.375-9]; 
“For that I do suspect the lusty Moor / Hath leapt into my seat” [2.1.286-87]).
18
  This 
darkness of motive proves irresolvable; neither Iago, nor literary critics can provide 
any definitive interpretation.  As for principles, with Iago, as with Richard III, it never 
occurs to us to inquire whether he is oriented by principles that seek to establish, 
protect, or augment a common world: such principles simply do not appear.   
With Shakespeare’s Brutus, however, the situation is manifestly different, 
declaring as he does his intent and principles to the conspirators, who are the only 
representatives of plurality that the contracted public world of Julius Caesar makes 
available to him.  The features of this orientation toward a public world that 
distinguish it from motive and which Arendt finds in Brutus remain largely 
unexamined, and her reading cuts against the grain of much criticism of the play.  In 
his essay, "Julius Caesar and the Mystery of Motive," David Lucking supplies a case 
study of the very "search for motives" that Arendt cautions against, writing: "As is 
only to be expected in a work that is so deeply interested in the ambiguities of 
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political action, discrepancies between real and professed motives, between covert 
intention and overt justification, are evidenced in a number of personages who 
conceal personal or caste interests beneath a veneer of public commitment" (120).  
Like Arendt, Lucking tells us that the opacity of Brutus’ motivations guarantees that 
the "determinants of human action can ever truly be grasped at all."  But Lucking 
does not distinguish between principle and motive; that Brutus might be inspired by 
Republican principle is for Lucking merely one possible motive among others (122).  
When we conflate political principle with individual motives in this way, Arendt 
argues, we deprive the phenomenon of action that is inspired by principle (and 
consequent sustainable forms of political freedom) of the attention that it merits.  
     Because they concentrate on Brutus’ self-examination of his motives, critics often 
discount his identification of political principles entirely.  His claim that “I know no 
personal cause to spurn at him / But for the general.  He would be crowned…” 
(2.1.11-12) is taken as cover for some other, unacknowledged and deeply personal 
motivation for murdering Caesar.  And because Caesar has not yet done the things 
Brutus fears he might (“So Caesar may. / Then, lest he may, prevent” [2.1.27-28]), it 
follows that Brutus is merely fulfilling Cicero’s observation that “men may construe 
things after their fashion / Clean from the purpose of the things themselves” (1.3.34-
35).  But if Brutus does not articulate the specific effects that Caesar’s actions and the 
actions of those who support him have already had on the Roman political world, 
others in the play do.  Regarding his ever increasing influence, Cassius asserts that 
Caesar “doth bestride the narrow world / Like a colossus” and that, as a consequence, 




Walk under his huge legs and peep about / To find ourselves dishonorable graves” 
(1.2.134-37).  Cassius’ concerns correspond with those of the historical Cicero, who 
asked, “Quae causa justior est belli gerendi, quam servitutis depulsio?  In qua etiamsi 
non sit molestus dominus, tamen est miserrimum posse si velit.  Immo aliae causae 
justae, haec necessaria est” (Philippic VIII.iv.12) [“What juster reason is there for the 
waging of war than to repel slavery? A condition in which, though your master may 
not be oppressive, yet it is a wretched thing he should have the power to be so if he 
will.  Nay, other causes are just, but this is necessary”].
19
  The fact that Caesar has the 
formal or informal ability to encroach on the freedom of others is already a sufficient 
condition for concluding that the public freedom of all citizens has contracted.        
     Arendt would be the first to admit that Brutus and Cassius may well have personal 
histories that play a role in their affective responses to Caesar’s rise to power.  This, 
however, does not prevent them from articulating the consequences his ascendancy 
has had for the shared world they inhabit or from acting on the basis of political 
principles that transcend individual motive.
20
  Certainly, a mere espousal of principles 
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offers no guarantee against hypocrisy, against the possibility that the agent may 
incorrectly judge the correlation of a principle with a particular goal, or that the 
principle will not ultimately be hijacked by incompatible motives.  But attendant 
individual desires do not necessarily strip principle of all meaning or significance. To 
better understand this, as well as how Arendt explores principle through 
Shakespeare’s plays, requires a more thorough understanding of what she means by 
political principle. 
     In “On the Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding,” Arendt 
connects her notion of political principle with that of Montesquieu, who makes a 
distinction in his L’Espirit de Lois between the laws that constitute various forms of 
government (the constitutional framework of a republic that grants sovereign power 
to the people, the lawlessness of tyranny that reduces politics to the whims of a single 
person’s will) and the principles that inspire the actions of citizens and so set into 
motion and sustain those same forms of government (Essays in Understanding 330).
21
  
While Arendt clearly does not agree with Montesquieu that a fixed number of 
political principles exist, since she believes that action can introduce entirely new 
principles into the world, she does take from him the notion that certain forms of 
action are undertaken for the sake of a principle that then guides the selection of aims 
and goals.  Arendt writes that in the case of republics, for example, the “fundamental 
experience upon which republican laws are founded and from which the action of its 
citizens springs is the experience of living together with and belonging to a group of 
equally powerful men…the common ground of republican law is thus the insight that 
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human power is not primarily limited by some superior power, God or nature, but by 
the powers of one’s equals” (336).  In Shakespeare’s play, Caesar’s conception of his 
own individual sovereignty flatly contradicts this principle.  He acknowledges that 
just as there are many stars in the heavens, so the world “‘tis furnished well with 
men” (3.1.66); but he is loath to permit this cosmic analogy to foster a vision of 
Republican plurality.  Caesar admits of only “one / That unassailable holds on his 
rank / Unshaked of motion” (3.1.68-70).  As he puts it, “I am constant as the northern 
star, / Of whose true-fixed and resting quality / There is no fellow in the firmament” 
(3.1.62, emphasis mine).     
     When Flavius, however, urges Murellus near the beginning of the play that he “Let 
no images / Be hung with Caesar’s trophies,” he is enlisting the aid of a fellow citizen 
to preserve the principle of equality, a principle that cuts across patrician and plebeian 
lines to define the Roman republic (1.1.68-69).  This rather desperate symbolic 
gesture is overshadowed by a deeper anxiety about the material support of the Roman 
people, the “vulgar” who lift up Caesar.  Flavius wants to pluck the “growing 
feathers… from Caesar’s wing” to “make him fly an ordinary pitch, / Who else would 
soar above the view of men / And keep us all in servile fearfulness” (1.1.73-76); but 
he does not appear to expect popular support for this.  He implies that if the 
governing principle of republican law (its “spirit,” in Montesquieu’s parlance) that set 
the republic into motion and sustains the public space of equality ceases to be the 
predominant inspiration for the actions of the citizenry, another form of government 
will arise in which actions are inspired by entirely different principles.  In any form of 




specific criteria of behavior are no longer held valid, the political institutions 
themselves are jeopardized” (Essays in Understanding 332).  And when subsequently 
and without warning we learn from Casca that “Marullus and Flavius, for pulling 
scarfs off Caesar's images, are put to silence” (1.2.285), we are confronted with the  
dangers of operating according to marginal principles, that is, according to principles 
belonging to a form of government whose institutions have all but evaporated.
22
        
    As the political experience of the patricians in Julius Caesar tilts away from 
republic and toward tyranny, fear, an emotion that Montesquieu thought characteristic 
of the governing principle that inspires action under tyranny, accompanies 
anticipation of the loss of the Roman republic.  Yet “[f]ear as a principle of action is 
in some sense a contradiction in terms,” Arendt concludes, “because fear is precisely 
despair over the impossibility of action” (Essays in Understanding 337).  And the 
thirty-nine appearances of the word fear in Julius Caesar signal not only the subjects’ 
fear of a tyrant but also that tyrant’s fear of his subjects.  Not just Flavius’ 
premonition of the “servile fearfulness” to which they will all be subjected or Brutus’ 
“fear” that “the people / Choose Caesar for their king” (1.2-78-79) but also Caesar’s 
own misgivings contribute to the play’s atmosphere of apprehension.  At the same 
time that he denies that he is subject to the impulses of fear—“I rather tell thee what 
is to be feared / Than what I fear: for always I am Caesar” (1.2.210-11), he assures 
Marc Antony—Caesar revealingly identifies what the object of his fear would be, if 
he were to be afraid: “I fear him not: / Yet if my name were liable to fear / I do not 
know the man I should avoid / So soon as that spare Cassius” (1.2.197-98).        
                                                 
22




     Pervasive fear compels citizens to retreat from a public space into individual, 
depoliticized private life, generating, according to Arendt, “that anxiety which we 
experience in situations of complete loneliness” (Essay in Understanding 336).  As 
Andrew Hadfield points out, there is “no shared public culture” in the play; the 
characters in Julius Caesar are separated out into “small groups whispering secrets to 
each other” (171).  The political world presented in Julius Caesar is thus one in 
which the space where a plurality of actors had the ability to encounter one another 
has been eclipsed by the specter of tyranny.        
     Brutus begins the play among a crowd of Romans, yet he remains alone.  When 
Cassius criticizes him for his recent neglect of their friendship, Brutus hints at his 
private struggle with matters of public import: “I turn the trouble of my countenance / 
Merely upon myself” (1.2.39-40).  In an attempt to draw him out of this inwardly 
directed disposition, Cassius asks, “Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?” 
(1.2.51).  When Brutus responds that “the eye cannot see itself” (1.2.52), he elicits 
confirmation of finitude from Cassius (“’Tis just”), who then offers up the judgment 
of others as the only pathway to something like self-knowledge.  Isolated as he is, 
Brutus does not realize the value others place on his political friendship and 
leadership.  Unseen others—“such mirrors / As will turn your hidden worthiness into 
your eye / That you might see your shadow” (1.2.56-57)—lament that Brutus forgoes 
their judgment.  Unlike Richard III, whose “delight” it is “to see my shadow in the 
sun and decant on mine own deformity” (1.1.26-27), and whose identity is formed 




“groaning underneath’s this age’s yoke” (1.2.61), men who are the “mirrors” (1.2.56) 
and “glass” (1.2.68) that would enable him to see his own “shadow” (1.2.58).   
     The contrast between the individual freedom of the will articulated by Richard III 
and the capacity for the sort of freedom Arendt identifies in Brutus depends on the 
absence of others in the first case and their presence in the second.  The private 
deliberations of the Roman conspiracy, unlike the solitary dialogue with the self in 
Richard III, are symptomatic of the recent foreclosure of the space for public 
deliberation.  Principled action is planned in the private space of Brutus’ house that 
the conspiracy claims for itself as a substitute for the nearly defunct “Senate-house.”  
Yet while the two passages Arendt cites from Richard III and Julius Caesar represent 
fundamentally different conceptions of action, their contextual similarity—both are 
spoken in private spaces—brings into closer proximity the two-in-one of the 
individual will and the condition of the conspirators who have been deprived of a 
public venue for their grievances.   
          Indeed, moments before the other conspirators arrive at his home, Brutus 
himself suffers from the vicissitudes of the isolated mind contemplating a course of 
action but caught in the “interim” when:   
 The genius and the moral instruments 
 Are then in council, and the state of man, 
 Like to a little kingdom, suffers then 
 The nature of an insurrection. (2.1.66-69)  
The moment he is joined by others, all this is forgotten. The social technology of 




and nilling of inward life into the normative force of speech that implicitly keeps the 
presence of others in mind.  In contrast to the opacity of motives that frustrates 
interpretation of the self by the self and by others, promising is transparently identity-
forming and -declaring: to promise to do and then to perform are constitutive social 
acts that produce a public self and acknowledge the need for others.           
     While the conspirators briefly consider bringing Cicero into their enterprise 
because his reputation would lend legitimacy to their enterprise (“It shall be said his 
judgment ruled our hands” [2.1.145]), Brutus rejects the suggestion, emphasizing 
Cicero’s inability to “follow any thing/ That other men begin” (2.1.150-51).  As 
Arendt argues in The Human Condition, the capacity to act alongside others provides 
the only possibility for non-sovereign freedom, the only escape from the logic of 
freedom understood as the freedom of the sovereign will to control the self or to 
dominate others: 
Man's inability to rely upon himself or to have complete faith in himself 
(which is the same thing) is the price human beings pay for freedom; and the 
impossibility of remaining unique masters of what they do, of knowing its 
consequences and relying upon the future, is the price they pay for plurality 
and reality, for the joy of inhabiting together with others a world whose reality 
is guaranteed for each by the presence of all. The function of the faculty of 
promising is to master this two-fold darkness of human affairs and is, as such, 
the only alternative to a mastery which relies on domination of one's self and 
rule over others; it corresponds exactly to the existence of a freedom which 




If the passage from Julius Caesar to which Arendt refers (“That this shall be or we 
will fall for it”) exemplifies the freedom to act in concert and to set in motion a 
renewed political life, the condition of possibility for that freedom is understood not 
only by Arendt, but by Brutus as well, to be the ability to promise.  And whenever 
Arendt speaks of promising, she means committing to a political principle.  Such 
commitments do not require the successful achievement of a particular goal to retain 
their validity, although committing to a principle does require actions that are 
oriented by the pursuit of goals.   
     Hence, when Brutus insists that the conspirators forgo swearing a religious oath 
that would commit them to the assassination they intend, he points to a more general 
“promise” (2.1.139) that must have a binding force if what they will do is to have any 
lasting meaning.  To make an oath would carry with it the assumption that they are 
atomized individuals who need to be compelled through fear of external retribution to 
lay aside private desires and motivations:
23
   
            …What other bond 
Than secret Romans, that have spoke the word, 
And will not palter? and what other oath 
Than honesty to honesty engaged, 
That this shall be, or we will fall for it? (2.1.123-27) 
This last line, seized upon by Arendt to represent political freedom, arises in a context 
that assumes citizens are constituted by underlying political promises and actions that 
are a fulfillment of them.  Such promises subtend individual identity and 
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  When Brutus asks, “What need we any other spur but our own cause / 
To prick us to redress?” (2.1.122-23), he (like Arendt) implies that political promises 
“spring from” a shared principle.  If their mutual political experiences, what they 
witness in others (“the face of men” [2.1.113]) and among themselves (“the 
sufferance of our souls” [2.1.114]), are not sufficient testimony that the principle of 
republican virtue is fundamentally threatened (“the time’s abuse” [2.1.114]), and if 
they do not commit themselves to action with those experiences in mind, then even if 
they succeed, the form of political life they claim to support can have no lasting 
future.  If they have not internalized Republican virtue such that oath-making has 
become superfluous, they might as well “break off betimes, / And every man hence to 
his idle bed; / So let high-sighted tyranny range on, / Till each man drop by lottery” 
(2.1.115-18).  This conclusion is drawn by the character in play that has been most 
evidently affected by the destabilization of Roman political life and the inward retreat 
into individual psychic life that it has promoted in him.  The failure of republican 
virtue and the rise of tyranny are two symptoms of an underlying antipolitical 
tendency driving the subject toward the soporific isolation of private life.  
     Unlike the individual will, adept at setting and pursuing goals, principles “are 
much too general to prescribe particular goals, although every particular aim can be 
judged in light of its principle once the act has been started” (Between Past and 
Future 152).  Yet this very generality is the source of principled action’s 
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characteristic power.  Recall for a moment the “weak” quality of action so evident in 
Lucrece: all action enters an already existing world of improvising actors, a fact that 
frustrates the attempts of a solitary will to achieve anything enduring in the political 
world on its own, much less through a single act.  But Brutus also hints at the 
curiously “strong” quality of action that has been inspired by principle; it is never 
exhausted by a particular act and can be recalled as a promise, a “spur” (2.1.122) for 
future action: 
Shall Rome stand under one man's awe? What, Rome? 
My ancestors did from the streets of Rome 
The Tarquin drive, when he was call'd a king. 
'Speak, strike, redress!' Am I entreated 
To speak and strike? O Rome, I make thee promise: 
If the redress will follow, thou receivest 
Thy full petition at the hand of Brutus! (2.1.152-58) 
Calling to mind the foundation of the Roman republic that frames 
Shakespeare’s narrative poem, Brutus promises to act according to a principle whose 
beginning, its principium, he traces to actions that first founded the political space of 
the republic.  For the freedom to begin something new is also the freedom to begin 
anew: it can never be about “absolute beginnings” but is an attempt to “restart time in 
an inexorable time continuum (Life of the Mind, II 213-14).  As a way of highlighting 
the structural conundrum posed by political beginnings, Arendt attends to the Roman 
myth of foundation, Aeneas’ journey from a conquered Troy to found the city of 




freedom would not be the automatic result of liberation, that the end of the old is not 
necessarily the beginning the new” (Life of the Mind, II 204).  Founding for Arendt is 
always in some way to re-found, to repeat in Kierkegaard’s distinctive sense as 
repetition-with-a-difference (149).
25
  As John Caputo writes: “To repeat is to produce 
and to alter, to make and to make anew.  Repetition is a principle of irrepressible 
creativity and novelty; it would be impossible to repeat without making and without 
altering what is already made.  Even to repeat ‘exactly the same thing’ is to repeat it 
in a new context which gives it a new sense” (142).  Characteristically reusable, then, 
political action not only creates but cultivates a collective space for further action 
when those who inhabit it continue to act in accordance with the principles that 
established it.  And as others enter the political scene, Arendt suggests, principles 
allow for and require continued reinterpretation regarding how one should act to 
fulfill them.   
     But given the ultimate failure of the conspirators to restore any kind of meaningful 
public freedom, we might be mystified by Arendt’s citation from Julius Caesar and 
even begin to wonder whether principles really do supply a sufficient intersubjective 
substrate for action from which a political world could emerge.  In her own 
discussion of Arendt’s reading of Julius Caesar, Suzanne Smith objects that because 
Arendt’s vision of action attempts to purge it of means-ends rationality entirely, it 
leaves little room for the necessarily practical aims of political life: “One could argue 
that nothing less than an abject failure to achieve instrumental goals would suffice by 
way of indicating the lofty disdain for success that Arendt sees as characteristic of 
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free political action” (273).  Ironically, the failure of the conspirators, contra Smith, 
has more to do with their resurrecting a sovereign, instrumentalist view of action (this 
time in a collective incarnation) than with relinquishing such a view.  As we have 
seen, because the background conditions for free action were no longer in place, the 
conspirators concluded that they had few alternatives to violent rebellion.   
The danger with acts of violence is that they often become ends in themselves 
when actors attempt to achieve with finality the principle that inspires them.  Our first 
hint in Julius Caesar that violent overthrow might be viewed not as the beginning but 
as the end of publically spirited action occurs when Brutus promises to oppose Caesar 
upon condition of a successful outcome: “O Rome! I make thee promise, / If the 
redress will follow, thou receives / Thy full petition at the hand of Brutus!” (2.1.56-
58).  His misunderstanding is detectable in the analogy he makes between one’s 
internal state during a  moment of decision  (“Between the acting of a dreadful thing / 
And the first motion” (2.1.63-64)—a “little kingdom” of contending forces—and a 
political “insurrection.”  Although Shakespeare uses this moment to show the 
distinction between willing alone and the promising among others that follows hard 
after, we might also infer from these lines that Brutus never escapes entirely from the 
logic of the sovereign will.  A Stoic philosophy of individual self-mastery that 
prefigures the Christian freedom of the will governs his view that the public freedom 
of the Republic somehow hinges on his action alone, on his inner freedom to unify 
the multiplicity of inner wills into a sovereign act of violence.   
          In the play, Brutus argues that Antony should be spared because what the 




how political promises commit them to act in opposition to the principle, or “spirit,” 
of Caesarism, he confuses the principle with the person, with a single will that can be 
eliminated through violence.  According to this view, Antony is a mere appendage of 
Caesar’s will rather than an agent who is himself capable of acting and of reacting; he 
“can do no more than Caesar’s arm / When Caesar’s head is off” (2.1.181-82).
26
  In 
the corresponding passage in North’s Plutarch, Brutus recognizes how an action can 
serve as an exemplar of principle in precisely the way Arendt imagines.  This Brutus 
hopes that Antony, in the absence of Caesar, will take up their cause and “willingly 
help his country to recover her liberty, having them an example unto him to follow 
their courage and virtue” (125).  And here Brutus seems to recognize that their 
actions offer merely the possibility of Republican freedom, its conditio sine qua non, 
rather than its conditio per quam, its foundation (Life of the Mind, II 208).   
What Shakespeare stages in Julius Caesar is a movement toward freedom that 
does not account for the chasm between the freedom to begin something new and the 
constitution of a sustained public freedom.  The fundamental problem with the 
conspirators’ perspective in Julius Caesar is that they conflate two terms: liberation 
and freedom.  Immediately following Caesar’s death their cries are celebratory 
(“Liberty! Freedom! Tyranny is dead!” [3.1.78]; “Some to the common pulpits and 
cry out / Liberty, freedom, and enfranchisement” [3.1.80-81]), suggesting that they 
have achieved directly—through a single, liberating act of violence—political 
freedom.  Yet notwithstanding the transactional metaphor Brutus deploys to suggest 
the final eradication of tyranny (“Ambition’s debt is paid” [3.1.83]), political freedom 
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argues “implies a theory of Caesarism—that, since everything depends on one man, when he goes his 




can be lasting only if it is continually reconstituted through action and 
institutionalization that is consistent with its originating principle. 
Rather than urge the Romans to reinitiate the constitution of a common world 
by restoring the institutional life that supported the Republic, the post-assassination 
conspirators deploy rhetoric of self-exculpation.  And while the Senate is mentioned 
several times in the first half of the play, ironically it is Caesar who last invokes it—
and then only as a kind of personal possession (“Are we all ready? What is now amiss 
/ That Caesar and his senate must redress?” [3.1.31-32]).  With Caesar’s murder, the 
Senate-house empties; the next time the Senate is even  peripherally invoked, it is 
when we learn “That by proscription and bills of outlawry / Octavius, Antony, and 
Lepidus / Have put to death an hundred senators (4.2.225-27).  Rather than restoring 
the Republic, the conspirators merely reinforce the loss of institutional life that has 
already transpired. 
What Shakespeare suggests to us is that the “spirit” of Caesar that Brutus 
dismisses as the will of a single individual is instead its own inspiring pseudo-
principle, which in the absence of any durable Republican institutions will continue, 
post-Caesar, to inspire the actions of others.  When Antony subsequently recurs to the 
word “spirit,” he suggests not only his own independence as an individual agent who 
can act according to the principle of Caesarism, but also the non-coincidence of 








Here again theatrical performance serves as an apt metaphor for the freedom 
that emerges through public, political action.  The performance of freedom, like the 
performance of a play, requires actors and a performance space, and it lasts only as 
long as the action itself.  Absent reincarnation in the bodies of succeeding actors, it 
will disappear from the world stage.  Recalling how the experience of writing in 
Shakespeare’s Rape of Lucrece articulates the fantasy of a sovereign, authorial will, 
we are now in a better position to understand the potential risk of analogizing the 
polis with a non-dramatic work of art:      
In the sense of the creative arts, which bring forth something tangible and 
reify human thought to such an extent that the produced thing possesses an 
existence of its own, politics is the exact opposite of an art—which 
incidentally does not mean that it is a science.  Political institutions, no matter 
how well or how badly designed, depend for their continued existence upon 
acting men; their conservation is achieved by the same means that brought 
them into being.  Independent existence marks the work of art as a product of 
making; utter dependence upon further acts to keep it in existence marks the 
state as a product of action. (Past and Future 153) 
That political freedom depends upon future performers is precisely what the 
conspirators fail to recognize.  Rather than conceive of how they might inspire others 
to act in the name of freedom according to Republican principle, they instead predict 
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how their deeds will be commemorated on the playhouse stage (“How many ages 
hence / Shall this our lofty scene be acted over / In states unborn and accents yet 
unknown? [3.1.111-13]) in remembrance of what they judge will be a lasting 
achievement of freedom (“So often shall the knot of us be called / The men who gave 
their country liberty” [3.1.118-19]).  Inspired by principle the conspirators may be, 
but they nevertheless succumb to the temptation to understand revolution from the 
perspective of means-ends rationality. Compared to spectacular acts of rebellion, the 
work of constituting and fostering the principle that inspired them—through laws, 
institutions, and quotidian civic practices—can seem tedious, non-urgent, and even 
reactionary or conservative. 
If, like the conspirators, we fail to distinguish liberty from freedom, then we 
risk blurring the distinction between tyranny and Republicanism.  René Girard, who 
reads Julius Caesar in light of his mimetic theory of tragedy, contends that rather 
than differentiating itself from Caesarism, Republicanism merely emerges in the play 
as its reactionary double.  Exemplified by the mimetic envy Cassius evinces toward 
Caesar, aristocratic emulation encourages rather than prevents the unraveling of the 
Republic (110).  Wayne Rebhorn has similarly argued that Shakespeare’s play levies 
greater responsibility for the reduction of shared political space and the ascendancy of 
absolutist regime forms on a widespread aristocratic will-to-power than on the 
individual figures of Caesar, Antony, and Octavius (107).  There is much merit in 
these arguments, yet if we consider the principled pact that Brutus and the 
conspirators make (to begin anew the promise that an earlier Brutus set into motion) 




hypocritical, Republican garb—we may miss how Shakespeare’s play is also a study 
in the phenomenon of promises and principles that are the precondition for an 
institutional life capable of fostering future action consistent with the experience of 
public freedom.   
Any single action might for a while open up a space for freedom but never 
secure it.  Principles, unlike motives, align with the weak character of action in that 
they never seek out ends in any final sense of the term.  Jacques Derrida, who draws 
an inspiration similar to Arendt from Hamlet’s sense that the time is “out of joint,” 
supports this view when he writes in Specters of Marx of the infinite promise of 
democracy, of what he refuses to call a future democracy but only a “démocratie á 
venir” (143) [“democracy to come” (81)].    Actions that advance a principle are 
subject to programmatic failure, not only because of their non-sovereignty in a world 
of plural actors but also because no particular action can ever fulfill the “infinite 
promise” that political principles harbor.  Nevertheless, even when actors fail to 
recognize the danger of attempting to “set things right” once and for all, their 
principled action becomes an inheritance that obligates all of us with a call to 
respond: 
Même si elle n'a pas été tenue, du moins sous la forme de son énonciation, 
même si elle s'est précipitée vers le présent d'un contenu ontologique, une 
promesse messianique d'un type nouveau aura imprimé une marque 
inaugurale et unique dans l'histoire. Et que nous le voulions ou non, quelque 
conscience que nous en ayons, nous ne pouvons pas ne pas en être les 





A messianic promise, even if it was not fulfilled, at least in the form in which 
it was uttered, even if it rushed headlong toward an ontological content, will 
have imprinted an inaugural and unique mark in history.  And whether we like 
it or not, whatever consciousness we have of it, we cannot be its heirs. There 
is no inheritance without a call to responsibility. (115)   
 In Julius Caesar, Arendt finds in Brutus’ words the quality of political freedom that 
has the power to establish and maintain a world when he recalls the foundation of the 
republic and commits himself to the “promise” of restoring it.  It is his unfortunate 
equation of violence with political action, his pursuit of the “ontological content” of 
the Republic by violence alone, that resurrects a sovereign, albeit collective, will, 
pitting the Roman conspirators against the individual will of Caesar.   
At the same time, and notwithstanding this durability of political principles, it 
would also appear that promises and the individual acts they inspire are not sufficient 
to support a lasting space for freedom.  Certainly, reading Arendt’s early essay “What 
is Freedom?” alongside Shakespeare’s Lucrece and Julius Caesar enables reflection 
on a conceptual history of freedom that led to the equation of freedom with the 
freedom of the will, the consequences of which this chapter has only briefly surveyed.  
As a non-philosophical discourse, the Shakespearean corpus serves us as it did 
Arendt, as a model for rediscovering the potentialities that exist when we have the 
imagination and courage to create something new in our political life by (counter-
intuitively, perhaps) diving into our collective past to recover those rich and strange 




Arendt, Shakespeare suggests to us not only the durability of political principles once 
they first have made their appearance on the political stage, but also how transient 
they can be as material incarnations if not properly cared for, and ultimately, how 
difficult it is for us first to understand what freedom is and then to act in such a way 
as to nourish it.   
Yet neither Arendt’s essay nor the Shakespearean works in question are 
equipped to help us think quite so carefully about how public freedom, as locus for 
the freedom to begin anew, nevertheless requires stable legal and institutional 
frameworks that will “house” in a worldly space the principles which inspired it.  
Through a reading of Shakespeare’s Coriolanus in the next chapter, I will analyze the 
two-fold perplexity of political action that we have now begun to uncover.  Although 
freedom is located in the capacity to begin something new, public freedom must be 
sustained through institutions that in some measure structure and restrict the scope of 
all future actions.  Yet contrary to the assumptions of the Platonically inspired 
tradition of political theory that Arendt consistently critiques, the political world 
should not be analogized to a finished object, as if it were preconceived as an idea in 
the mind of a craftsman philosopher-king and then forged through his will.  As a 
space of action, the state is necessarily saturated with a quality of thoroughgoing and 
ineradicable indeterminacy, and affords re-interpretation of the principles that 
founded it, in new contexts and based on the perspectives of newcomers.   
In the conclusion to The Promise of Politics, Arendt suggests that because 
wars and revolutions became the most fundamental political experience of the 




We thus may be tempted to agree with the conspirators of Julius Caesar about their 
terms for defining freedom and to account their action a failure because it does not 
ultimately succeed.  But as we will explore in more detail in the next chapter, while 
violence may take the form of a sovereign individual fashioning the world according 
to her will, action neither pursues ends nor depends upon success to introduce new 
principles into the world we share.  If Shakespeare’s Martius exemplifies the 
persistent conceptual substitution of making for acting in Western political thought, 
Brutus’ move toward principled action succumbs to some of the same 
presuppositions; his reliance on violence alone to restore the Republic misconstrues 
what may be accomplished through one act as if it would leave behind a state that 




Homo Faber, Action Hero Manqué: Crafting the State in Coriolanus 
 
 
You have made good work, 
You and your apron-men; you that stood so much 
Upon the voice of occupation and 
The breath of garlic-eaters! (4.6.96-99)  
 
Thus Menenius illustrates a contradiction that Hannah Arendt locates at the heart of 
classical Western political philosophy.  On one level we hear the patricians’ contempt 
for craftsmen’s participation in the sphere of political action:  “You have made fair 
hands, / You and your crafts! You have crafted fair!” (4.6.118-19).  Right from the 
start of Coriolanus, Menenius denounces the citizens’ political aspiration with a 
sarcastic display of paternalistic disdain for their desire to trade solitary work in their 
shops for concerted action in the political realm:  “What work’s, my countrymen, in 
hand? Where go you / With bats and clubs?” (1.1.55).  The First Citizen’s response–
“Our business is not unknown to th’ Senate; they have had inkling this fortnight what 
we intend to do, which now we’ll show ’em in deeds” (1.1.56-58)–both 
acknowledges and deflects the insult.  If “business” refers ambiguously to labor as 
well as to action, “deeds” signifies more definitively the citizens’ self-conscious 
engagement in the business of politics, not the business of the market, and thereby 
refutes the claim that what they are engaged in is “work” rather than action.  On 
another level, however, Menenius’s sentiments correlate with the pervasive 
conceptual “substitution of making for acting” that Arendt identifies in Western 




distinctive uncertainty of action, this persistent category mistake stifles our ability to 
recognize new political formations and possibilities as they arise.  Menenius’ 
suggestion that the citizens have ineptly “made” the political world they inhabit 
implies an analogy between the work of craftsmen and actions of citizens.  The 
paradox that Menenius thereby expresses is one that Arendt attributes to the thought 
of both Plato and Aristotle, who even while being among “the first to propose 
handling political matters and ruling political bodies in the mode of fabrication” 
simultaneously “thought craftsmen not even worthy of full-fledged citizenship” (The 
Human Condition 230).
1
  But this contradiction, observed by both Arendt and 
Shakespeare, is merely the most ironic by-product of the fabrication trope’s entrance 
into the space of the political.  When we imagine the state as something that emerges 
through a craftsman-like process of reification, as in the Roman myth of foundation 
where the sovereign founder draws the sacred boundaries of the city, we are likely to 
conceive of it as an object that is or ought to be impervious to human plurality, to the 
very multiplicity of perspectives and individual actions that in actuality constitute, 
preserve, and augment any common political world.   
In Chapter 1, we explored Arendt’s meditations on the conceptual history of 
freedom through an elaboration on her own reading of Shakespeare.  When The Rape 
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This accounts for the inconsistent attitude toward work that Tom Rutter identifies in the play: “The 
fact that the language of work—indeed, the word ‘work’ itself, obsessively—is so ostentatiously used 
and with such negative connotations in the latter half of the play is strikingly at odds with its more 
positive use in a very different context in the first half” (149).  For Rutter, the difference is explained 
by contemporary shifts in attitudes toward work and by an ideological backlash against a changing 
political economy.  While Reformation ideologies often held up work as a model for virtuous action, 
the social mobility of the mercantile classes who either engaged in labor or (more often) employed 
laborers threatened a social hierarchy long presided over by the nobility.  If the play’s representation of 
the entry of the craftsman into the ranks of the citizenry reflects a changing perception during 
Shakespeare’s time of the role of the worker in the body politic, it is less the case that the play’s 
attitude toward work is inconsistent than that it sharply distinguishes the “work” engaged in by 




of Lucrece and Julius Caesar are considered as essays on the various deformations 
that political freedom as a concept has endured under philosophy’s preference for a 
freedom of the will, Shakespeare appears to be performing the kind of “poetic 
thinking” that Arendt describes as reconsidering from the perspective of present 
experience such “rich and strange” “thought fragments” as have “suffer[ed] a sea-
change” (Illuminations 50-51); particularly when read alongside one another, both 
works suggest how the fundamental experience of plurality has been overshadowed 
by the notion of the sovereign individual that the freedom of the will produces as its 
impossible ideal.  Shakespeare thereby resurfaces a cultural memory of forms of 
political action that only exist in the modern world under a kind of erasure. 
Yet just as Arendt’s fidelity to the experience of plurality precludes freedom 
of an individual, sovereign will from standing in for political freedom, so too it 
prevents the sovereign will of any ruling class from imposing a predetermined 
structure upon the domain of the political, a domain which is characterized by the 
entrance of newcomers who may reevaluate, again and again, the meaning of political 
freedom.  In Coriolanus, at the same time that the patricians attempt to deny or ignore 
the obvious fact that the craftsmen citizens’ political action radically interrupts and 
disturbs the political world they share with them (resulting as it does in the 
establishment of a new political institution, the tribunes of the plebeians), these same 
patricians view the city as if it were a made object which they themselves crafted .
2
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 Anne Barton has argued that among the patricians, Martius is the only one who ultimately refuses “to 
accept that a new stage has been reached in the evolution of Rome” (73).  I see a more widespread  
recalcitrance on the part of the patricians when it comes to acknowledging both the possibility of 
political change, as well as what I take to be more significant, deeply embedded cultural metaphors and 





By examining in this chapter the three categories of human engagement with the 
world that Arendt develops in The Human Condition—labor, work, and action—and, 
in particular, the political consequences of our tendency to overlook the fundamental 
difference between making and acting, I will demonstrate how this conceptual 
conflation is carefully considered in Shakespeare’s Coriolanus.  Because the play 
highlights the unprecedented and unpredictable events that the public actions of the 
citizens set into motion, Coriolanus allows us to experience what Arendt calls the 
“pathos of novelty” (On Revolution 27), that is, a brief encounter with our ability to 
set into motion new political realities.  The tragedy is that this is no more than a vista 
glimpsed:  the plebeians and patricians alike are unable to learn from this experience 
or to nurture this ability.  They, like we, fail to recognize and remember such 
moments as fundamental to who we are as political actors.  
While setting out in Chapter 1 to analyze the conditions for the possibility of a 
sustained political freedom, I also demonstrated that Julius Caesar articulates the 
limits of political promising and political action when they do not found or re-found 
institutions that afford a lasting public space where speech and action among citizens 
readily can take place.  This very durability of institutional life complicates the claim 
that the political world of action is not something that is made, because its foundation 
attempts to establish pre-determined limits to action, and thus to novelty.  In staging 
our recurrent blindness regarding political action, I will argue that Coriolanus also 
articulates, in ways that Julius Caesar and The Rape of Lucrece do not, the 
irresolvable ruptures between the novelty of free action and existing structures of 




Coriolanus, Shakespeare enables us to speculate more comprehensively than does 
Arendt about the relationship between the radicalism of the doer who begins 
something new and the comparative stability of those not-quite-“made” political and 
legal institutions that enable action to be interpreted and remembered by a political 
community.    
 
A Constellation of Citizenships 
The citizens of Coriolanus, identified variously as plebeians and craftsmen, 
are, like so many of Shakespeare’s characters, overdetermined by the social 
categories to which they can be said to belong.  If their complaints of hunger remind 
Annabel Patterson of the 1607 Midlands Uprising, and align them with an English 
rural poor seeking national political representation (Popular Voice 129), for Theodore 
Leinwand, the play’s urban context “acknowledges Rome’s dyadic social structure 
but regularly (re)imagines Roman plebeians occupying an intermediate position in a 
tripartite social structure” (“Shakespeare and the Middling Sort,” 296).  And indeed, 
when Martius goes to the market to ask the consulship of the plebeians, to “cog their 
hearts” with the intention of returning “beloved of all the trades in Rome” (3.2.227), 
the play’s citizens seem to comport with London’s middling sort.  It also turns out 
that the reimagining that Leinwand observes extends to Shakespeare’s decision to 
strip his plebeians of their significant military role in Roman history in order to recast 
them as urban craftsmen.  In Plutarch’s “Life of Coriolanus,” the eponymous general 
is not the only one who publically displays the wounds his body has suffered in 




creditors; in desperate pleas for recognition, they reveal their own injuries, not hoping 
to gain political office (as may Martius) but merely to preserve their status as free 
men: “And such as had nothing left, their bodies were layed holde of, and they were 
made their bonde men, notwithstanding all the woundes and cuts they shewed, which 
they had receyved in many battells, fighting for the defence of their countrie and 
commonwealth” (5).  Plutarch’s plebs are also soldiers, but speech prefixes in the first 
Folio (“plebeians,” “the people,” and “citizens”) distinguish citizens from soldiers.  
And when Martius disdainfully refers to the plebeians’ military “valor,” what he has 
in mind are what he considers to be their disgraceful domestic uprisings, their 
“mutinies and revolts” (3.1.125). 
When considering what these distinctions mean in the play, we would do well 
to remember that most of the extant classical political philosophy available to 
Shakespeare assumed that craftsmen and retailers were dubious candidates for full 
citizenship.  When the First Citizen of Shakespeare’s play complains, “We are 
accounted poor citizens, the patricians good” (1.1.14), he acknowledges the classical 
perception of craftsmen as pseudo-citizens and the prevailing belief that full 
citizenship requires political action and military service.  Xenophon’s Treatise of 
Household, for example, remarks on the illiberal nature of the craftsman’s work and 
how ill-suited the men who engage in it on a daily basis are for the responsibilities of 
citizenship:  
For suche craftes, as be called handye craftes, they be very abiecte and vile 
and littell regarded and estemed in cities and common welthes: For they do 




sytte euermore at home, and to be fedde vppe alwaye in the shade, and some 
make them to stande all the day staryng on the fire. And whan the body is 
ones tender and feble the stomacke and spirite muste nedes to waxe a greatte 
deale the weaker. And agayne, they haue but smalle leysure to sette theyr 
mynde and diligence to do theyr frendes any good, nor also the common 
welthe. Wherfore suche men seme to be but a smalle comforte to theyr frendes 
at a nede, nor no good men to succour theyr countree in tyme of ieopardie. 
And for a suertie in some cities and common welthes, and specially suche as 
be daylye in warre hit is not lawfull to neuer [sic] a cytesyn to occupie no 
handye crafte (11). 
In Coriolanus where, as Cominius claims, “valour is the chiefest virtue and / Most 
dignifies the haver” (2.2.84-85), the depiction of the plebeians as craftsmen, not 
soldiers, makes their irruption into the political space of Rome even more 
scandalous.
3
    
Echoing Xenophon, Plato’s writings also reveal the full weight of the 
contradiction that Arendt identifies in Western political thought.  In his Laws, the 
city-state is arranged in a series of concentric circles, with the public and religious 
sites, agora and temple, at the center, the properties of the citizens next, then twelve 
villages occupied by non-citizen craftsmen and citizen soldiers, and finally a border 
zone in which each citizen would also have a country house.  Here, artisans are 
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 Rita Banerjee discusses at more length the relation between republican conceptions of citizenship and 
military service in Coriolanus (39-45).  She finds in Martius a representation of Machiavelli’s warning 
that republican values can foster martial competitiveness at the expense of civic participation, and 
quotes J.G.A Pocock’s interpretation of Machiavelli’s concerns: “A man who should devote the whole 
of his energies to the arte della lana and none to participation in public affairs would appear in classical 
theory as less than a citizen and a source of weakness to his fellows; but a man who should devote the 
whole of his energies to the arte della guerra ... is an infinitely greater danger” (Machiavellian Moment 




deprived of citizenship and excluded from political participation, but in Plato’s other 
writings, craftsmanship is a model for political action (Vidal-Naquet 231).  The 
demiurge in Timaeus is an artisanal god who shapes the world-soul as a metallurgist, 
the human body as a potter (235); elsewhere, the political ruler’s science is compared 
to that of the weaver (227).   A similar contradiction surfaces in Coriolanus.   
Menenius bitterly attacks the plebeians for the "good work" they have "made" of 
Rome, implying that the plebeians cannot make a satisfactory political world because 
of their work as craftsmen; but Cominius has recourse to the metaphor of a master-
craftsman when he stipulates Martius' singular, innate virtues: "He leads them like a 
thing / Made by some other deity than nature, / That shapes man better” (4.6.90, 
emphasis mine).      
 
In early modern London, the craftsman’s status as a citizen was no less 
equivocal.  In Philomen Holland’s translation of Britannia (1607), William Camden 
sharply distinguishes the categories of citizen and craftsman.  Whereas “Citizens or 
Burgesses” occupy a position just below that of gentlemen, “Craftsmen, Artisans, or 
Workemen,” those that “labour for hire” and “sit at worke” (“Mechanicke Artificers, 
Smiths, Carpenters, &c.”) are ranked “Lastly” as persons “termed of the Romans, 
Capite censi, as one would say, Taxed or reckoned by the poll, and Proletarii” (177).  
In Angliae Notitia (1669), Edward Chamberlayne subscribes to Camden’s hierarchy, 
but he allows that retailers and craftsmen are “capable of bearing some Sway or 
Office in Cities and Towns Corporate” (492).  
Comparable ambivalence about the political status of artisans prevails in 




them as members of the commonwealth (“wealsmen”), he also tells them: “I cannot 
call you Lycurguses” (2.1.54).  Lycurgus’ reputation as the classical law-maker par 
excellence makes the most obvious thrust of this insult its suggestion that the tribunes 
are inept legislators.  But they are also unlike the Spartan Lycurgus because, as 
Plutarch records, he separated craftsmen (whose tasks he relegated to slaves and 
foreigners) from citizen-soldiers: 
….casting all craftes and base occupations upon bondemen and straungers, 
and putting into the hands of citizens the shield and launce, suffering them to 
exercise no other arte or science, but the arte and discipline of warres, as the 
true ministers of Mars….For to have any occupation, to buye and sell, or to 
traficke, free men were expressely forbidden: bicause they should wholy and 
absolutely be free. (54) 
Articulating a view of citizenship more Greek than Roman, Martius holds the 
plebeians to be non-citizens.  He grudgingly acknowledges those institutional reforms 
that have reshaped the Roman political world even as he questions the legitimacy of 
these changes: “I would they were barbarians—as they are, / Though in Rome litter’d; 
not Romans—as they are not, / Though calv’d i’th’porch o’th’Capitol” (3.1.236-38).  
And confronting his mother at the end of the play, Martius opposes the soldiers that 
follow him to the plebeian craftsmen he intends to crush: “Do not bid me / Dismiss 
my soldiers, or capitulate / Again with Rome’s mechanics” (5.3.81-83).   
By occluding its artisans’ role as plebeian soldiers, Coriolanus brings ancient 
standards of aristocratic citizenship to bear on the early modern citizen of the craft 




of Walter Benjamin that, according to Arendt, uncovers the neglected meanings 
preserved in words by juxtaposing present understandings with “those spiritual 
essences from a past that have suffered the Shakespearean ‘sea-change’” (Benjamin 
Illuminations 48-49).  As Benjamin himself describes the concept of the 
“constellation” in his Arcades Project, “[i]t is not so much that what has gone by [das 
Vergangene] casts its light upon the present, or that the present casts its light upon 
what is gone; rather, the image is the constellation that ensues when what has been 
[das Gewesene] converges with the Now in a flash” (The Arcades Project N3,1).  
Although Coriolanus is set in ancient Rome, the political dialogue that it stages 
between past and present conceptions of citizenship and the political status of the 
craftsman constellates in a single image the opposition between ancient and 
seventeenth century notions of citizenship.  With the patricians disparaging and the 
plebeians failing to nurture their intervention in the public political world, the play 
signals the maddening closure of political space at the very moment of its emergence.   
The plebs first violate the ancient divide between full citizens and craftsmen, 
performing publically as civic actors who demand political representation.  Then, 
having opened up a space within which to speak as a plurality, they seem to 
relinquish their responsibility to preserve it when they return to work as private 
individuals in the civil space of the market.  Arendt finds similarities between the 
political capacities of those categorically excluded from politics in the ancient world 
and the modern citizen who by and large abstains from political participation.  For the 
possibility of political freedom is always tenuous; it “does not always exist, and 




foreigner, and the barbarian in antiquity, like the laborer or craftsman prior to the 
modern age, the jobholder or businessman in our world—do not live in it” (Human 
Condition 199).  Indeed, the citizens described by Sicinius—“singing happy in their 
shops and going about their functions friendly” (4.5.9)—end the play resembling 
nothing so much as the modern bourgeois citizen whom Arendt identifies in the work 
of Thomas Hobbes (Origins 139-43).
4
  The emancipation of the historical craftsman 
occurs when Hobbes’ modern, negative concept of freedom, what he describes as “the 
liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own 
abode, their own diet, and trade of life,” powerfully takes  hold of the political 
imagination, and civic duties give way to individual interests (131).  For Hobbes, 
freedom is not found in the concerted public actions of citizens but rather in what 
liberal political theory claims as their freedom from politics, the freedom of atomized 
individuals to pursue their private economic desires.  Persons thus shrink from their 
fear of their natural, isolated condition into the state, and once in it, prudentially seek 
out “commodious living” (Leviathan 79).  The parallel reversion of the once 
publically-oriented citizens in Coriolanus back into isolated craftsmen has been a 
locus of debate among critics concerned with the play’s attitudes toward modern 
representative politics, a politics in which people trade their public “voices” for the 
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 As Arendt writes in The Origins of Totalitarianism:  “It is significant that modern believers in power 
are in complete accord with the philosophy of the only great thinker who ever attempted to derive 
public good from private interest and who, for the sake of private good, conceived and outlined a 
Commonwealth whose basis and ultimate end is, the accumulation of power.  Hobbes, indeed, is the 
only great philosopher to whom the bourgeoisie can rightly and exclusively lay claim, even if his 
principles were not recognized by the bourgeois class for a long time.  Hobbes’ Leviathan exposed the 
only political theory according to which the state is not based on some kind of constituting law—
whether divine law, the law of nature, or the law of social contract—which determines the rights and 
wrongs of the individual’s interest with respect to public affairs, but on the individual interests 




voices of those who, like the tribunes of Coriolanus, hold elected positions of 
political authority.
5
   
 
Labor, Work, and Action 
Of course, from the start, Menenius’ suggestive remarks about the political 
action of the citizens—their “good work”—points up not merely the political capacity 
of the craftsmen but the commonplace analogy according to which political action is 
compared with craftsmanship.
6
  For Arendt, this durable analogy is a clear indicator 
that political philosophy since Plato has preferred to rely on the certainty of work 
rather than confront the uncertainty of political action:    
This seeming contradiction clearly indicates the depth of the authentic 
perplexities inherent in the human capacity for action and the strength of the 
temptation to eliminate its risks and dangers by introducing into the web of 
human relationships the much more reliable and solid categories inherent in 
activities with which we confront nature and build the world of the human 
artifice (The Human Condition 230). 
In Coriolanus, we witness both the radical newness initiated by the political action of 
the craftsmen citizens as well as the deeply imbedded political metaphors of 
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 For an example of such debates, see Oliver Arnold’s contention that Annabel Patterson and other 
“Whig Shakespeareans” put too much stock in the play’s recurrent theme of the citizens’ “voices.”  
Such critics, Arnold argues, see the citizens’ participation in politics as unequivocally progressive 
rather than seeing that the concepts of consent and representation are ideological terms that mask many 
of the coercive aspects of representational politics.  In failing to make sharper distinctions between the 
plebs and the tribunes, Arnold argues, they also fail to discuss the distinction between “speaking for 
oneself and being spoken for by representatives” (195). 
 
6
 This suggests that an Arendtian reading of the political in Coriolanus would exceed the limitations 
that Stanley Cavell implies political interpretations of the play are almost necessarily subject to: “A 
political reading is apt to become fairly predictable once you know whose side the reader is taking, that 




craftsmanship that help to deny that anything fundamentally new could ever arise in 
political life.   
In order better to understand the troubled conceptual relationship between 
work and action, we should first begin with a review of Arendt’s tripartite ontology 
that also includes labor, in addition to work and action.
7
  Chained to necessity and the 
life process, labor is trapped in an endless cycle of production and consumption that 
sustains bare life.  Channeling Macbeth, Arendt writes that “the end of its toil and 
trouble” arrives only at death (Portable Hannah Arendt, 171).  Producing the least 
durable and most natural of human things, labor’s products do not erect a human 
world or make of it an inhabitable place; they merely stave off the eternally recurring 
appetite of the human animal.  By and large, the ancient view held that those who 
engaged in labor were slaves of necessity.  The only way to achieve the freedom of 
action available in public was to enslave others who would keep the demands of labor 
at bay.  Relegated to the private household, the oikos, labor and the concerns of 
biological life (zoē) were sharply distinguished from political life (bios) and the 
public stage of virtuous action.   Arendt argues that with the advent of modernity, this 
dramatic space for acting and witnessing action was eclipsed by the state’s increasing 
concern with what had previously been under the purview of the private household, 
the maintenance of mere, or “bare” life.  “In a world without action,” drama itself 
became meaningless as a generic model for political life (Origins 141).   
Precisely this takeover of bios by zoē has pre-occupied the attention of recent 
political theorists, notably Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben.  In Coriolanus, 
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 The distinction Arendt makes between work and labor, two words we have come to think of as 
synonyms, is one she herself admits is “unusual” but nevertheless of crucial importance for our ability 




labor still bears the classical connotations, marking the bodies of those who engage in 
it as apolitical animals.  When the tribunes consider how to turn the people against 
Martius, Brutus suggests the commonplace belief that, should it be in his power, 
Martius would strip the citizens of their ability to act politically and transform them 
into a resource for labor that would be sustained solely on account of its use value.  
Martius would: 
Have made them mules, silence’d their pleaders, and 
Dispropertied their freedoms; holding them 
In human action and capacity, 
Of no more soul nor fitness for the world 
Than camels in their war, who have their provand 
Only for bearing burthens…. (1.2.245-50) 
In this nightmare vision of Roman politics, the plebeians have lost their legal status as 
citizens to become what Arendt calls animal laborans, laboring without end between 
birth and death.  A form of life whose killing would not be a crime, they resemble 
what Giorgio Agamben refers to as homo sacer, a figure that makes its most dramatic 
entrance into history with the death camps of Nazi Germany.
8
  The rise of biopower 
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 Homo sacer literally means both “sacred” and “cursed man,” but most nearly signifies a person who 
stands outside the law.  In the introduction to his Homo Sacer, Agamben identifies Arendt, not 
Foucault, as the thinker who had “analyzed the process that brings homo laborans—and with it, 
biological life as such—gradually to occupy the very center of the political scene of modernity.  In The 
Human Condition, Arendt attributes the transformation and decadence of the political realm in modern 
societies to this very primacy of natural life over political action” (3-4).  Certainly, Arendt’s concept of 
the “rise of the social” into public life accords with Agamben’s concern that the introduction of the 
Greek notion of bare life  (zoe) into the public space (bios) blurs the distinction between public and 
private.  Agamben’s reduction of the gap between totalitarianism and modern representative 
democracy to an asymptotic curve, however, is not shared by Arendt.  Arendt does assert that the very 
fact of totalitarianism’s emergence embeds it in our shared political history and makes its resurgence 
as a regime form a dangerous possibility.  While her genealogy of the rise of totalitarianism identifies 
the “thought-trains” of modern political theory that contributed to the emergence of totalitarianism in 




in the twentieth century gave states the capability to manage life, as in the welfare 
state.   But it also enabled it to kill with unprecedented efficiency, as in 
totalitarianism. Biopower effaced the public identity of the citizen and made the “bare 
life” achieved through labor the central focus of modern governments.  Amidst such 
an administered life, it becomes the prerogative of the state to decide who constitutes 
the “healthy” portion of the body politic and who represents the threats to it that 
should be eliminated.  Like the totalitarian camp, according to Agamben, every 
modern government produces a “zone of indistinction” (Homo Sacer, repeated 
throughout) that makes it impossible to tell the difference between inside and outside, 
legal and illegal, transforming what had been deemed a state of emergency or an 
exception in the ancient state into something much closer to the rule.   
James Kuzner, who reads Coriolanus according to Agamben’s belief that 
labor and concern with biological life processes have thoroughly undermined the 
capacity of institutions to reliably support political life without disastrous 
consequences, concludes that the play offers the only viable alternative to affairs of 
the state: a rejection of all forms of political community.  When Coriolanus promises 
to become “a kind of nothing, titleless” (5.1.13), he is “promising nothing except to 
break every other promise” (196) and, ultimately, in his uncertain attachment to both 
Antium and Rome, is “a traitor to every promise and to every border of identity” 
(197) made possible by the state.  Arendt, too, shares the concern that the public 
                                                                                                                                           
reduces the modern state to the camp, as does Agamben (10).  And while there is evidence to support 
Slavoj Zizek’s claim (see Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?) that the term totalitarian has been used 
as an ideological bogeyman to shield the status quo against viable political alternatives, his accusation 
that Arendt’s focus on totalitarianism makes her the most visible representative of this form of 
conservatism is simply false: one need only notice her relentless exploration of human action and the 
freedom that permits the foundation of new political worlds based on entirely unforeseen and 





space of political action has been intruded upon as the traditionally private concerns 
of labor and the maintenance of life have fallen under the aegis of the modern state.  
Although labor occupies one mode of the human condition that Arendt identifies, the 
reduction of the human to mere laborer or of the state to the administrator of 
biological life, needless to say, leaves no room for political action.  Yet Arendt, 
whose exploration of the deep structural connection between political promising and 
action I explored in Chapter 1, certainly does not share Agamben’s (or Kuzner’s) 




At the same time, Arendt’s concern with the intrusion of labor into modern 
political life demonstrates the importance she places on drawing and maintaining 
important conceptual distinctions, a mode of thinking we have seen she finds operant 
in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar.  Keen to reclaim the full potential of political action, 
Arendt distinguishes it not just from labor but also from work, the process of 
fabrication that starts with a preexisting eidos, or form, in the mind of the craftsman 
and ends with a self-subsistent object.  As Sir Philip Sidney remarks in his Defence of 
Poesy “the skill of each artificer standeth in that idea or fore-conceit of the work” 
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 Contrary to recent pro-republican interpreters of Coriolanus, Kuzner argues that the play “represents 
the birth of Roman Republicanism as the birth of a state that, in the name of securing personal borders, 
uses law to place individuals outside the law, thus making life within the city what Agamben calls 
“bare life”—life that can be killed without recourse to more recognizable legal channels” (174).  
Although the notion of a bounded self-hood protected by the state makes human rights possible, it also 
(writes Kuzner following Agamben) gives the state the right to remove those rights-bearing boundaries 
whenever it wishes.  Citing instances when the citizens resort to extra-legal measures to excise Martius 
from the body politic as the very means by which they will preserve their own rights, Kuzner suggests 
that Martius responds by refusing a bounded self-hood and the state that supports it, exposing himself 
to be “undone” by others, both on the battlefield as well as in the market.    But this is to ignore those 
moments when Martius himself intervenes in the civic space, deciding who should be included in it 
and who should not, as we see above at 3.1.236-38.  Failing to see the ways that institutional life 
mediates conflict in political organizations, Kuzner concludes that Shakespeare’s play anticipates what 
he takes to be the modern state’s reduction of the possibilities of action to labor and “bare life” such 






  Whereas life-sustaining labor has no beginning or end, work is the only 
human activity that can be said to have both a definitive beginning and an end.  As for 
action, it possesses a beginning, but complete with infinite and largely unpredictable 
repercussions, it cannot be said to have an identifiable end.  Like metaphor, action 
establishes links between things hitherto considered unrelated or incompatible and so 
opens up unprecedented political spaces.  “Action,” writes Arendt, “always 
establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent tendency to force open all 
limitations and cut across all boundaries" (Human Condition 190).  This 
"boundlessness” of action has the potential to destabilize existing human institutions 
(The Human Condition 190-91).  When the tribunes rally the plebs to pursue Martius 
to his home with violent intent, Menenius fears that they are on the cusp of 
fundamentally threatening existing legal processes; they should instead, he argues, 
"bring him / Where he shall answer by a lawful form" (3.2.321-22).  The First Senator 
backs this alternative, recognizing the programmatic uncertainty of action: "The other 
course / Will prove too bloody, and the end of it / Unknown to the beginning” 
(3.2.324-26).   
As we saw in Chapter 1, when Lucrece acts against Tarquin, she attempts to 
control the outcome through the rhetorical manipulation of others; we might now say 
that when she does so, she imposes her will on the world as a craftsman might upon 
the material with which she works.  She does this of necessity, because her status as a 
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 Unlike action, work begins with a preexisting model, or concept.  Arendt developed a more complete 
articulation of this in her lectures on Kant’s Critique of Judgment, where she discusses Kant’s notion 
of the concept:  what “Plato called the eidos—the general form—of a house, which is never given to 
the natural senses but only to the eyes of the mind…Whenever one draws or builds a house, one draws 
or builds a particular house, not the house as such.  Still, one could not do it without having this 




woman does not permit her entry into the public realm as a political actor, does not 
enable her to enact a new political beginning based on principle.  Hence, she returns 
violence upon violence, attempting to counteract the sovereign will of Tarquin who 
raped her with a sovereign will of her own that will live on after her death.  We also 
saw that the moment she enlists the aid of others, she sets into motion a collective act 
which is based on principle (although admittedly not one that could change political 
conditions for Lucrece or for women generally), something she did not intend and 
could not have predicted when she began to act.
11
        
Work, then, having a predictable beginning and end, is fundamentally 
different from both labor and action.  Unlike labor, it has the capacity to produce 
things that exceed the cycle of production and consumption.  Through work, the 
human world of tools, edifices, and art emerges as does “the familiarity of the world, 
its customs and habits of intercourse between men and things as well as between men 
and men” (The Human Condition 94).  Because they ease the burden of the continual 
labor required to sustain life and create artifacts that preserve and remember the 
actions performed, the res gestae (“things done”) which would otherwise not survive, 
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 A further connection between the craftsman citizens of Coriolanus and Lucrece—the fact that their 
social roles dictate an isolation from public political life—presents an opportunity to discuss the vexing 
question of the relation between Arendt’s political theory and her gender politics.  Arendt has long 
been criticized for the stark distinctions between public and private that make her critique of modern 
political life possible, as they seem to reinforce the longstanding dichotomy of the polis that banishes 
women to the private household and deprives them of the possibility for significant action through its 
valorization of the public life of the citizen.  Despite the unpalatable social hierarchy that the 
public/private distinction historically upheld, as Bonnie Honig suggests, in Arendt “there is no 
determinate class of persons that is excluded from political action.” (155).  In fact, when Arendt’s 
concern with preserving the public sphere as a space of appearance where political action rather than 
the attitudes of labor or work are the primary preoccupation is coupled with her notions of plurality 
(heterogeneity) and natality (the constant birth of new actors onto the public stage) as conditions for 
the possibility of political life, the public stage appears subject to the “boundlessness” of action 
(discussed above) in such a way that any roles that gender or all other forms of identity might have in 




the products of work, while not eternal, may continue to erect a human world well 
beyond the lifespan of their individual creators.
12
   
In fabrication, the end product always predetermines the appropriate materials 
and methods for its production.  Work, therefore, will always depend on means-end 
rationality, will always necessitate that a measure of violence be imposed on the 
matter upon which it works.  As Arendt put it, the craftsman, who is the “creator of 
human artifice[,] has always been a destroyer of nature” (Portable Hannah Arendt, 
174).  Arendt accepts fabrication as a necessary form of violence, endorsing a 
conceptual opposition between nature—that which has not been shaped by human 
hands—and the human world of fabricated objects whose emergence is dependent 
upon human will’s forcible reshaping of nature.  If in the mode of labor we are 
servants to nature, through work we appear as its master.  What worries Arendt is the 
tendency to use any analogy based on craftsmanship or the craftsman (whom she calls 
homo faber) to conceptualize action in the political sphere.  When this happens, the 
fabrication process supplies the fantasy that an absolute mastery over the political 
realm is possible (or even desirable).  The inherent uncertainty of action (praxis) that 
for Arendt characterizes political affairs is obscured by metaphors of making (poesis).   
Still, the perspective of homo faber dominates Western political philosophy. 
While it was only with modernity that man came to be defined “primarily as homo 
faber, a toolmaker and producer of things” (Human Condition 229) and only then that 
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 For another critical perspective on the relation between work and labor, see The Body in Pain in 
which Elaine Scarry reads the creation of artifacts as a response to the constant stresses of biological 
life: “The chair, for example, mimes the spine, takes over its work, freeing the person of the constant 
distress of moving through many small body postures, empties his mind of absorption with the pain in 
his back, enabling him instead to attend to the clay bowl he is making or to listen to the conversation of 





philosophy overcame its disdain for fabrication, classical political philosophy had 
already conceived of “acting in terms of making” (196).  Arendt connects this 
subsumption of praxis by poesis with Western philosophy’s desire for a greater 
degree of reliability in the realm of action than is available:  “It is as though they had 
said that if men only renounce their capacity for action, with its futility, 
boundlessness, and uncertainty of outcome, there could be a remedy for the frailty of 
human affairs” (195).  The tyrant’s resort to direct forms of violence might well be a 
vain attempt to eliminate the necessary weakness and uncertainty of action that are a 
consequence of human plurality, but Plato’s invention of the philosopher-king is yet 
another attempt to deny action its role in the political sphere, not only for the 
multitude but for the tyrant as well.  The reliability of the contemplative life of Ideas 
furnishes standards which, lying outside the realm of action, re-enter the polis as 
authoritative measures:  “Plato is helped by an analogy from practical life, where it 
appears that all arts and crafts are also guided by ‘ideas,’ that is, by the ‘shapes’ of 
objects, visualized by the inner eye of the craftsman, who then reproduces them in 
reality through imitation” (110).  But these ideas, when they become the 
“unwavering, ‘absolute’ standards for political and moral behavior and judgment in 
the same sense that the ‘idea’ of a bed is the standard for making and judging the 
fitness of all particular manufactured beds” (Between Past and Future 110), provide 
even greater incentives for tyranny to reemerge, the regime form most suited to 
shaping a polis by way of brutal means-end rationality.  Arendt, again: “If the 




artist…the tyrant is indeed in the best position to achieve the purpose”  (Between Past 
and Future 112).   
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics helpfully introduces a theoretical distinction 
between the type of reason employed in making and the type employed in acting.  
Making “has an end distinct from itself,” not so acting since its only ends are the 
individual acts themselves (107).  According to this formulation, action (praxis) 
appears to be unequivocally superior to making (poiēsis).  The banausic life, then, the 
making of objects for sale in the market, is not worthy of the citizen.  For Aristotle, 
political actions are and must be pursued for their own sake.  But even here, 
Aristotle’s conceptual distinction between praxis and poesis fails to acknowledge the 
radical quality of political action—what Arendt will insist upon as the setting into 
motion of the completely new— by interpreting action teleologically and as a means 
toward another, higher end: the establishment and maintenance of the good state 
(Villa, Arendt and Heidegger 49).
13
       
Although the seventeenth-century philosophy that was emerging about the 
time that Shakespeare was writing for the stage largely rejected such teleological 
readings of nature and politics, it (and Hobbes in particular) did not so much overturn 
the classical tradition of political thought as emancipate it from the social context in 
which the work of the craftsman was less important than the contemplative life of the 
philosopher.  For Arendt, Hobbes exemplifies homo faber’s takeover of the political 
because he made visible a pervasive undercurrent of Western philosophical thought in 
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 For the best account of Arendt’s vexed relationship with Aristotle’s theory of action, see Dana Villa, 
Arendt and Heidegger, who delineates her major objections to his concept of action as an 
instrumentalization of action that simultaneously destroys any distinction between nature and the arena 





his mechanistic conception of both nature and politics.  We see this clearly in his 
introduction to Leviathan: 
Nature is the art through which God made the world and still governs it. The 
art of man imitates it in many ways, one of which is its ability to make an 
artificial animal. Life is just a motion of limbs caused by some principal part 
inside the body; so why can’t we say that all automata (engines that move 
themselves by springs and wheels as a watch does) have an artificial life?  For 
what is the heart but a spring? What are the nerves but so many strings? What 
are the joints but so many wheels enabling the whole body to move in the way 
its designer intended? Art goes still further, imitating that rational and most 
excellent work of nature, man! For by art is created that great Leviathan called 
a ‘commonwealth’ or ‘state’, which is just an artificial man - though bigger 
and stronger than the natural man, for whose protection and defence it was 
intended. (9) 
Hobbes’ famous formulation collapses nearly all of the traditional distinctions 
between nature and art on the one hand, and between making and acting on the other.  
And as God the creator is now understood as a craftsman God (“God is the Artificer 
and nature is his fabrication”) so man is a lesser craftsman who creates from the 
material of men a singular artificial man, society (“History of Political Theory,” 
023991).  And yet, as Arendt points out, although Hobbes analogizes divine creation 
and the formation of political bodies, he also establishes a crucial difference between 
them.  Unlike the relationship between nature and God, in which the creator retains 




“stronger than all its producers who need to be protected by their own production” 
(“History of Political Theory,” 203992).  With the disappearance from modern 
political life of what Arendt calls political principles (a concept explored in Chapter 
1) from which free actions spring and according to which each particular action is 
judged, ends are judged solely by the product they fashion.  The will of the 
anonymous craftsman has become superior not only to the means that are used to 
produce the political “product” but, ultimately, to politics itself; according to the logic 
of homo faber, all political action would itself come to an “end” with the final product 
(Promise of Politics 193).  According to this interpretation of politics, the product of 
human fabrication takes precedence over its individual fabricators.       
Shakespeare’s Rome anticipates this Hobbesian analysis.  The patricians also 
view politics as a violent process of molding the polis into a preconceived form, that 
is, as work and not action.
14
  It follows that they relegate craftsmen, putatively 
unsuited to active participation in politics, to making objects for sale in the market.  
For his part, Martius conceives of the political world as a mechanism that guards 
against something like a Hobbesian state of nature in which atomized individuals 
pursue unchecked their cannibalistic appetites:  “You cry against the noble Senate, 
who / (Under the gods) keep you in awe, which else / Would feed on one another?” 
(1.1.185-87).  This justification of the state as that which mitigates rapacious 
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 Barbara L. Parker has argued for the influence of Plato’s Republic on the play’s political 
preconceptions: the rigid functions Republic assigns to various members of the polis are tacitly 
supported by the play’s tragic conclusion (23-24, 54-73).  Like Plato, the play envisions an inevitable 
decline when monarchy (grounded in reason) is perverted by material interests.  What follows is a 
cycle of regime changes whereby republic gives way to oligarchy, oligarchy to democracy, and 
democracy to mob rule.  While the play’s patricians’ view of the state does resemble Platonic political 
thought, the play as a whole is skeptical about the inevitability of regime change.  As does Arendt, 
Shakespeare emphasizes the surprise and spontaneity of political action, not its necessity. 




individualism anticipates Hobbes theory of state formation as Arendt describes it:  
“Their equality as potential murderers places all men in the same insecurity, from 
which arises the need for a state” (Origins 140).  As Menenius represents it to the 
plebeians, the sovereign power of the state, once established, is itself not only 
irresistible but mechanistic.  Its motion is predetermined and inexorable: “…you may 
as well strike at the heaven with your staves, as lift them against the Roman state, 
whose course will on the way it takes, cracking ten thousand curbs of more strong 
link asunder than can ever stand in your impediment” (1.1.66-71).  Again, Arendt 
finds a similar sentiment in Hobbes:  “Security is provided by the law, which is a 
direct emanation from the power monopoly of the state…as this law flows directly 
from absolute power it represents absolute necessity in the eyes of the individual who 
lives under it” (Origins 141).  With Arendt, we are left wondering whether there is in 
the formulations of Menenius, Coriolanus, or Hobbes any possibility of spontaneous 
action. 
The longstanding, implicit assumption of Western political philosophy which 
Hobbes and Shakespeare’s Coriolanus make explicit—that the political world is 
made—fundamentally limits our understanding of political action, the human activity 
by means of which new forms of political space unpredictably emerge and are 
sustained.  As Arendt argues, homo faber cannot adequately account for political life 
because it works with prefabricated concepts, whether the Ideas in Plato’s cave or the 
objects with properties in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason:   
The idea that only what I am going to make will be real—perfectly true and 




of events, where nothing happens more frequently than the totally unexpected. 
To act in the form of making, to reason in the form of "reckoning with 
consequences," means to leave out the unexpected, the event itself, since it 
would be unreasonable or irrational to expect what is no more than an "infinite 
improbability." Since, however, the event constitutes the very texture of 
reality within the realm of human affairs, where the "wholly improbable 
happens regularly," it is highly unrealistic not to reckon with it, that is, not to 
reckon with something with which nobody can safely reckon. The political 
philosophy of the modern age, whose greatest representative is still Hobbes, 
founders on the perplexity that modern rationalism is unreal and modern 
realism is irrational—which is only another way of saying that reality and 
human reason have parted company. (The Human Condition 300) 
Events emerge through action, ushering in unforeseen and unprecedented 
configurations; they can only be subsumed by preexisting categories when interpreted 
as if they were a finished work.  But how can we reckon with something for which we 
have no preexisting standard of measurement?  Both Shakespeare and Arendt caution 




The versions of Menenius’s fable of the belly—the old explanatory 
frameworks—available to Shakespeare effectively conceal the possibility for genuine 
political action.  In Plutarch, for instance, a causal connection is insinuated between 
Menenius’s oration and the restoration of civil order: his “good persuasions and 
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gentle requestes…pacified the people, conditionally, that the Senate would graunte 
there should be yerely chosen five magistrates, which they now call Tribuni Plebis, 
whose office should be to defend the poore people from violence and oppression” (6).  
The plebeians’ agency in acquiring tribunal representation takes a back seat to the 
persuasive, shaping power of Menenius’s words.  Even more striking in this respect is 
Philip Sidney’s recourse to Menenius in his account of the poet as maker in his 
Apologie for Poesy.  Early in the treatise, Sidney urges his readers to “give right 
honour to the heavenly Maker of that maker [the poet], who having made man to His 
own likeness, set him beyond and over all the works of that second nature: which in 
nothing he showeth so much as in poetry, when with the force of a divine breath he 
bringeth things forth surpassing her doings” (24-25).  Having analogized the creation 
of nature with the production of poetry, Sidney finds in Menenius Agrippa an 
exemplar of the poet as maker.  Menenius’s tale “wrought such effect in the people, 
as I never read that only words brought forth but then so sudden and good an 
alteration; for upon reasonable conditions a perfect reconcilement ensued” (42).  Here 
again we see the Aristotelian politician whose chief end is to shape the character of 
citizens so that they are predisposed to noble action (Nicomachean Ethics 23).  To be 
“politically active” is to “practice [politics] in the way that handcraftsmen practise 
their craft” (Nichomachean Ethics 159).  Both Plutarch’s and Sidney’s accounts of 
Menenius’s oration, then, implicitly favor the aristocratic poet over the people, the 
maker over the multitude. 
But as we have seen, to rely on the metaphor of making is to grasp at fantasies 




Shakespearean Menenius' vision of the Roman state proceeding on a predetermined, 
inexorable "course" participates in a recurrent ideology that claims the status-quo as 
necessity.  Whether our context is the Roman senate’s monopoly on political power in 
Coriolanus or the depoliticized citizenry of the neo-liberal state that accepts global 
capitalism as the only possible life-world, when the pretense of necessity is 
countenanced, the illusion of the necessary turns into a nearly fixed reality, a made 
thing.  According to Arendt’s account of Nazi Germany, a similar form of 
propaganda was “one, possibly the most important, instrument of totalitarianism for 
dealing with a non-totalitarian world” (Origins 344).  But it is the non-totalitarian 
nature of the political world, its un-made-ness, its susceptibility to action, which gives 
the lie to fictions of necessity, just as the plebeians who revolt in Coriolanus do to the 
claims of Menenius’s oration and as the recent public displays of solidarity from the 
streets of Cairo to Wall Street undercut nationalist and free market ideologies. 
In Shakespeare’s, if not Sidney’s telling, rebellions occur in “several places of 
the city” (1.1.184).  By decoupling the oration of Menenius from the founding of a 
new political order, Shakespeare preserves the constitutive unpredictability of 
political action, as well as the wonder and fear its uncertainties provoke in those who 
wish to be the masters of the world.
16
  When the patricians hear of the concessions 
granted to the plebeians, they cannot think of what has happened in terms of a 
finished work or product, but are forced to confront contingent political action as if 
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 Stanley Cavell also sees Shakespeare’s deployment of the belly fable in competition with Sidney’s 
account, perhaps even an outright “rebuke of it” (82).  According to Cavell, Shakespeare “puts into 
question both the nature of the ‘alteration’ and the ‘perfection’ of the reconciliation by placing the 
story at the beginning of the play” (83).  I contend  that Coriolanus does both more and less, that it 
leaves  intact the shaping power of Menenius’ oration  but refuses to diminish the unpredictable 




for the first time.  They are faced with the possibility that the political is not 
something that is made according to a preconceived idea (eidos) but instead is 
produced, altered, and maintained by an improvising plurality of actors. Because 
action does not emerge out of the natural bodily compulsions that necessitate labor, or 
out of means-ends rationality and the desire for utility that motivates the creation of 
objects in work, it follows no preordained script.  As we learned in Chapter 1, all that 
prevents the act of beginning something new from becoming arbitrary is the political 
principle that inspires it, for beginning and principle, “principium and principle, are 
not only related to each other, but are coeval” (On Revolution 212).  And because, 
unlike a made thing, an action is never fully bounded or finished, there always exists 
the possibility that the unprecedented will occur.  We may conjure into existence not 
only something that has no previous existence, but even more radically, something 
not even given “as an object of cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly 
speaking, could not exist” (Between Past and Future 155).   
Only when Martius reports that “the other troop” (1.1.203) has been granted a 
“strange” (1.1.209) petition does Menenius learn that the plebs have been granted five 
tribunes “of their own choice” (1.1.215).  Menenius, too, finds this “strange” 
(1.1.220).  Their shared “strange” speaks to the wonder and surprise that political 
revolution can provoke, to what Arendt identifies as the “pathos of novelty” (On 
Revolution 27).
17
  In such moments, the “shock of experience” temporarily disrupts 
our familiar categories and confronts us with the need to reevaluate them:    
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  The word “strange” also evokes another related blindness that plagues the perspective of homo 
faber: that the forms of political action that serve to open up a political space where there was none 




Whenever we are confronted with something frighteningly new, our first 
impulse is to recognize it in a blind and uncontrolled reaction strong enough 
to coin a new word; our second impulse seems to be to regain control by 
denying that we saw anything new at all, by pretending that something similar 
is already known to us; only a third impulse can lead us back to what we saw 
and knew in the beginning. It is here that true [political] understanding begins. 
(Arendt, Essays in Understanding) 
While at first the play recognizes the novelty of citizens leaving their solitary work 
and acting together to open up a new public space, ultimately the plebeians and the 
patricians alike are unable either to seize hold of or to abide by the “strange."  The 
play anticipates the fate of modern politics when the citizens disperse and return to 
being isolated craftsmen.  The death of Martius heralds not the emergence of 
something new but, in what is perhaps Shakespeare’s unique political tragedy, the 
near collapse of political life.  At best, the market has taken revenge against an 
aristocratic monopoly on political action. 
At least part of the plebeians' ultimate failure fully to grasp their political 
capacity may be attributed to their internalization of the play's valorization of 
individual action and its utter disregard for collective organization.  When actions are 
publicly praised, as when, for instance, the Herald announces Martius' triumph over 
the Volsces, they are attributed to a single actor: 
Know, Rome, that all alone Martius did fight 
Within Corioles gates: where he hath won, 
With fame, a name to follow Martius Caius. These 





In honor follows Coriolanus. (2.1.161-64, emphasis mine) 
Arendt diagnoses the tendency to laud as action par excellence those instances when 
someone appears to do something "all alone" to be yet another consequence of the 
tremendous sway that the perspective of homo faber, ever obscuring the distinctions 
between work and action, has on our understanding of the possibilities of action: 
Fabrication is surrounded by and in constant contact with the world: action 
and speech are surrounded by and in constant contact with the web of acts and 
words of other men.  The popular belief in a “strong man” who, isolated 
against others, owes his strength to his being alone is…based on the delusion 
that we can “make” something in the realm of human affairs—“make” 
institutions or laws, for instance as we make tables and chairs, or make man 
“better” or “worse” (188). 
Surely no one in Coriolanus sees the political sphere more intently through the homo 
faber lens than does Martius.  While their own desire for increased political influence 
with the plebs may inspire the tribunes’ accusation that Martius would, “depopulate 
the city and / Be every man himself,” (3.1.263-64), his refusal of sustained interaction 
with others is never in question.  At the end of the play, Martius even renounces his 
limited partnership with Aufidius in favor of his earlier solitary attack on the Volsces; 
whereas his “Alone I did it” attempts to reclaim an image of masculine self-sufficient 
adulthood, his “Boy!” (5.6.116) returns Aufidius’ “boy of tears!” (5.6.100) jibe back 
upon him for relying on Martius’ help to attack Rome.
18
  And if Cominius’ claim that 
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 For a sustained discussion of the Roman culture of honor and its attendant elevation of individual 
action that Shakespeare’s play constructs, explores, and challenges, see Alexander Welsh (191-209), 
who plausibly argues that the Martius’ claims of autonomy are overshadowed by the counterfactuals 




Martius "rewards his deeds with doing them" (2.2.26-62) marks Martius as the play’s 
exemplar of action as the highest good and as an end in itself, in actuality he, too, 
subjects action to categories that are appropriate only to work.   
Before exploring this at length, it is worth remarking on the curious fact that a 
play so concerned with the relation between work and action has inspired critics to 
focus on the third human capacity that Arendt identifies: labor.  For Arendt, politics 
can only happen once individuals are freed from the constraints of labor and the 
demands of the body.  A political world that cannot move beyond the issue of hunger 
is not a properly political world at all.  Its citizens, compelled to speak on behalf of 
the needs of their private bodies, can neither act nor emerge as individuals who speak 
freely in the public realm.  In “Anger’s my meat,” Janet Adelman brilliantly explores 
the metaphors of feeding in the play, arguing that “the taking in of food is the primary 
acknowledgement of one’s dependence on the world, and as such, it is the primary 
token of one’s vulnerability” (131).  This reading persuades us that Martius’ identity 
is founded on a denial of the bodily dependence we all have on the biological life of 
others for our creaturely existence.  And certainly, by altering the historical account 
in Plutarch from one of debt among returning plebeian soldiers to the price of grain, 
the play makes possible Martius’s categorical opposition of the ravenous appetites of 
the citizens to his fantasy of his own biological self-sufficiency.  But the claim that 
feeding is the “primary acknowledgement of one’s dependence” obscures another 
crucial form of dependency.  We are not only reliant on the physical bodies of others 
for our bare life, we are also subject to a community of others who reflect back our 




authors of ourselves. Conflating the finitude of biological dependency with the 
finitude that structures intersubjective action, Adelman’s psychoanalytic reading 
sutures the life of the individual to the processes of labor and feeding. This conflation 
reaches its apotheosis in a melding of the maternal body with the polis: “Rome and 
his mother are finally one” (140).  In Arendt’s terms, while “Anger’s My Meat” aptly 
demonstrates how the perspective of homo faber, the self-sufficient maker, refuses to 
acknowledge a dependency on labor and the mother’s body (represented in 
Coriolanus by the figure of Volumnia), it neglects the extent to which homo faber 
also refuses to acknowledge a dependency upon the political world and the 
constitutive unpredictability of action that establishes and sustains it.   
Martius believes himself the sole author of his political persona, utterly 
independent from the public stage on which he acts and the audience who witnesses; 
the honorific cognomen he receives after his defeat of the Corioli only  bolsters his  
fantasy that he is “author of himself.”  Indeed, Martius seems to fancy himself a self-
sufficient master-craftsman when he recalls how the battlefield was just so much 
material for him to mold as he willed: “Alone I fought in your Corioles walls, / And 
made what work I pleas’d” (1.8.8-9). From this perspective, the honorary title appears 
as a mere by-product of action, an object that he has fashioned for himself in combat 
with the Volces.   
     Hannah Arendt gives us a different view of public recognition.  When she was 
awarded the Lessing Prize in 1959 and Denmark’s Sonning Prize for her 
contributions to European civilization in 1975, she used both acceptance speeches as 




and preserve when they reify action in the memory of a political community.  
Contrary to Martius’ craftsman ideology that misrecognizes action as making, Arendt 
(as we saw in Chapter 1) asserts that the meaning of an action exceeds its author’s 
intentions and is subject to interpretation by a community of others.   Such honors, 
then, supply us with “an impressive lesson in humility, for [they imply] that it is not 
for us to judge ourselves, that we are not fit to judge our own accomplishments as we 
judge those of others….I have always believed that no one can know himself, for no 
one appears to himself as he appears to others” (Responsibility and Judgment 7).  
Furthermore, the very possibility of receiving an honor requires the prior existence of 
a public space within which action can be recognized: “In awards, the world speaks 
out, and if we accept the award and express our gratitude for it, we can do so only by 
ignoring ourselves and acting entirely within the framework of our attitude toward the 
world, toward a world and a public to which we owe the space into which we speak 
and in which we are heard” (Men in Dark Times 3).  Martius earns his moniker 
through his actions, but he is impatient with the fact that recognition of those actions 
depends both on those who will perform the recognition as well as on the public 
space that makes the performance possible.  Menenius, initiating the Roman ritual by 
which action becomes work in cultural memory, calls upon the “present consul” to 
“report / A little of that worthy work perform’d / By Caius Martius Coriolanus” so 
that patricians and plebs alike are able “both to thank and remember” it and to bestow 





 Ultimately, Martius is determined to craft a name for himself that does not 
rely on the recognition or consent of the Roman people at all but, rather, on their 
annihilation.  As Cominius tells us, he “forbade all names / He was a kind of nothing, 
titleless, / Till he had forged himself a name o’ th’ fire / Of burning Rome” (5.1.12-
14).  Refusing to allow his actions to be registered in the communal memory through 
public recognition (he will not hear his “nothings monster’d” [2.2.77]), he rejects the 
transformation by others of his action into work. 
Arendt is careful not to ask that we cease being homo faber, only that we not 
allow the perspective of homo faber to exclude all others.  Indeed, political action 
depends upon reification if it is to obtain any lasting significance.  The: 
 doing of great deeds and the speaking of great words will leave no trace, no 
product that might endure after the moment of action and the spoken word has 
passed. If the animal laborans needs the help of homo faber to ease his labor 
and remove his pain, and if mortals need his help to erect a home on earth, 
acting and speaking men need the help of homo faber in his highest capacity, 
that is, the help of the artist, of poets and historiographers, of monument-
builders or writers, because without them the only product of their activity, the 
story they enact and tell, would not survive at all. In order to be what the 
world is always meant to be, a home for men during their life on earth, the 
human artifice must be a place fit for action and speech, for activities not only 
entirely useless for the necessities of life but of an entirely different nature 
from the manifold activities of fabrication by which the world itself and all 




Protagoras, or decide whether man or a god should be the measure of all 
things; what is certain is that the measure can be neither the driving necessity 
of biological life and labor nor the utilitarian instrumentalism of fabrication 
and usage. (173-74) 
To focus on Martius’ constitutive dependence on his mother and the body politic for 
his bare life and not to recognize his dependence on the political community for the 
meaning of his life as a political agent, is to replicate Martius’ blindness.  To favor 
the independent moment of action over the dependent one is to imagine oneself a 
maker and is to adopt the perspective of homo faber.  
Arendt’s contextualization of the Lessing Prize is motivated less by modesty 
than her fear for the extinction of public spaces and the possibilities for meaningful 
political action in the modern world (Men in Dark Times 4).   Martius, who is averse 
to the market, the locus of exchange and commensurability, fears the world of 
political action even more.   Ironically, his misrecognition is not due to an aversion to 
the craftsmen ethos, but to the fact that he unselfconsciously esteems himself a master 
craftsman.  While he claims to be devoted to actions which serve no larger purpose 
larger than their enactment, actions whose greatness is exhausted in their 
performance, he is in fact doing his best to repudiate action’s inexorable resistance to 
sovereign mastery or biological necessity and its reliance on the interpretation and 







Political Theater, Political Institutions 
Bolstering Martius' vision of political making, the dominant patrician 
ideology of Coriolanus wholly discredits in advance the concerted actions of the 
many.  According to Cominius, it is to the Martius’s credit that “alone he enter’d / 
The mortal gate of the city,” and “aidless came off” (2.2.112; my emphasis).
19
  When 
the tribunes assert that the people join them in denouncing Coriolanus’s unregenerate 
pride, that they “do it not alone,” Menenius categorically dismisses collective action 
as unworthy of the name action: “I know you can do very little alone, for your helps 
are many, or else your actions would grow wondrous single: your abilities are too 
infant-like for doing much alone” (2.1.34-37).  Menenius would have it that when the 
plebeians act together, they are less than full, adult citizens.  Indeed, they truly act 
only if they act alone.         
This difference between the patricians’ vision of solitary action and the 
collective action that the plebeians engage in can be understood with the help of 
another pair of Arendtian categories: the patricians reduce action to violence, whereas 
the plebeians reveal the full potential of action as power.  Violence characterizes the 
craftsman or politician who attempts to work in isolation, shaping the objects or men 
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 There are many other such examples in the play, for instance when the First Solider observes that 
Coriolanus single-handedly faces down the Volsces (“he is himself alone, / To answer all the city,” 
1.4.50-51), or when the Herald praises him for his achievements: 
 
Know, Rome, that all alone Coriolanus did fight  
Within Corioli gates: where he hath won,  
With fame, a name to Caius Coriolanus; these  
In honour follows Coriolanus.  
Welcome to Rome, renowned Coriolanus! (2.1.161-66) 
 
Martius’ conception of himself as self-sufficient seems in accord rather than in conflict with this 
communal assessment of his actions, but it is, ironically, most ideologically useful to him when he 
shuns all forms of community: “though I go alone, / Like to a lonely dragon, that his fen / Makes fear'd 





upon which he works toward the ends he desires.  Even on the battlefield, where 
acting together would seem to be  virtually unavoidable, the individual soldiers of 
Coriolanus strive for the exclusive right reductively to offer up each of their bodies as 
raw material that will be transformed into an instrument of Martius’ will: “O me 
alone! Make you a sword of me!” (1.6.76).  Both master and made object, the two 
models of absolute independence for the slave of Hegel’s well-known master-slave 
dialectic, stand apart from any public world of plurality.
20
  The soldiers’ craftsman 
mentality imposes a sense of isolation on the world of appearance and strips it of its 
possibility for spontaneous action—everyone becomes mere material for the will of 
another or, perhaps worse still, material for the anonymous processes of history.  It is 
in this sense that violence characterizes the work of the craftsman. 
Power, on the contrary, should be linked conceptually to action, for it can only 
exist in the legal and institutional spaces between individuals that they work together 
to create and preserve (The Human Condition 200):  “Action, as distinguished from 
fabrication, is never possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of the 
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 In Hegelian terms, from the perspective of the soldiers in Coriolanus, the pure negativity that 
Martius imposes on them and on the battlefield makes it into a pure object of his desire, and gives the 
impression that Martius is an absolutely independent being.  This correlates with the perspective of the 
slave in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, for whom the concept of independence is figured first 
through the master:  “To begin with, servitude has the lord for its essential reality; hence the truth for it 
is the independent consciousness that is for itself” (117).  Through work, the slave gains another vision 
of independence.   Work, according to Hegel, “is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other 
words, work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its form and 
something permanent, because it is precisely for the worker that the object has its independence.  This 
negative middle term or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-
self of consciousness which now, in the work outside of it, acquires an element of permanence.  It is in 
this way, therefore, that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the 
object] its own independence” (118).  But it is only the slave who has come to grips with the fear that 
accompanies the threat of death at the hands of the master  who can attain a self-conscious that 
includes acknowledgment of the presence of others (what Hegel calls geist, or spirit).  When, as with 
Coriolanus, the “consciousness fashions the thing without that initial absolute fear, it is only an empty 
self-centered attitude; for its form or negativity is not negativity per se, and therefore its formative 




capacity to act” (188).  Hence it is encouraging to come across those moments in 
Coriolanus when the citizens distinguish themselves from the soldiers through their 
generation of power rather than violence.  Power, the plebeians’ answer to the 
Senate’s threats of strength and violence, represents a version of action that cannot 
succumb to the temptations of an impossible individual sovereignty because it 
depends at its root on collective striving.   And yet unlike the soldiers on the 
battlefield who serve as ready-to-hand resources for the will of Martius, the collective 
actions of the plebeians never coalesce into a single will.  While the manipulative 
tribunes nearly achieve consensus that assent should be withheld from Martius, some 
disagreement among the plebeians persists; “almost all repent in their election” but 
not all do (2.3.253).     
The political theater of the marketplace in the world of Coriolanus had 
customarily been a place where manipulative political rhetoric enabled the staging of 
pleasant fictions, a form of role-playing that Coriolanus, in his drive for 
independence, finds distasteful: "it is a role that I will blush in acting" (2.2.144-45).  
This interpretation of acting in public assumes that the identity of the private 
individual is compromised whenever one takes on a public role and submits oneself 
to the judgment of others.  So understood, it is impossible to avoid the implication 
that such activity is the part of the hypocrite.  But as Arendt discusses in On 
Revolution, the “profound meaningfulness inherent in the many political metaphors 
derived from the theatre” also supplies us with an understanding of the public stage as 
potentially revelatory of identity rather than necessarily duplicitous (106).  For 




relevant.  The mask, or persona, worn by actors in the ancient theater was a metaphor 
for the process by which private individuals emerged from their solitary abodes onto 
the public stage, where they took on the role of citizens.  Rather than concealing or 
effacing the individual beneath it, this mask, expressive of the legal status of the 
persona, produced an identity that could speak and act politically among others.  
Accorded both rights and duties, this entity was distinguished from the apolitical 
existence of homo, the natural person who stood outside the body politic, the slave 
(and, often enough, homo faber) who was “certainly a politically irrelevant being” 
(107). 
Even if Coriolanus’ interpretation of political acting dominates the play—
Volumnia agrees, and so too does Menenius, who seems to relish the work of political 
manipulation rather than to eschew it—in 2.3, the marketplace briefly becomes a 
theater in which another available set of meanings for the term acting stands shoulder 
to shoulder with theatrical posturing, with pretending to be something that one is not.  
For a moment, a plurality of citizens perform as political actors on a public stage, and 
their acting enables the disclosure of their public persona rather than hypocrisy or the 
concealment of ulterior motives.  Shakespeare affords us a glimpse of power 
emerging in that most ironic form of civil disobedience, when citizens violate cultural 
habit by holding an institution to its word, the principle to which it purports to adhere, 
for the first time.  And they do this precisely when that institution—the public theater 
of the state—seems on the verge of extinction.  First Martius asks that he be allowed 
to neglect the ritual in the marketplace ("Let me o'erleap that custom" [2.2.135]); 




(2.2.145) completely.  Even as a symbolic locus for the principle of popular election, 
the marketplace is under threat. 
While the citizens await Martius in the marketplace, they debate the merits of 
performing an act that the patricians had not considered even a possibility: the 
rejection of a suit made to the people by a prospective consul.  That the First Citizen 
opens the scene arguing that they "ought not to deny him" (2.2.1-2) suggests that this 
option has already been discussed offstage.  The Second Citizen's "We may, sir, if we 
will," (2.2.3) confirms that the controversy has not been settled.  The Third Citizen 
also acknowledges the citizens’ collective capacity, but he appears to be  resigned to 
the present state of affairs, to submitting the power of assembly and public 
deliberation to the authority of precedent: “We have power in ourselves to do it, but it 
is a power that we have no power to do" (2.3.4-5).  While the power of collective 
action that opens the play results in a new political institution, here performing the 
unprecedented, briefly acknowledged and entertained as a possibility, would have 
taken the form of a surprisingly modest (but nevertheless utterly radical) demand: that 
the already existing institutional space of the marketplace can fulfill its promise as an 
arena for the people's deliberations.  Thus when the Third Citizen's stance wins the 
day and Martius is selected as consul (“Are you all resolv’d to give your voices? But 
that’s no matter, the greater part carries it” [2.3.37-38]), the space for public critical 
thought, debate, and action evaporates even as it emerges.   We feel a residue of 
uneasiness when the plebs express doubts that their voices have been freely given.  




First Citizen responds by specifying effects —"He has our voices” (2.3.154)—not 
causality or agency.   
   Recollections of the events in the marketplace provide us with further evidence of 
their skepticism: Coriolanus "mock'd us," (2.3.157) they claim, "flouted us," (2.3.158) 
"u'sd us scornfully" (2.3.161). These accusations of intimidation are voiced 
diffidently (the Second Citizen worries that his social status even renders him 
"unworthy" as a witness) and it is only through the cajoling of the Tribunes that the 
suit is ultimately rejected (2.3.156).  Nevertheless, there is a revolutionary quality to 
the fact that the deadening consistency of what Slavoj Zizek calls “habit” is 
temporarily disturbed by the citizen's open public debate: 
Every legal order has to rely on a complex "reflexive" network of informal 
rules which tells us how we are to relate to the explicit norms, how we are to 
apply them: to what extent we are to take them literally, how and when we are 
allowed, solicited even, to disregard them, and so on--and this is the domain 
of habit.  To know the habits of a society is to know the metarules of how to 
apply its explicit norms: when to use them or not to use them; when to violate 
them; when not to choose what is offered; when we are effectively obliged to 
do something, but to have to pretend that we are doing it as a free choice...[as 
in] many political situations in which a choice is given on condition that we 
might make the right choice: we are solemnly reminded that we can say no--
but we are expected to reject this offer and enthusiastically say yes. (Defense 




In such circumstances, when unspoken rules effectively negate an explicit offer of 
free choice, taking that offer in earnest constitutes a novel, revolutionary event. When 
the market as a place of ritual exchange (wherein the bearing of wounds is swapped 
for the unanimous and anonymous support of the people and "their voices") reveals 
its potential as a political space of deliberation and decision, the unspoken rules 
undergirding the world that the patricians have tried to fashion for themselves 
suddenly seem inconstant and unreliable, airy nothing given a local habitation and a 
name.  
The craftsmen-citizens’ re-founding of an endangered institutional principle is 
another instance of their concerted action opening up something new in the political 
space of Coriolanus; it also sets into motion the play’s most explicit confrontation 
with a contested definition of Rome’s political foundation.  For Arendt, it is the 
Roman concept of foundation that finally offers a kind of bridge between action and 
work, between, on the one hand, the promises that action implicitly or explicitly 
offers, and on the other, the more durable institutional life it sets into motion, 
preserves, or interrupts.  In relation to action, the story of Rome’s foundation 
acknowledges an “unrepeatable beginning,” an action that can usher in 
unprecedented, utterly new forms of life:  “The foundation of a new body 
politic…became to the Romans the central, decisive, unrepeatable beginning of their 
whole history, a unique event” (Between Past and Future 121).  Yet as we explored 
in Julius Caesar, if action is to create a more durable space for freedom than the 
limited “islands of security” (Human Condition 237) that promises offer, a political 




collective action cannot achieve its own authority through institutionalization of its 
principles, the power it generates dissipates as soon as the action is completed.  While 
violence relies on the substantial resources of strength, power always only exists 
potentially: “What keeps people together after the fleeting moment of action has 
passed (what we today call “organization”) and what, at the same time, they keep 
alive through remaining together is power” (Human Condition 201).  Only the 
citizens' care for the world and its democratic spaces preserves their power.  As a 
constituting event but also a “work,” then, the foundation is the locus of a political 
authority that supports the principles that inspired the act of founding, framing 
through laws and institutions the actions of citizens which themselves simultaneously 
undergird and constitute the foundation’s very durability.    
In this way, foundation serves to conceptualize the political as something that 
is created but never quite made, and which, while set into motion by an arbitrary free 
act, must subsequently attempt to set provisional boundaries for the disruptive power 
of action, or to some extent, as Arendt puts it, “renege on the very experience of 
freedom and novelty” (Life of the Mind II, 210).  Nevertheless, political foundations 
are quite different from the Platonic, workman-like conception of laws as external 
forms that serve as the immutable standards of political life; the concept of 
foundation captures the power of action without banishing all significant action to a 
past historical moment, and blurs the commonplace distinction between conservative 
and revolutionary by incorporating the roles that both work and action play in 
politics.  Arendt links authority (auctoritas) to its root, augere (to augment), claiming 




ancestors and to augment the polis, to act anew by building upon (even if revising or 
reinterpreting the meaning of) the foundation that opened up the space of freedom.   
In Livy’s account, Ab urbe condita (From the Founding of the City), Rome’s 
foundation is traced to a single act by its eponymous founder, Romulus.  But he does 
not elevate the founder to the status of maker or prescribe preservation as the only 
legitimate work of the present.  Reflecting on the establishment of the Republic that 
follows the rape of Lucretia, Livy praises the wisdom of those involved because in 
acting they preserved the work performed by the Roman kings who had followed 
Romulus, those whom he describes as “deinceps conditores” (218) [“successive 
founders”] (219).  The most prominent of these is Numa, whom Livy credits with 
supplying the legal foundations of the city:  “Qui regno ita potitus urbem novam, 
conditam vi et armis, iure eam legisbusque ac moribus de integro condere parat” (66) 
[“Having received the kingship in this way, Numa prepared to give the new city that 
had been founded by force of arms a new foundation in justice, law, and proper 
observances”] (29).  Livy thus provides support to Arendt’s argument that the Roman 
notion of foundation accommodated the freedom to act: to revise, alter, and re-“work” 
the existing public space of freedom.   
But Shakespeare’s play demonstrates that this notion of augmentation fails to 
resolve the rupture between action and work to which Arendt draws our attention, to 
the radical quality of action that “cuts across all boundaries” and the work of 
foundation that attempts to limit the space of action (Human Condition 190).  The 
question of whether a particular action is consistent with the promise implicit in any 




rather than a violation of it, is always a site of potential conflict.  In Coriolanus, the 
voting ritual of the Roman marketplace appears, from one perspective, to be the 
fulfillment of a promise already made but from another, the patricians’, the breaking 
of that same promise.  Learning that his suit for consul has been rejected, Martius 
again wonders aloud if the people should have the right to do so:  “Must these have 
voices, that can yield them now / And straight disclaim their tongues?” (3.1.33-34).  
This comment leads to a larger conflict centered on the legitimacy of the newly 
created institution, the tribunes of the plebs.  First, suggesting that the tribunes are 
cloaked in a false authority [“For they do prank them in authority, / Against all noble 
sufferance] (3.1.23-24), Martius argues that although it may have been necessary for 
the patricians to grant that privilege during the plebeian rebellion, it now undermines 
the longstanding authority of the patricians, arguing for once that the violence of 
others to make the state is illegitimate because it does not originate in authority: 
In a rebellion,  
When what's not meet, but what must be, was law, 
Then were they chosen, in a better hour, 
Let what is meet be said it must be meet, 
And throw their power in the dust. (3.1.165-69) 
Against the charge that the creation of their office was illegitimate, the tribunes point 
to the political compact reached through the agreement of both patricians and 
plebeians alike (“By the consent of all were we establish'd / The people's magistrates" 
[3.1.198-99]).  Martius’ categorical dismissal of this institutionalized authority is 




But when the plebeians voice their support for the tribunes as official magistrates 
("You so remain" [3.1.200]), and Menenius attempts to reassure them  ("And so are 
like to do" [3.1.201]), Cominius supports Martius by claiming that the very creation 
of the institution threatens to dismantle Rome’s political foundation: 
That is the way to lay the city flat,  
To bring the roof to the foundation, 
And bury all which yet distinctly ranges 
In heaps and piles of ruin. (3.1.202-4) 
Although Cominius’ admonition against the leveling of traditional hierarchies might 
refer to the general escalation of violence between patricians and plebeians, and the 
eventual failure of politics that we are witness to, Cominius is implying as well that 
any political actions the plebs take to alter the constitution of Roman political life are 
violations of the foundational principles upon which Rome was built.  In this sense, 
he echoes Martius concern for the “integrity” of the “fundamental part of state,” 
(3.1.150), and reinforces an architectural metaphor of the political realm as something 
that is “made” by the few, if not by a single historical founder.  In both their 
estimations, the people are certainly not the city, and have no right to perform as 
“successive founders”; their participation can only unmake or “unbuild the city” 
(3.1.196) rather than augment it.  Coriolanus thereby reveals the basic rupture 
inherent in a political foundation, a rupture between work and action that Arendt’s 
notion of augmentation cannot quite suture; to claim to act through the inspiration of 
a political principle is, first, always the creation of something new, but, second, 




reinterpretations are subject to the judgment of a political audience who will debate 
whether or not the action is an augmentation of that foundation.  Failing a political 
resolution of this debate, violence erupts.   
     From one perspective, then, Coriolanus stages the tragedy of a genuine action hero 
manqué who shares in political philosophy’s failure to recognize the distinction 
between work and action.  But it is also equally the tragedy of a citizenry unable to 
achieve or sustain the forms of power it seems to be on the verge of developing.  
Coriolanus performs our recurrent inability to recognize, harness, and remember that 
we can act according to new principles and set into motion new political realities.  
And it evokes the pathos of novelty that we experience when we grasp, even for a 
moment, our startling theatrical powers.  Finally, it offers as well a challenge to 
Arendt’s theory of foundation, and to any attempt finally to resolve the conflict 




Sovereign Fathers and Sovereign Friends in Hamlet 
  
When Arendt proposes in her Denktagebuch that the task of critical thought is to 
reconsider “all the old questions” of political philosophy from the perspective of 
plurality, it is unsurprising to find not only Arendt, but also Shakespeare, in whom 
she had an abiding interest as a political thinker, interrogating presuppositions about 
freedom and action.  What is surprising, perhaps because its role has not figured 
prominently in scholarly work on Arendt’s thought, is that her list of “old questions” 
includes “what is friendship?” (Denktagebuch 295).
1
  Alongside her conviction that 
the public world of freedom has been supplanted by the freedom of the will (as I 
explored in Chapter 1 through a reading of The Rape of Lucrece), and that the 
redemptive possibilities of political action have been occluded by political metaphors 
of a sovereign, solitary craftsman forging the universal history of the polis (as we saw 
in the last chapter’s exploration of Coriolanus), is her observation that inter-
subjective relations between citizens—the locus of the political friend—have been 
overshadowed by the concept and practice of private forms of friendship.     
According to Arendt, we have developed the habit of viewing “friendship 
solely as a phenomenon of intimacy, in which the friends open their hearts to each 
other unmolested by the world and its demands” (Men in Dark Times 24).  This 
insular perspective on friendship, which deprives us of alternate understandings of the 
relationship, is symptomatic of a broader misunderstanding of the relation between 
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the self and the world that grounds our capacity to act among, and interact with, 
others.  According to Arendt, this limited view of friendship:  
conforms so well to the basic attitude of the modern individual, who in his 
alienation from the world can truly reveal himself only in privacy and in the 
intimacy of face-to-face encounters.  Thus it is hard for us to understand the 
political relevance of friendship.  When, for example, we read in Aristotle that 
philia, friendship among citizens, is one of the fundamental requirements for 
the well-being of the City, we tend to think that he was speaking of no more 
than the absence of factions and civil war within it.  But for the Greeks the 
essence of friendship consisted in discourse.  They held that only the constant 
interchange of talk united citizens in a polis. (Men in Dark Times 24) 
The fundamental problem of relegating friendship to the domain of private life is that 
there is no guarantee it will maintain any relevance to the world that is its condition of 
possibility.  The close, personal attachments associated with this version of friendship 
may offer a temporary refuge from a public world threatened during what Arendt 
refers to as “dark times,” but they do not typically foster action that restores or 
sustains that world.  Political friendship, on the contrary “is not intimately personal 
but makes political demands and preserves reference to the world” (Men in Dark 
Times 25).  Because it occurs in the public world, the “in-between” of political 
agents, this philia of the polis is charged with the affect of respect, not love:   
what love is in its own, narrowly circumscribed sphere, respect is in the larger 
domain of human affairs.  Respect, not unlike the Aristotelian philia politike, 




for the person from the distance which the space of the world puts between us, 
and this regard is independent of qualities which we may admire or of 
achievements which we may highly esteem. (The Human Condition 243) 
More recent political theorists have articulated at greater length the underlying 
rhetorical connection between the dominant understanding of friendship as a private 
affair and the emergence of classical liberalism’s vision of the citizen.
 2
   When the 
public world becomes limited to governmental administration and action itself to 
individual activity within the capitalist market, the citizen is circumscribed as an 
atomized, self-interested agent and relieved of the burdens of civic responsibility.  
Here the philia of public discourse and debate is displaced by depoliticized forms of 
friendship that are the purview of the sovereign individual's private, intimate election; 
the belief that self-identity is most authentically located in one’s relation with private 
friends serves as another powerful ideological support for the definition of freedom as 
"freedom from politics" that I explored in the first two chapters. 
The modern form of friendship that Arendt describes can be traced back to 
Shakespeare’s work, despite the quite different historical and political constellation 
from which his plays arose.  Drawing attention to the discourses of ideal friendship in 
the Renaissance and their articulation of an alternative form of sovereignty to 
monarchic rule and patriarchal authority, recent scholarship implicates a notion of 
friendship that emerged toward the end of the sixteenth century in a broader cultural 
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 According to Michael Kaplan, private friendship plays a prominent role in the “liberal imaginary that 
is obliged to produce the sentimental attachments of private life as the site of extrapolitical sociality, 
inasmuch as, paradoxically, their imagined antipathy toward authority effectively renders them 
paradigmatic of liberal citizenship” (7).  With a less critical eye than Kaplan, Allan Silver explores 
how the historical emergence of capitalism and liberal thought produced friendship as the locus of 
“intimacy,” demarcating the private role of friend from the public role of citizen; Silver identifies how 
Adam Smith and many of his contemporaries identified friendship as a shelter from the “impersonal 




movement that attempted to establish stable boundaries between public and private 
identities.
3
  Early modern writers utilized the term “sovereign” when describing the 
domain of friendship, not only to refer to what at least since Plato had been 
considered the superlative quality of homosocial relationships but also to highlight 
the possibility that friendship could establish a non-hierarchical polis insulated and 
independent from the rest of the political economy.
4
  As an alternative to the 




Following classical formulations, the humanist vision of ideal friendship 
imagined the friend as “another self” (Shannon, “Monarchs, Minions,” 92).  Thomas 
Elyot, for example, described friendship as “a blessed and stable connexyon of sondry 
wylles, makynge of two persons one, in hauynge and suffrynge” (135).  This image of 
one soul in two bodies corresponded to a desire for an absolute identification between 
partners that could serve as a potential shield against the sullying interactions of 
commercial and political action.
6
  In an early modern world of class hierarchies, it is 
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See Tom Macfaul (1-29) and especially Laurie Shannon (Sovereign Amitie 1-53).  While I am 
indebted to the previous work of many scholars, the title of this chapter conveys a particular 
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4
This does not in any way suggest that the discourses of early modern friendship were not often deeply 
bound up with notions of public political life.  But if we accept C. Stephen Jaeger’s assertion that 
“[m]edieval poets and historians were largely indifferent to what we call private life,” then the early 
modern affective possibility of bracketing public and private life with regard to friendship reveals a 
quite different political and emotional topography; indeed, Jaeger himself finds Shakespeare’s King 
Lear symptomatic of a western culture that had “increasingly privatized” the experience of love and 
friendship (4).  
5
As Macfaul argues, by the time Shakespeare was writing toward the end of the sixteenth century, “the 
Protestant Church of England was clearly beginning to impose ideas of the nuclear family as the 
foundational unit of society. With the destruction of other modes of allegiance, the family became an 
increasingly monolithic commitment for the individual—and friendship, the one remaining alternative 
mode of allegiance, therefore came to be presented in stark opposition to family” (5). 
6
Macfaul suggests that Shakespeare’s plays were performed at a crucial moment in the western history 
of friendship, “as older feudal modes of allegiance gave way to modern friendship of affection.”  
Without completely disappearing, the medieval conception of friends as those who were materially 




not difficult to imagine how such an idealization—one that attempted “to make men 
the same” (Macfaul 83)—would have encouraged the resurrection of a form of 
individual sovereignty, however paradoxically dependent it was upon mutual support; 
the constant friend impervious to fortune could bolster the Stoic’s fantasy of an “inner 
citadel” of thought.
7   
And even when the rhetoric of sovereign friendship, wherein 
identity is “an antidote to the politics of hierarchical difference,” was self-consciously 
recognized as a fantasy, it could still endure as an ideal for early moderners to pursue 
(Shannon, “Monarchs, Minions,” 92).  Thus, Laurie Shannon correctly diagnoses 
                                                                                                                                           
“noninstrumental friendship, based in affinity, that d[id] not (and should not) obtrude on a wider world 
of public affairs” (5).  
7
The seventeenth century Neostoic reflections of the English clergyman Joseph Hall reproduce in a 
Protestant context the early Roman Stoic conception of the mind as another polis: “Everie man hath a 
kingdome within himselfe: Reason as the Princesse dwels in the highest and inwardest room. . . . 
violent passions are as rebels to disturb the common peace” (97-98).  It should be noted, however, that 
Christian Neostoicism in the sixteenth century often transformed the early Roman Stoical belief in 
reflection as a retreat from the uncertainty of worldly affairs into programs for practical political 
action, tempering where necessary the “pagan” belief in self-sufficiency as a doctrine antithetical to 
dependence on a Christian God. See Adriana McCrea (3-39).  Perhaps best exemplified by the life of 
Justius Lipsius, friendship in this context more closely resembles the later Roman Stoicism of Cicero, 
which was “adapted to the practical requirements of the Roman senatorial class,” and often extended 
friendship “beyond the inner circle of two or a few friends to widening circles of humanity. . . .”  
(Morford 15, 25).  See also Jacqueline Lagrée (148-76).  For the purposes of this chapter, though, the 
term “Stoicism” will not be explicitly linked with any particular offshoot of early modern Neostoic 
philosophy.  Rather, it will be deployed as a way of harnessing Arendt’s conception of the term and its 
history in the west in order to suggest similarities with the privatized friendships articulated by 
Montaigne’s Essais and  Shakespeare’s Hamlet.  One final note: Montaigne is often offered as an 
example of early modern Neostoic thought only after a considerable degree of qualifications are 
presented that refer to his idiosyncrasies as an individual thinker.  If analysis is limited to Montaigne’s 
discussion of friendship, though, the term “Stoic” as Arendt defines it will prove an appropriate label.  
As I explored in Chapter 1, in Arendt’s consideration of the western tradition’s tendency to embrace 
Stoic forms of thought and its pernicious effects on the viability of a public political sphere, she locates 
a link between two western concepts of sovereignty in the emergence of Stoic philosophy during the 
late Roman Empire.  Against a notion of political life in which men could participate as citizens only 
through the mastery of others, as we have seen, Stoicism raised thought itself to the position of the 
sovereign.   Thus, for Arendt, freedom as a political concept is logically prior to the metaphoric 
translation of freedom to an inner, non-political realm and its understanding in Christian thought as the 
question of the freedom of the will.  For further evidence, see Arendt’s posthumously published The 
Life of the Mind, in which she provides examples of the recurrent influence of Stoical thought (151-
66).  Also see Serena Parekh (111-15).   Because this chapter draws heavily upon both Arendt and 
Hegel, it is also important to point out that Arendt’s interpretation of Stoicism is read here as a 
rearticulation of Hegel’s well-known account of the master-slave dialectic and of the unhappy 
consciousness, which also treat Stoicism as a form of revolt against the material conditions of slavery.  
See G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (119-23).  Finally, for a discussion of the similarities 
between Hegel’s and Arendt’s diagnoses of Stoicism as “an inner withdrawal from political conflict,” 




sovereign friendship in the early modern period as a manifestation of “the private 
subject’s sovereign aspirations” (“Monarchs, Minions,” 92).  
All forms of sovereignty, according to Arendt, are founded on escapist 
fantasies that attempt to deny the fundamental plurality of public life, the non-
sovereignty of all human action: 
If it were true that sovereignty and freedom are the same, then indeed no man 
could be free, because sovereignty, the ideal of uncompromising self-
sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory to the very condition of plurality. 
No man can be sovereign because not one man, but men, inhabit the earth—
and not, as the tradition since Plato holds, because of man’s limited strength, 
which makes him depend upon the help of others. All the recommendations 
the tradition has to offer to overcome the condition of non-sovereignty and 
win an untouchable integrity of the human person amount to a compensation 
for the intrinsic "weakness" of plurality. Yet, if these recommendations were 
followed and this attempt to overcome the consequences of plurality were 
successful, the result would be not so much sovereign domination of one’s 
self as arbitrary domination of all others, or, as in Stoicism, the exchange of 
the real world for an imaginary one where these others would simply not exist. 
(Human Condition 234) 
It may at first seem counterintuitive to apply Arendt’s concept of non-sovereignty to a 
critique of early modern sovereign friendship—a relationship of interdependence 
between two persons might appear to necessitate abandoning the notion of individual 




Coriolanus, for example, as homo faber, the elite maker of the political world, might 
be tempered by reliance on the intimacy of private friendship.  Further, as an arena of 
free choice and spontaneity, friendship might seem the ideal site of new beginning, a 
natality that transcends the mere fact of biological birth.  Arendt herself articulated 
this aspect of friendship in the The Origins of Totalitarianism, suggesting that the 
unpredictability of freely given friendship continually disrupted the ideologies of 
totalitarian regimes, which claimed they had substituted spontaneous human action, in 
both its public and private forms, with a coordinated and dutiful pursuit of a 
predetermined vision of historical progress (456).
8
  
And yet, if the figure of the monarch symbolizes what Arendt outlines as the 
first mode of sovereignty—“the arbitrary domination of all others”—sovereign 
friendship occupies the mode of “Stoicism” with a minimal difference: it is indeed 
“the exchange of the real world for an imaginary one where these others”—with the 
sole exception of the ideal friend—“would simply not exist” (234).  What I want to 
suggest is that there is something of a shared assumption between the otherwise 
distinct modes of thought that I will be calling “sovereign fathers” (to represent the 
given relation to patriarchal or sovereign authority) and “sovereign friends”; such a 
concord can be located in their mutual refusal to acknowledge plurality, vulnerability, 
and inevitable dependence, and in their collaboration as a Scylla and Charybdis of 
sovereignty between which the early modern (masculine) subject oscillates.  By 
reading Michel de Montaigne’s essay “Of Friendship” alongside Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet, this exploratory chapter will examine two different early modern 
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articulations of the movement away from sovereign fathers and toward sovereign 
friends.  The question I will pose is whether or not the tragically interpellated Hamlet, 
having thoroughly considered both notions of sovereignty, is finally able to adopt a 
posture of non-sovereignty by risking a further shift to what we could call non-
sovereign, or political, friendship. 
 
Montaigne and La Boétie 
     Well before Hamlet believes he has sufficiently demonstrated the legitimacy of the 
ghost that resembles his father, the prince already appears guilty to himself for having 
delayed revenge.  Having failed to restore a public image of the absolute authority of 
his father—an image tarnished by Old Hamlet’s own mortality but also by Gertrude’s 
infidelity and its threat to young Hamlet’s inheritance—Hamlet suffers the demands 
of the paternal sovereign in the form of an emasculating insult: “Who calls me villain, 
breaks my pate across, / Plucks off my beard and blows it in my face.” (2.2.567-68).
9
  
That now the injunction to “Remember me” (1.5.91)  issues from a “who” suggests 
that for Hamlet, moral law is itself a sort of dead father perpetually reminding him of 
his promise to “wipe away all trivial fond records” from the “table” of his memory 
(1.5.98-99).  Because the world outside Hamlet seems to be a place where memory 
has almost universally failed, it has become an “unweeded garden” (1.2.135).
10
  As 
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All references to the play are from Hamlet, ed. Harold Jenkins (Walton-on-Thames: Methuen and Co., 
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 Immediately after remarking that the world is “an unweeded garden / That grows to seed; things rank 
and gross in nature / Possess it merely” (1.2.135-37)—“possess” here bemoans not only a general 
condition of fallenness but also the possession of the political world of Denmark by Claudius— 
Hamlet turns to the failure of Gertrude to adequately mourn his father (“That it should come to this: / 
But two months dead”),  insinuating a connection between the failure of memory and the “unweeded” 




the agent of his father’s will, Hamlet is left to commemorate sovereignty itself.  Both 
“scourge and minister,” he has concluded that it is the son’s role to pursue justice and 
reformation (4.3.177).  And insofar as Hamlet upholds the demands of patriarchal 
authority, he preserves a fantasy of lost sovereignty’s return.
11
  In his quest for the 
restoration of an ideal world of fathers, Hamlet as avenger represents what Nietzsche 
would later identify as the potential for political violence in what he calls 
monumental history, wherein, “[h]ass gegen die Mächtigen und Grossen ihrer Zeit für 
Bewunderung der Mächtigen und Grossen vergangener Zeiten ausgiebt. . . . ob sie es 
deutlich wissen oder nicht, sie handeln jedenfalls so, als ob ihr Wahlspruch wäre: 
lasst die Todten die Lebendigen begraben (302) [“hatred of present power and 
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The above summary draws upon the work of a host of critics, but most notably on John Kerrigan, 
who identifies the role of memory in Hamlet and its problematic relation to revenge, observing that 
“An Orestes-figure,” like Hamlet, “so devoted to the past will find it hard to avenge” (182); “Even 
when comfort is found in the past, that only makes the present more desolate, ‘an unweeded garden’” 
(183).  On Hamlet’s internalization of his father’s desire for revenge see, for example, Joanna 
Montgomery Byles, who suggests: “The superego, then, is a revengeful force which seeks to punish.  
Hamlet tries to become his father’s superego, but because he cannot act on it, his own superego takes 
revenge on him—tortures him, kills him eventually” (129).   Though this chapter will attempt to 
establish a fundamental connection between the sovereignty of patriarchal hierarchies and the 
sovereignty of private, ideal friendships, the role of Hamlet’s mother should not be neglected.  For 
instance, Janet Adelman makes use of psychoanalytic perspectives to restore Gertrude to the center of 
the drama: “[T]he fathers in Hamlet keep threatening to collapse into one another, annihilating in their 
collapse the son’s easy assumption of his father’s identity. . . . The initiating cause of this collapse is 
Hamlet’s mother: her failure to serve her son as the repository of his father’s ideal image by mourning 
him appropriately is the symptom of her deeper failure to distinguish between his father and his 
father’s brother. . . . as she forgets, he inherits the burden of differentiating, of idealizing and making 
static the past; hence the ghost’s insistence on remembering . . . and the degree to which Hamlet 
registers his failure to avenge his father as a failure of memory” (13).  See also Jacques Lacan (11-52).  
As I move on to discuss ideal friendship in the play, I want to preserve the link that Adelman 
establishes between the act of avenging the father and the attempt to reform the mother, but I will not 
take a side with regard to their priority in psychoanalytic terms.  The important matter here will be that 
if the mother-father dynamic is sutured together in the play by Hamlet’s desire for revenge, ideal 




greatness masquerades as an extreme admiration of the past. . . . whether they wish it 
or no, they are acting as though their motto were: ‘Let the dead bury the living.’”]
12
 
Before exploring any possible alternatives to revenge that friendship might 
offer Hamlet, I want to examine the case of Michel de Montaigne as an example of a 
late sixteenth century strategy for shifting emphasis away from the sovereign 
commands of the father to the sovereignty of private friendship.  In “Of vanity,” 
Montaigne relates the regret he experiences when observing the diminished quality of 
the plot of ground that his own dead father had cultivated and that he has inherited, 
the French estate which bears the family name.  Published in the final volume of the 
Essais in 1588, twenty years after the death of his father, the essay records a sort of 
confession: “Et accuse ma faineance de n'avoir passé outre à parfaire les beaux 
commencements qu'il a laissez en sa maison; d'autant plus que je suis en grans termes 
d'en estre le dernier possesseur de ma race et d'y porter la derniere main” (3.9.419) 
[“And I blame my indolence that I have not gone further toward completing the 
things he began so handsomely in his house; all the more because I have a good 
chance of being the last of my race to possess it, and the last to put a hand to it” 
(3.9.726)].
13
  Even while Montaigne writes, “Je me glorifie que sa volonté s'exerce 
encores et agisse par moy” [“I glory in the fact that his will still operates and acts 
through me”], he also suggests, to borrow Hamlet’s words, “what a falling off was 
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there” from Montaigne père to Montaigne fils.  Deficient in two filial responsibilities, 
he has both neglected the upkeep of the estate and failed to produce a male heir who 
will inherit his father’s land.   
But where Hamlet’s ethical relationship to the dead is dominated by the 
commands of his father, Montaigne is able to move beyond the commands of his dead 
father toward a cultivation of an individual identity.  In the preface to his “Apology 
for Raymond Sebond,” Montaigne relates that his earlier vernacular translation of 
Sebond’s Theologia Naturalis was carried out at the request of his dying father: 
“C'estoit une occupation bien estrange et nouvelle pour moy; mais, estant de fortune 
pour lors de loisir, et ne pouvant rien refuser au commandement du meilleur pere qui 
fut onques, j'en vins à bout comme je peus . . .” (2.12.177) [“It was a very strange and 
a new occupation for me; but being by chance at leisure at the time, and being unable 
to disobey any command of the best father that ever was, I got through it as best I 
could . . .” (2.12.320)].  As for Hamlet, the memory of his own dead father is 
fashioned into an ideal image whose commands cannot be resisted.  The passage of 
time lacerates the guilty conscience of the Prince of Denmark (“I do not know / Why 
yet I live to say this thing’s to do” [4.4.43-44]), but Montaigne performs the will of 
his father, although not without interposing his own.  The “Apology,” as readers of 
Montaigne have long noted, does not live up to its name; defending Sebond from the 
critical attacks of other writers does not prevent Montaigne from criticizing the 






  In more ways than one, then, Montaigne undermines the will of his 
father by perpetuating the memory of Sebond on his own terms. 
 In “Of Friendship,” Montaigne shifts attention away from a sovereign 
patriarchy that is subservient to the model of the estate and toward the “souveraine et 
maistresse amitié” (1.28.72) [“sovereign and masterful friendship” (1.28.140)], that, 
in its utter particularity, is subservient to no model.  “[P]arfaicte amitié” (1.28.72) 
[“perfect friendship” (1.28.141)], as he also terms it, is in no way to be confused with 
more common types of friendship; whether “naturelle, sociale, hospitaliere, 
venerienne” [“natural, social, hospitable, erotic”], forged by “la volupté ou le profit” 
[“pleasure or profit”], or for “le besoin publique ou privé” [“public or private needs”], 
none of these can equal it (1.28.70; 1.28.136).  Friendships “si entiere et si parfaite” 
(1.28.70) [“so entire and so perfect” (1.28.136)] emerge from a free choice and 
bestowal of affection, and are best conceived of in opposition to the affections due to 
blood relations: “Le pere et le fils peuvent estre de complexion entierement 
eslongnée, et les freres aussi. . . . à mesure que ce sont amitiez que la loy et 
l'obligation naturelle nous commande, il y a d'autant moins de nostre chois et liberté 
volontaire” (1.28.70) [“Father and son may be of entirely different dispositions, and 
brothers also. . . . the more they are friendships which law and natural obligation 
impose on us, the less of our choice and free will there is in them” (1.28.137)].  And 
since sovereign friendship must be governed by two equal partners, the “trop grande 
disparité” (1.28.70) [“too great inequality” (1.28.136)] between fathers and sons 
inhibits its cultivation.   
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Despite Montaigne’s political conservatism and his desire to contain the 
revolutionary potential of friendship, his essay reveals the impossibility of an ideal 
harmony between patriarchal sovereignty and mutual sovereignty and, indeed, the 
potential for outright antagonism between the two.  As Montaigne notes: “L'unique et 
principale amitié descoust toutes autres obligations” (1.28.73) [“A single dominant 
friendship dissolves all other obligations” (1.128.142)].  Departing significantly from 
his source material in Cicero’s De Amicitia, Montaigne offers the Roman pair 
Tiberius Gracchus and Caius Blossius as the prime example of a sovereign friendship.  
In Cicero, for whom friendship is virtuous only insofar as it is compatible with the 
duties of Roman citizenship, the two men are an example of a friendship that 
extended well beyond its proper bounds.  In the dialogue, Laelius informs his 
interlocutors about the time when Caius Blossius came to him to receive pardon for 
actions disloyal to the state.  Attempting to justify what he had done, Blossius 
claimed he had been bound by loyalty to his friend Tiberius Gracchus.  Hearing this, 
Laelius proceeded to investigate just how far these bonds of friendship might have 
extended: 
‘Etiamne si te in Capitolium faces ferre vellet?’ ‘Numquam,’ inquit, ‘voluisset 
id  quidem; sed si voluisset, paruissem.’  Videtis quam nefaria vox!  Et 
hercule ita  fecit, vel plus etiam quam dixit; non enim paruit ille Tiberii 
Gracchi temeritati,  sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius furoris sed ducem 
praebuit. . . . Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati si amici causa peccaveris; nam 
cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere 





[“Even,” I said, “if he wanted you to set the Capitol on fire?”  “He would 
never have wanted that,” he answered “but if he had, I would have complied.”  
You can see what a pernicious thing to say that was; and, in fact, he put it into 
practice, or even did more than what he said: he did not simply follow the rash 
designs of Tiberius Gracchus, but was the author of them. . . . it is no excuse 
for wrongdoing if one does wrong for the sake of a friend, for, since the belief 
in each other’s good character was the agent that brought the friends together 




That Blossius remained loyal to Gracchus and supported him during the revolutionary 
activity he undertook for popular land reforms is unequivocally referred to as a form 
of wickedness.  While Montaigne mentions that Blossius admitted he would have 
burned Roman temples if Gracchus had requested it, he softens the statement by 
claiming that Blossius had “la volonté de Gracchus en sa manche” (1.28.71) 
[“Gracchus’ will up his sleeve” (1.28.140)] and completely omits their revolutionary 
solidarity.  In Cicero, no friendship is so perfect that it cannot be broken:  “they ought 
not to consider themselves under any obligation to stand by friends who are disloyal 
to the republic.”  In Montaigne, though, sovereign friendship seeks to exempt itself 
from the requirements of citizenship:  “Ils estoient plus amis que citoyens, plus amis 
qu'amis et qu'ennemis de leur païs (1.28.71) [“They were friends more than citizens, 
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friends more than friends or enemies of their country” (1.28.140)].
16
  All that keeps 
Montaigne’s notion of sovereign friendship politically conservative is his assertion of 
its perfection, rarity, and ultimately, unworldliness.
17
  In this guise, friendship 
approaches what Arendt calls love, a form of intimacy in which the relation to the 
beloved eliminates the space that might otherwise exist between political subjects: 
“Love, by reason of its passion, destroys the in-between which relates us to and 
separates us from others” (The Human Condition 242).   
Sovereign friendship in Montaigne thus severs the obligations of public life, a 
fact that is resonant with conclusions Arendt finds him drawing in “Of Solitude”: “Il 
se faut reserver une arriereboutique toute nostre, toute franche, en laquelle nous 
establissons nostre vraye liberté et principale retraicte et solitude. En cette-cy faut-il 
prendre nostre ordinaire entretien de nous à nous mesmes, et si privé que nulle 
acointance ou communication estrangiere y trouve place” (1.39.242) [“We must 
reserve a back shop all our own, entirely free, in which to establish our real liberty 
and our principal retreat and solitude.  Here our ordinary conversation must be 
between us and ourselves, and so private that no outside association or 
communication can find a place…” (1.39.177).  While Montaigne’s retreat from the 
political realm is not tied to a bourgeois pursuit of private economic interests (“un 
office servile que la mesnagerie”[1.39.244]) [“the care of an estate is a job for slaves” 
                                                 
16
Powell notes in his commentary that “Montaigne, Essai 1.28, takes issue with Cicero over his 
judgment on Blossius” (98).  But Montaigne’s changes are better categorized as muted, even 
surreptitious, alterations that are representative of an early modern tension between monarchical and 
amity-based forms of sovereignty.  At once declaring the priority of friendship over every other 
obligation and concealing the potential for political rupture by denying the radical possibilities made 
explicit in Cicero, Montaigne presents the private sphere of friendship as an innocuous retreat from 
public life. 
17
For a discussion of the wider Renaissance cultural belief in true friendship as an anomaly, see Ulrich 




(1.39.180)], and must be mitigated by his longstanding civic service, it does 
nevertheless suggest that the primary end of life is a care for the solitary self rather 
than for the world: “Il est temps de nous desnouer de la societé, puis que nous n'y 
pouvons rien apporter. (1.39.242) [“It is time to untie ourselves from society, since 
we can contribute nothing to it” (1.39.178)].  According to Arendt, Montaigne 
presents solitude as the “Situation, in der wir nichts mehr beitragen können zu der 
gemeinsamen Welt, dem human artifice” (Denktagebuch 349) [the “situation in 
which we can contribute nothing to the common world, the human artifice.”]  For 
Arendt, on the contrary, solitude is never a “silent dialogue between me and myself, 
but an anticipated dialogue with others…” (Men in Dark Times 10).  Thinking in 
solitude prepares one to return to a political form of friendship where the logic of the 
“other self” is always already interrupted by plurality, a radical otherness whose only 
common ground is the shared political world.  
But unlike political bonds of obligation that draw their power from a concern 
for the world, loosely binding individuals together while preserving their separate 
identities, the ideal friendship that Montaigne and La Boétie experienced effaced the 
distinction between self and other altogether:  
En l'amitié dequoy je parle, elles se meslent et confondent l'une en l'autre, d'un 
melange si universel, qu'elles effacent et ne retrouvent plus la couture qui les a 
jointes. Si on me presse de dire pourquoy je l'aymois, je sens que cela ne se 






[In the friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend with each other so 
completely that they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it 
again.  If you press me to tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be 
expressed, except by answering: Because it was he, because it was I.] 
(1.28.139) 
So rare is sovereign friendship, in fact, that Montaigne can cite no contemporary 
example that even approaches it: “entre nos hommes, il ne s'en voit aucune trace en 
usage” (1.28.69) [“among men of today you see no trace of it in practice” (1.28.136)].  
The impossibility of an incarnation of fraternal mutuality that escapes private 
interests absolutely—in which “il n'y a affaire ny commerce, que d'elle mesme” 
(1.28.71) [“there are no dealings or business except with itself” (1.28.138)]—is 
occluded by the nostalgic fantasy of the relationship Montaigne claims to have shared 
with the late Etienne de La Boétie.  Perhaps, as Tom Macfaul argues: “Death . . . 
provides a form of reconciliation, by sublimating . . . past feeling into an ideal which 
can no longer be altered” (65).   
     If the praise of friendship is a praise that includes the former self, it turns the 
present self into an uncanny thing—neither here nor there, neither now nor then.  The 
persistence of the self in the absence of the other gives the lie to any absolute 
intersubjective union and lowers the self even as it idealizes the other: “Car, de 
mesme qu'il me surpassoit d'une distance infinie en toute autre suffisance et vertu, 
aussi faisoit-il au devoir de l'amitié” (1.28.73) [“For just as he surpassed me infinitely 
in every other ability and virtue, so he did in the duty of friendship” (1.28.143)].  The 




another form of guilt for spectral images inadequately memorialized; shifting 
sovereignty from dead fathers to dead friends does not purge the subject of the 
superego.  Montaigne remarks in a letter to Paul de Foix that he possesses “bien aussi 
peu de moien et de suffisance pour . . . render” (1368) [“little means and ability to 
render” (1063)] faithfully the memory of La Boétie.
18
   Shortcomings appear here as 
an individual’s limited capacity for expression, rather than, as in Hamlet, as public 
but “maimed rites” of remembrance.
19
   
Although Montaigne is committed elsewhere in the Essais to a depiction of 
the ephemeral and ever-shifting qualities of a mutually constituting world and self, in 
“Of Friendship” he produces a unique memory of wholeness. And yet, even though 
his tone can be categorized as nostalgic, in grasping for a type of stabilizing force in a 
singular friendship rather than in family coats of arms that “n'ont de seurté non plus 
que les surnoms” (1.46.116) [“have no more security than surnames” (1.46.203)], 
Montaigne idealizes the past in a way that exceeds the parameters of Nietzsche’s 
notion of monumental history.  Monumental history, like revenge, seeks the 
restoration of an ideal past: “Er entnimmt daraus, dass das Grosse, das einmal da war, 
jedenfalls einmal möglich war und deshalb auch wohl wieder einmal mölich sein wird 
(297) [“It is the knowledge that the great thing existed and was therefore possible, 
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and so may be possible again”(14)].
20 
 As a cultural anomaly, something that happens 
only “une fois en trois siecles” (1.28.70) [“once in three centuries” (1.28.136)]—and 
even then only through mere fortune or coincidence—sovereign friendship is an 
absence to be mourned, not a political project that can actively be pursued.  Here we 
may call to mind Arendt’s argument that discussions of the rarity of ideal love have a 
tendency to obfuscate the political problems that the concept of ideal love itself 
introduces: “Love, by its very nature, is unworldly, and it is for this reason rather than 
its rarity that it is not only apolitical but antipolitical, perhaps the most powerful of all 
antipolitical human forces” (The Human Condition 242).  For the Montaigne of “On 
Friendship” (if not for the more Pyrrhonian Montaignes of other essays), or Hamlet 
himself, the “unweeded garden” of the world can never again be cultivated.   
     Such a relation to the past, though, produces a malaise in the present.  All the 
pleasures of life, Montaigne writes, “au lieu de me consoler, me redoublent le regret 
de sa perte” (1.28.73) [“instead of consoling me, redouble my grief for his loss” 
(1.28.143)].    With the death of La Boétie, the “amitié qui possede l'ame et la regente 
en toute souveraineté” (1.28.73) [“friendship that possesses the soul and rules it with 
absolute sovereignty” (1.28.143)] persists only to cast a pall over the present: “ce 
n'est que fumée, ce n'est qu'une nuit obscure et ennuyeuse” (1.28.73) [“it is nothing 
but smoke, nothing but dark and dreary night” (1.28.143)].  Because the Platonic 
union of Montaigne and La Boétie meant that they went “à moitié de tout” [“halves in 
everything”], it thus now seems to Montaigne as if he is “luy desrobe sa part” 
(1.28.73) [“robbing him of his share” (1.28.143)].  Preserving for the reader the idea 
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of a sovereignty and wholeness achieved through friendships of the past, the essay 
passes on as its own legacy a feeling of dispossession. 
 
Hamlet and Horatio 
By contrast, Hamlet is oriented by a desire to restore a world that has been 
lost.  Briefly recall the way Arendt reads Hamlet’s sense of obligation at the close of 
the play’s first act: “In the last analysis, the human world is always the product of 
man’s amor mundi, a human artifice whose potential immortality is always subject to 
the mortality of those who build it and the natality of those who come to live in it.  
What Hamlet said is always true: ‘The time is out of joint; O cursed spite / That ever I 
was born to set it right!’” (The Promise of Politics 204).  Here Hamlet speaks on 
behalf of natality, Arendt’s coinage for newborn agents continually emerging onto the 
world stage, inserting themselves into the political world they have entered and 
altering it through their actions, however incalculable or indeterminate.  Insofar as 
action relies upon the power of multiple actors, it is of interest to wonder whether 
Hamlet speaks these lines as an aside, replicating the isolation that characterizes the 
play’s extended soliloquies, or whether Hamlet confides this obligation—however 
elliptically—to Horatio and Marcellus, the “good friends” (1.5.146) who promise to 
keep secret their encounter with Old Hamlet’s ghost.
21
  Hamlet has just dispensed 
with the protocols of class difference in favor of solidarity, urging the pair a moment 
before, “Let us go in together” (1.5.194).  He repeats this immediately after, when 
(presumably) seeing Horatio and Marcellus hesitate, he enjoins them: “Nay, come, 
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let’s go together” (1.5.198).  Taken together with the interactions of Bernardo, 
Francisco, Marcellus, and Horatio, "friends to this ground" (1.1.16) who open the 
play expressing their concern for Denmark in opinions that diagnose and attempt to 
understand the appearance of the ghost (Horatio: “But in the gross and scope of mine 
opinion, / This bodes some strange eruption to our state” [1.5.71-72])  and the reason 
for their enforced vigil (Marcellus: “What might be toward, that this sweaty haste / 
Doth make the night joint-laborer with the day: / Who is’t that can inform me” 
[1.1.80-82]), we might identify in Hamlet’s disclosure (if it is a disclosure) the 
nascent signs of political friendship.   
For one necessary condition of the discourse of political friendship is that the 
doxa of citizens—how the world appears to each in their own particularity—not 
become obscured by any purportedly objective or universal truths.  Speaking about 
the world which "friends have in common" is, by and large, what constitutes this form 
of friendship:  "By talking about what is between them, it becomes ever more 
common to them.  It gains not only in its specific articulateness, but develops and 
expands and finally, in the course of time and life, begins to constitute a little world 
of its own which is shared in friendship" (The Promise of Politics 16).   Marcellus’s 
plea for others to help him understand cultivates a space for doxa (“Who is’t can 
inform me?”[1.1.82]), and Horatio responds in kind, but only by further widening the 
scope of the debate to include what others, not present, have themselves concluded: 
“That can I.  / At least so the whisper goes” (1.1.82-83).  This “at least” lends his 
explanation a provisional quality which is echoed throughout the scene: “And this, I 




I heard, and do in part believe it” (1.1.170).  The speculative atmosphere adds weight 
to another allusion Arendt makes to Hamlet’s articulation of responsibility, where she 
uses it to illustrate the deliberative possibility for friends in "dark times" together to 
test “the limits of their ability to understand even inhumanity and the intellectual and 
political monstrosities of a time out of joint" (Men in Dark Times 17).   
Yet the lonely quality of Hamlet’s protestation against his fate suggests that 
the form of aristocratic revenge in which he feels an obligation to participate supplies 
yet another incarnation of the sovereign theory of action we explored in The Rape of 
Lucrece, Julius Caesar, and Coriolanus.  If Martius recalls Rome’s defeat of Corioles 
as an event that he alone achieved (“Alone I did it” [5.6.116]), Hamlet thinks that he 
alone “was born to set it right.”  And tellingly, when Hamlet contemplates revenge 
(either by himself or with Horatio), the manifestations of civic doxa evident in the 
play’s first scene give way to an underlying devotion to truth that is only superficially 
concealed by Hamlet's articulations of doubt.  As Georg Lukacs points out, 
notwithstanding the “‘sceptical’ and ‘philosophical’” qualities that Hamlet evinces, he 
“never for a moment doubts that he is impelled as though by categorical imperative to 
seek blood revenge” (142).  Dutifulness to a law of truth, in this case to the truth of 
sovereignty in kingship, establishes an ultimate authority for action that obviates the 
need for consultation with others, others with manifestly different experiences of the 
world.  Under such conditions, non-sovereign friendship cannot appear: “The political 
element in friendship is that in the truthful dialogue each of the friends can 
understand the truth inherent in the other's opinion.  More than his friend as a person, 




appears to the other, who as a person is forever unequal and different" (The Promise 
of Politics 18).  The notion of an absolute truth (whether philosophic, religious, or 
scientific) that is independent of contextualized, sensuous experience imposes a law 
of logicality and an obligation to “objectivity” that does not require the opinions of 
others.  Regarding this sense of duty, Arendt observes that a guilty conscience is 
produced not when one sacrifices politics to truth but, instead, truth to politics.  And 
in its cruelest manifestations, the idea of truth can be deployed to naturalize 
difference, as when scientific discourses were used to construct the Jews as a pariah-
people who could be deprived of rights, or even, under totalitarianism, could be killed 
en masse.   
Political friendship, an endangered form of solidarity that takes human 
plurality as the ground for the possibility of a shared world, poses the only relevant 
question that Arendt believes can stand in opposition to the dictates of truth: "Would 
any such doctrine, however convincingly proved, be worth the sacrifice of so much as 
a single friendship between the two men?”(Men in Dark Times 29).  Parting company 
with Aristotle, Arendt credits Socrates with locating within the experience of thinking 
by oneself the logically prior experience of dialogue with particular others; when the 
experience of plurality is remembered as the ground of experience, rather than 
construing the friend as another self, valorizing identity and logicality, it becomes 
clear that “The self, too, is a kind friend” and, moreover, that “the guiding experience 
in these matters is, of course, friendship and not selfhood”  (The Life of the Mind I, 
189).  Thinking, as I will explore with Arendt and Shakespeare in much greater detail 




that multiplicity of opinions and wills, is oriented by the prior experience of plurality 
so that thinking becomes the locus of ethical judgment and the staging ground for 
political action.  But Hamlet, while caught between his sovereign father and his 
sovereign friend, Horatio, largely remains preoccupied with being and truth rather 
than plurality and friendship.    
When Hamlet confronts Gertrude in her chambers, the image of Claudius held 
up next to that of Old Hamlet’s serves as a self-evident reflection of the truth of the 
dead king's virtues, while reminding us at the same time of his non-sovereignty, as 
evidenced by his very substitutability: “Could you on this fair mountain leave to feed 
/ And batten on this moor? (3.4.66-67).  Defending the truth of his father's 
sovereignty does serve as a kind of categorical imperative for Hamlet, something that, 
as Arendt puts it, “is postulated as absolute and in its absoluteness introduces in the 
interhuman realm—which by its nature consists of relationships—something that runs 
counter to its fundamental relativity” (Men in Dark Times 27).  And as we discover 
from Hamlet’s soliloquies, all relations—sexual no less than political—are potential 
threats to this truth, and indeed already appear to have transformed the world into an 
“unweeded garden.”
22
   
In his capacity as private friend, Horatio serves as a mere reflection of the 
truths that Hamlet takes to be indisputable; he does not manifest for Hamlet the 
plurality of the public world but, quite the contrary, represents for him the sameness 
of fraternity.  Hamlet claims that they will consult the opinions of one another 
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regarding Claudius’ reaction to the play (“after we will both our judgments join / In 
censure of his seeming” [3.2.86-87]), but when the time comes, Horatio’s 
noncommittal replies go characteristically unnoticed by the Prince of Denmark: 
Hamlet: O good Horatio, I’ll take the ghost’s word for a  
     thousand pound.  Didst perceive? 
Horatio: Very well, my lord. 
Hamlet: Upon the talk of the poisoning? 
Horatio: I did very well note him (3.2.280-84) 
Horatio does not express agreement here that Claudius has ratified the ghost’s 
accusations by his reaction to the staging of the Mousetrap.  Experienced as a mirror 
of Hamlet’s own convictions, Horatio thus in some measure reinforces the truth of the 
lone avenger-actor who rises to defend the sovereignty of his dead father.  But 
because revenge—itself unable to undo the King’s death or prolong others’ mourning 
his memory—is incapable of restoring this sovereignty, the idea of Horatio as friend 
salvages a different form of sovereignty.  As I hope to demonstrate, Hamlet attempts 
to compensate in some measure for the failed sovereignty of kingship, exchanging the 
monumental history of Hamlet's father for a monumentalizing of the singular friend.
23
 
     As does Montaigne, still another of Shakespeare's contemporaries, Thomas 
Churchyard, ascribes priority to the free choice of friendship over the givenness of 
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family relations in his A Sparke of Frendship (1588), describing it as choosing “by 
election and privy liking” (D2).  Hamlet uses the same language to describe the free 
act of determining his own sovereign friendship when he confesses to Horatio: “Since 
my dear soul was mistress of her choice, / And could of men distinguish her election / 
Sh’ath seal’d thee for herself . . .” (3.2.63-65).  A comparable freedom appears 
unavailable in romantic love, where the duty to preserve familial nobility impinges on 
it.  Witness Laertes’ counsel to Ophelia: 
…he himself is subject to his birth: 
He may not, as unvalued persons do, 
Carve for himself, for on his choice depends  
The sanity and health of this whole state; 
And therefore must his choice be circumscrib’d 
Unto the voice and yielding of that body 
Whereof he is the head. (1.3.18-24)  
If Hamlet’s bride selection must bear the imprint of his status as prince (“his 
greatness weigh’d, his will is not his own” [1.3.17]), his private election of a singular 
and sovereign friend operates in pronounced opposition to a polity governed by a 
sovereign monarch.  Indeed, it is with friendship, not this obligation to his father, that 
Hamlet, for a moment, at least, identifies the soul as monarch.  By “having 
seal’d…for herself,” the soul produces an obligation that competes (even if not 




“seal” the death of the false friends Rosencrantz and Guildenstern in the name of the 
father (5.2.48).
24
           
     And yet, for all that Hamlet has glimmers of Montaignian friendship, there is a 
pervasive sense that it has been blocked by Hamlet’s destiny as the namesake of a 
dead king.  When Claudius informs the prince that he is heir to the throne, he also 
makes clear that the political world is not one from which Hamlet can retreat: 
  You are the most immediate to our throne,  
  And with no less nobility of love 
  Than that which dearest father bears his son 
  Do I impart toward you.  For your intent 
  In going back to school in Wittenberg, 
  It is most retrograde to our desire. (1.2.109-14)  
Prior to the action of the play, then, Hamlet has expressed a desire to leave Denmark 
for Wittenberg; is it merely coincidence that this would mean escaping from the 
realm of his father and of public election to reach the place where the object of his 
private election happens to reside?   Margreta de Grazia has argued persuasively that, 
“the language of the play itself upholds the attachment of persons to land,” rather 
than, as much criticism after Hegel supposes, produces an interiorized representative 
of modernity that is striving to be independent from the land in the wake of a 
disinheritance: “[f]ramed by territorial conflict, [Hamlet] stages one contest over land 
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Even though Hamlet is among the most thoroughly mined literary artifacts in the English language, 
the play’s concern with friendship has been much less of a critical focus than might be expected.  As 
Robert C. Evans remarks, “friendship—a crucial concern of classical and Renaissance thinkers—has 
not received much explicit or systematic attention as an important and pervasive theme in 
Shakespeare’s great tragedy.” (88) See Evans for a detailed analysis of the play’s treatment of 
friendship, according to which Horatio appears as one of the play’s “best examples of friendship.” The 
best recent account is Michael Neill (319-38); see also Macfaul (141-68) and Keith Doubt (54-62).  




after another . . . .  The language of the play itself upholds the attachment of persons 
to land, humans to humus” (2-3).  But even if, as she argues, “it is not clear that 
personal identity can survive deracination or disentitlement,” this is precisely the 
crisis with which Hamlet is forced to cope (43).  And while revenge, the dominant 
logic of the play, seems to offer the possibility of clinging to an identity that is based 
on land and inheritance, Hamlet’s image of Horatio serves as an example of a Stoic 
resolve that might stave off the loss of identity in a different register
25
: 
          for thou hast been 
  As one, in suff’ring all, that suffers nothing, 
  A man that Fortune’s buffets and rewards 
  Hast ta’en with equal thanks; and blest are those 
  Whose blood and judgment are so well commeddled 
  That they are not a pipe for Fortune’s finger 
  To sound what stop she please.  Give me that man 
  That is not passion’s slave, and I will wear him 
  In my heart’s core, ay, in my heart of heart, 
  As I do thee.                    (3.2.65-74) 
We do not learn exactly what it is that Horatio has endured at the hands of fortune 
but, as with almost everything that Hamlet says, his encomium offers clues about his 
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Perhaps another reason that the friendship of Horatio and Hamlet is not explored in criticism as often 
as it might be is that Horatio is nearly always read as a character whose main function is to serve as an 
objective arbiter of the events in question during the play.  Bert States calls him “Our man in Elsinore,” 
and compares his role in the play to that of a Greek chorus, a species of ideal spectator (147-56).  John 
Halverson makes the somewhat dubious claim that “[i]t is Horatio’s unimpeachable witness that, 
virtually alone, confirms Hamlet’s essential integrity and nobility of soul; without this confirmation, 
Hamlet would be an almost intolerably ambiguous figure” (57).  Christopher Warley has recently used 
these critical assumptions about Horatio to explore the general problem of all claims of impartiality 






If filial identity is bound to land and inheritance, sovereign 
friendship attempts to fashion an identity out of itself by making the break from land 
and from subjection to fortune that is the Stoic’s fantasy.
  
Here I want to suggest that, 
pace de Grazia, a fully historicized Hegelian reading remains available as a way of 
diagnosing Hamlet’s conflicted stance toward his own situation, not as a symptom of 
an emerging teleological movement toward modernity and absolute spirit, but rather 
of a specific early modern preoccupation with two modes of sovereignty.  What this 
more modest reading would suggest is that sovereign friendship as a cultural 
phenomenon must be read as a development that arises in opposition to a preexisting 
form of political sovereignty.  As de Grazia suggests, the first mode of sovereignty is 
concerned with the mastery of land and the mastery of others; the other mode, the 
fantasy of Stoic self-sufficiency, emerges in the guise of sovereign friendship as a 
reaction to this first mode.
26
  
Indeed, it is Hegel himself who still provides the best analysis of the Stoic 
mode of consciousness as a fantasy: what constitutes Stoicism is “. . . weder ein 
Anderes als es, noch die reine Abstraktion des Ich . . . sondern Ich, welches das 
Anderssein, aber als gedachten Unterschied an ihm hat, so daß es in seinem 
Anderssein unmittelbar in sich zurückgekehrt ist . . .” (134) [“. . . neither an other 
than itself, nor the pure abstraction of the ‘I,’ but an ‘I’ which has otherness within 
itself, though in the form of thought, so that in its otherness it has directly returned to 
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de Grazia’s groundbreaking study has important implications for my reading of the play.  She shows 
us how the long-standing generic categorization of Hamlet as a “pure tragedy” obscures its proximity 
to Shakespearean history plays: “The critical tradition that has identified Hamlet with the onset of the 
modern period has ignored the centrality of land.  For this tradition, it makes little or no difference that 
Claudius, ‘a cutpurse of the empire’ (3.4.99), has dispossessed Hamlet of the realm to which his birth 






  Is this not precisely what Hamlet articulates when, seeing in 
Horatio his model of a Stoic self impervious to fortune (“thou has been as one, in 
suffering all, that suffers nothing”), he internalizes him (“I will wear him in my 
heart’s core”) as an ideal friend?  The idea of sovereignty reemerges for Hamlet, then, 
as a contradictory partnership that asserts each member’s absolute independence from 
the external world—from the “thousand natural shocks / That flesh is heir to” (3.1.62-
63)—at the same time that it depends on the image of the other.   The Stoic friend 
who is “not passion’s slave” appears to be master of himself, a projection that 
provides an alternative to the revenger whose pre-scripted identity oversupplies “the 
motive and cue for passion” (2.2.555).  As Hamlet’s representation of absolute self-
mastery, this version of Horatio exemplifies the prince’s own desires for individual 
sovereignty. 
Horatio therefore fulfills the function of the friend that Jacques Derrida finds 
in the Ciceronian tradition of friendship, where by means of an exemplar of the self, 
“on projette ou reconnait dans l’ami vrai son exemplar, son double idéal, son autre 
soi-même, le meme que soi en mieux (20) [“projected or recognized in the true friend, 
it is his ideal double, the same as self but improved” (Politics of Friendship 4)].  This 
projection is not merely a misrecognition of the self as other, but an anticipation of a 
sovereign self not yet actualized: “Parce qu’on le regarde nous regarder, se regarder 
ainsi, parce qu’on le voit garder notre image dans les yeux, en vérité dans les nôtres, 
la survie alors est espérée, d’avance illuminée, sinon assurée, pour ce Narcisse qui 
rêve d’immortalité.  Au-delà de la mort, l’avenir absolu reçoit ainsi sa lumière 
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Georg Wilhelm Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Leipzig: Dürr’chen Buchhandlung, 1907); for 




extatique, il apparaît seulement depuis ce narcissisme et selon cette logique du 
même” (20) [“Since we watch him looking at us, thus watching ourselves, because 
we see him keeping our image in his eyes—in truth in ours—survival is then hoped 
for, illuminated in advance, if not assured, for this Narcissus who dreams of 
immortality.  Beyond death, the absolute future thus receives its ecstatic light, it 
appears only from within this narcissism and according to this logic of the same” 
(Politics of Friendship 4)].  Unlike the ghostly vision of the father that unsettles 
confidence in the sovereign self, haunting the notion because it has not been 
sufficiently remembered (“Do not forget.  This visitation / Is but to whet thy almost 
blunted purpose” [3.4.109-110]), the projection of a future solidity found in the 
private friend—this image of Horatio—bolsters sovereignty by suggesting a possible 
future self, an “other self” who would shed the indecisiveness and uncertainty of the 
avenging actor (“…for it cannot be / But I am pigeon-livered and lack gall” [2.2.572-
73]). 
Nevertheless, Hamlet himself seems to rehearse the possibility of an alternate 
sovereignty from an ironic distance, as if painfully aware that—in contrast with the 
demands of Hamlet’s father—his vision of ideal friendship is itself a sort of tautology 
that, in its absolute separation from material reality, is an unsustainable fantasy. 
“Something too much of this,” Hamlet tells Horatio, abruptly shifting the 
conversation back to the topic of revenge (3.2.74).  As Arendt puts it: “sovereignty is 
possible only in imagination, paid for by the price of reality” (Human Condition 235).  
Indeed,
 
the prevailing model of friendship foregrounded in Hamlet more closely 




another cause and object of reward than friendship itself” (1.128.136).  When Hamlet 
asks Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, “. . . in the beaten way of friendship, what make 
you at Elsinore?” their response, “To visit you, my lord, no other occasion” (2.2.269-
71), might, if true, appear to fulfill the condition of sovereign friendship that it “have 
no other dealings except with itself” (1.28.138).  But the audience (and Hamlet, too, 
as it turns out) knows that it is “the sovereign power” of Claudius, not sovereign 
friendship, that has brought them to Denmark (2.2.26).  
Since we do not know which “dozen or sixteen lines” (2.2.535) inserted into 
the The Mousetrap are Hamlet’s, he may himself be author of the Player King’s 
speech that articulates—and anticipates—a betrayal of love in terms of the fragility of 
friendships in the political world:    
  This world is not for aye, nor ’tis not strange 
  That even our loves should with our fortunes change... 
  The great man down, you mark his favorite flies; 
  The poor advanc’d makes friends of enemies; 
  And hitherto doth love on fortune tend: 
  For who not needs shall never lack a friend, 
  And who in want a hollow friend doth try 
  Directly seasons him his enemy.  (3.2.195-204) 
Counterpoised against the lines spoken to Horatio earlier in the very same scene, the 
image of the Stoic friend begins to appear to us a naïve exception that has 
nevertheless been retained by Hamlet as an ideal to be achieved.  And although 




income (Hamlet: “Nay, do not think I flatter, / For what advancement may I hope 
from thee / That no revenue hast but thy good spirits / To feed and clothe thee?) 
[3.2.57–60], this familiarity is not reciprocal.
28
  As Michael Neil observes: “for all its 
rhetoric of equality and the intense emotion Hamlet invests in it, royal friendship 
remains a painfully one-sided thing: Hamlet may garland Horatio with the pronouns 
of intimacy, ‘thee’ and ‘thou,’ but Horatio can never use the same intimate voice” 
(Neill 333).
29
  Thus if the notion of sovereign friendship now seems unsustainable, it 
is not yet because a realization about the inevitable non-sovereignty of all human 
action has set in, but rather because the material reality dominated by the sovereignty 
of kingship and hierarchy appears to prevent its fulfillment.  In Denmark, at least, 
friendship among equals does not appear possible.   
Still, a vision of an equality that is just out of reach undergirds Hamlet’s 
escapist tendencies.  Recall that earlier, in act 2, Hamlet discloses to Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern his conviction that “Denmark’s a prison” (2.2.243; Folio only).  Even 
though by this point in the play Hamlet’s desire to leave the country has been 
complicated by the appearance of the ghost and the command to remember his father, 
we should not entirely lose track of his earlier “intent” to return to Wittenberg 
(1.2.113).  Hamlet’s connection with Horatio, after all, is that of a “fellow-student” 
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 Lars Engle concludes from these lines that, “Politically powerless, [Horatio] can confer no 
advancement in return for insincere praise.” (257).     
29
 In his book Shakespeare, Love and Service, David Schalkwyk concludes that friendship in the early 
modern period was capable of shifting the relationship of subordination between masters and servants 
toward a friendship relation: “The initial conception of the servant as instrument is transformed via the 
recognition of the imaginative incorporation of that instrumentality into the master’s own subjectivity, 
following one of the most traditional tropes for love” (52).  Notably, Schalkwyk argues that the vision 
of the servant-friend as an “other self” could, “under certain circumstances render friendship possible, 
but those circumstances tend also to be its condition of impossibility. It promises but seldom delivers 
the ideal forms of autonomy and equality that sovereign amity requires, and to which eros in 




(1.2.177).  As Elizabeth Hanson has recently demonstrated, during the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries, the nobility and gentry were entering universities in 
increasing numbers; because universities had traditionally been reserved for the 
education of the “poor,” the class status of their more well-born attendees may have 
been undermined or contested by such institutional rules as those regulating the 
modesty of student dress.
30
  Thus Wittenberg may have offered Hamlet and Horatio a 
temporary reprieve from established hierarchies and been a more appropriate 
breeding ground for an amicitia among equals, something Denmark cannot offer 
them.
31
   And consistent with Margaret Ferguson’s observation that the language of 
Hamlet has the “curious effect of materializing the word” such that the distinction 
between literal and figurative meaning becomes unclear, both “Denmark” and 
“prison” become unstable in precisely this way when we recall two sets of details: 
Denmark is both a place Hamlet has been prevented from leaving and a word that 
also functions as a synecdoche in the play, with the father-king standing in for the 
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 In Hanson’s own words: “Insofar as clerical institutions create their communities through their own 
disciplines, rather than their members’ heredity, their membership is open ended and their practices 
can weaken other modes of social distinction. The ‘poor’ for whom the universities were supposed to 
have been founded and of whom Horatio is an exemplar may have been characterized not by actual 
economic poverty as much as by imperviousness to social class: a radical lack of status, either high or 
low” (212). 
31
 Part of Hanson’s fine essay compares the significance of place, Wittenberg in relation to Denmark, 
and thus resembles my own: “‘Wittenberg’ signifies ‘the university’ in the way that ‘Elsinore’ means 
‘the court.’  When ‘Wittenberg’ is paired with ‘Elsinore’ or ‘Denmark,’ it reminds us that these spaces 
cannot be occupied at the same time: for Hamlet, Horatio, and (in Q1) Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, 
to be in Elsinore is to be from Wittenberg.  As Hamlet’s unsuccessful suit to Claudius in 1.2 makes 
clear, ‘Denmark’s a prison’ (2.2.243), and Hamlet wants to escape it for the university.  In this way, 
Hamlet establishes at the outset a geography for its existentially fraught action, situating it in the 
corrupt and sycophantic court but shadowing the rotten state of Denmark with another space, the 
university, from whence the prince’s nobility of character seems to derive, less ambiguously perhaps 
for modern audiences than for those at the turn of the seventeenth century. However, if Wittenberg is 
an ‘elsewhere’ to Elsinore’s claustrophobic ‘here,’ it is also made present at Elsinore in the person of 
Horatio, whose displacement from university to court is signaled by his reply to Hamlet’s query, ‘But 
what in faith make you from Wittenberg?’—‘A truant disposition, good my lord’ (1.2.168–69) [220-
21].”  An earlier version of my chapter was published in the volume Friendship in the Middle Ages 
and Early Modern Age; Hanson’s argument was published subsequently to my own. 




nation (Ferguson 292).  In the opening scene, for example, the ghost takes the form of 
“the majesty of buried Denmark” (1.1.51).  Not long after, Gertrude urges Hamlet to 
conceal any enmity he harbors—both for the realm he wishes to depart and for the 
person of his uncle—by appearing to be a friend:  “let thine eye look like a friend on 
Denmark” (1.2.69).  Denmark is a place where one can “look like a friend” rather 
than actually become one.  This corresponds with Laurie Shannon’s suggestion that: 
“For the royal subject, friendship proposes an idealized world apart, a world 
magnifying that subject’s ‘sovereign prerogative’ as an individual” (Shannon, 
Sovereign Amitie 125).  And as Hamlet demonstrates, prohibitions often augment the 
idealization of desires: escaping back to Wittenberg represents an escape from 
Denmark and from fathers to friends, from an economy of the sovereign patriarch that 
demands for love an impossible revenge to a (more modern) economy of sovereign 
friendship whose requirement for love—mere arrival—is, perhaps, equally 
impossible.        
 
The Pariah and the Parvenu 
  When Hamlet claims, “I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself king 
of infinite space” (2.2.254-55), we again witness the Stoic illusion of sovereignty that 
is propped up by a refusal to acknowledge a dependency on others, apparently even 
one’s friends.  As Arendt points out, the desire to deny the fundamental condition of 
non-sovereignty may very well result in an “abstention from the whole realm of 
human affairs” (Human Condition 234).  A loss of kingship in Hamlet generates Stoic 




public freedom precipitates desire for “an escape from the world into the self which, 
it is hoped, will be able to sustain itself in sovereign independence of the outside 
world” (9 Men in Dark Times).  Although the play's preoccupations with kingship and 
patriarchy produce an opposition that is peculiarly early modern, it would not be 
amiss to consider them as at least analogous to, if not proleptic of, private friendship's 
function in modern liberalism to sustain the flight from political life.  In Hamlet, we 
witness something of what Arendt describes as an “inner emigration,” a retreat into 
private thought and emotion that repudiates but cannot deny the individual’s 
responsibilities as citizen (Men in Dark Times 19).  And because Arendt ultimately 
concluded that this disposition toward individual isolation was among the greatest 
dangers facing the modern world, I will take the risk of trying to glean from 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet those elements of friendship which, subsequent to Arendt’s 
analysis, appear as subterranean trends that we have inherited.   
In her articulation of the phenomenon of “inner emigration,” Arendt points to 
the situation of the cultural pariah.   Deprived of rights and a space in which to 
experience political friendship through public-spirited action and discourse, pariahs 
cultivate intimate and fraternal friendship as a stop-gap against the sense of 
worldlessness that accompanies exclusion from a political community.  Pariah 
peoples (by which we might imagine not only the 20
th
-century Jewish populations in 
anti-Semitic Europe but also communities of undocumented migrant workers in the 
United States today) may thus rely on fraternity, friendships based in a politics of 
identity that forms a protective circle against the properly political world that has 




We might well ask what the experience of a prince of Denmark has in 
common with that of the pariah.  Certainly, if a world of public freedom is to be 
sustained, the closeness of private fraternity cannot serve as a universal substitute for 
it, only as a temporary and situational one.  As Arendt argues:   
Flight from the world in dark times of impotence can always be justified as 
long as reality is not ignored, but is constantly acknowledged as the thing that 
must be escaped.  When people choose this alternative, private life too can 
retain a by no means insignificant reality, even though it remains impotent.  
Only it is essential for them to realize that the realness of this reality consists 
not in its deeply personal note, any more than it springs from privacy as such, 
but inheres in the world from which they have escaped.  They must remember 
that they are constantly on the run, and that the world’s reality is actually 
expressed by their escape. (Men in Dark Times 22) 
Nevertheless, Arendt also concedes that in such “dark times” (what Arendt, 
channeling Hamlet, also refers to as “a time out of joint” [17]), the pariah’s response 
to a politics that does not accommodate difference—seeking refuge in invisibility and 
fraternity—holds a much wider appeal, as concern for the world gives way to shame 
for what the world has become:  “And in invisibility, in that obscurity in which a man 
who is himself hidden need no longer see the visible world either, only the warmth 
and fraternity of closely packed human beings can compensate for the weird irreality 
that human relationships assume wherever they develop in absolute worldlessness, 
unrelated to a world common to all people” (16 Men in Dark Times).  This tendency 




sovereignty of private thought—might have for the aristocratic revenger like Hamlet, 
a solitary agent who alone is obliged to restore the world to its former pristine state.  
Another possibility for the pariah is the path of the parvenu, who instead of 
withdrawing, hysterically pursues acceptance into social and political worlds (from 
which she is either explicitly or implicitly excluded) without attempting to alter them.  
For some European Jews, this could require taking extreme measures toward 
assimilation, attempting to eliminate all recognizable ethnic markers and even 
internalizing a system of values that denigrated the pariah group from which they are 
trying to distinguish themselves.
32
  The French word, parvenu, designates someone 
who has merely “arrived” on the scene.  Prior to Arendt’s appropriation of the term, it 
was most frequently a class marker, referring to the nouveau riche who attempted to 
enter into French aristocratic circles with newly acquired wealth.  Arendt’s Jewish 
parvenu, then, in some measure imitates the behavior of this bourgeois individual 
who sought to achieve acceptance through capital and through his own imitation of 
courtly norms of conduct.
33
   
I have introduced Arendt’s pariah and parvenu because they can tell us 
something important about the introduction of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern at the 
Danish court (“Welcome, dear Rosencrantz and Guildenstern” [2.2.1]) as well as 
about the obstacles to political friendship which modernity increasingly presents us 
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 In her biography of the Jewish writer Rahel Varnhagen, Arendt quotes from a letter in which 
Varnhagen attempts to understand how this phenomenon had operated in her own life, as she had 
organized one of the most well-known salons from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century: 
“the Jew must be extirpated from us; that is the sacred truth, and it must be done even if life were 
uprooted in the process” (Rahel Varnhagen 183). 
33
 Providing context for the historical circumstances Rahel Varnhagen faced, Arendt writes: 
“Nineteenth-century Jews, if they wanted to play a part in society, had no choice but to become 
parvenus par excellence, and certainly in those decades of reaction they were the choicest examples of 




with.  Given their view of the middling social position they currently occupy in the 
world (“Happy that we are not over-happy / On fortune’s cap we are not the very 
button” [2.2.228-29]), the pair have been read as representatives of early modern 
class mobility: they are either aristocrats by birth who have fallen out of favor with 
fortune or men’s eyes, or else they are members of the gentry aspiring to become 
newly minted members of the royal court, with all its attendant privileges (Blits, 
Deadly Thought 127).   In either case, they seem devoid of the capacity to act, 
offering themselves as flexible instruments of the King and Queen’s will: “But we 
both obey, / And here give up ourselves in the full bent / To lay our service freely at 
your feet / To be commanded” (2.2.29-32).  Claudius and Getrude drop vague hints of 
the rewards they may receive for this willingness to subordinate all other principles of 
action to that of obedience to authority (“Your visitation shall receive such thanks / 
As fits a king’s remembrance" [2.2.25-26]).  Yet even as the royal pair seem to gentle 
the condition of these parvenu ("Thanks, Rosencrantz and gentle Guildenstern/ 
Thanks, Guildenstern and gentle Rosencrantz" [2.2.33-34]), in equal measure they de-
differentiate them as distinct individuals.
34
  Like the dactylic metrical foot that 
conjoins their names, both the play and its politics conspire to mold Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern into uniform subjects.    
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 Kenneth Muir characterizes Rosencrantz of Guildenstern as “indistinguishable as Tweedledum and 
Tweedledee” (68).  The onstage possibilities of this moment, consistent with Muir’s claims, are 
exploited by Tom Stoppard in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead (earlier 1-act version called 
Guildenstern and Rosencrantz are Dead), where the alternating lines of Claudius and Gertrude 
demonstrate not only their own confusion about who is Guildenstern and who Rosencrantz (Gertrude 
“correcting” Claudius while herself being mistaken), but also the characters’ own (Guildenstern 
bowing when Rosencrantz’s name is spoken, 36-37).  Responding to a modern theatrical tradition that 
similarly represents the pair, Marvin Rosenberg, however, outlines in some detail the individual 
differences in the speech patterns of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern that he finds suggestive of 




Like the parvenu, and apparently eager to conform to the rules and standards 
of the court or salon, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern participate in the effacement of 
their individual characters through the cultivation of a postured unanimity.  One 
frequently either finishes the other’s sentence, or provides a perspective that is 
intended to speak for both.  This pattern of collective response marks not only their 
dutifulness (“we both obey” [2.2.29]) and social status (“Happy that we are not over-
happy” [2.2.228]), but also the purpose of their visit with Hamlet (“What should we 
say, my lord?” [2.2.277]) and, finally, the unanimous quality of their thoughts ("We 
think not so, my lord" [2.2.248]). 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, who do not seem to mind (or even to notice) 
that they are shirking responsibility for an endeavor in which they are willing 
participants, rely entirely on external authority to provide them with their code of 
conduct.  Arendt deems this attitude to the world “behavior,” a term she deploys to 
distinguish the astonishingly automatic quality that accompanies rote adherence to a 
truth or to authority from an individual’s ability to think, to judge a situation, and then 
to act with the principle of plurality in mind.
35
  In the context of the parvenu, behavior 
is paradoxically at once both self-centered and self-annihilating, concerned as it is 
with the preservation of the individual by means of a practiced attunement to, and a 
habitual readiness to obey, the expectations of the presiding authority in any given 
situation.  Such unquestioning conformism loses sight of the world that stands 
between actors.  If parvenu behavior were to shift from being the exception to 
becoming the norm, both principled action and doxa would lack a space in which to 
                                                 
35
 Hannah Pitkin identifies this characterization of behavior in Rahel Varnhagen, where Rahel, in a 
moment of reflection, describes her non-engagement with the world as precisely “doing...nothing”, 




appear, to become meaningful, and to support the tangible forms of solidarity which 
sustain political friendship.   
In the case of the 19
th
-century Jewish parvenus that Arendt explores in Rahel 
Varnhagen— those exceptional because wealthy Jews who did escape from pariah 
existence into the salon—the price of assimilation was at least to some extent to 
internalize the oppressor’s system of values.  It could even mean supporting the 
continued exclusion of other Jews, particularly poor immigrants and refugees, the 
class of pariahs from which they sought to dissociate themselves.
36
  Political 
friendship, which requires acts of solidarity, withers under such pressure.  For to 
ensure success, the parvenu must learn to ignore his capacity “to distinguish between 
friend and enemy,” thereby relinquishing political forms of friendship altogether.  
This unthinking conformity to the world as it is holds special affinities with the 
apolitical focus of the modern citizen writ large, who must increasingly adapt to a 
world of radical, deracinating change as a people who are both isolated from one 
another (insofar as they cannot openly exchange opinions about the world that has 
deracinated them) and thrown together as a uniform mass of living beings.  Both the 
path of the pariah who seeks intimate, private friendship as a substitute for the 
political world and the parvenu who sacrifices friendship as well as action to 
conformism, avoid the open conflict and dispute that are the ground of political life. 
(Men in Dark Times 30). 
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That Hamlet deploys the prison trope just moments before he reveals his 
knowledge of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s business with him as the court's 
parvenus ("But in the beaten way of friendship, what make you at Elsinore" [2.2.269-
70]) further suggests a connection between the absence of a public space for 
friendship and Hamlet’s alternation between remaking the world alone and 
abandoning it altogether.  Notwithstanding what transpires on the battlements in the 
opening scenes of the play, nothing in the Denmark of Hamlet resembles what we 
observed in Coriolanus, the dialogue between citizens and the concerted action that 
constitutes what Arendt calls power.  In Hamlet, action is limited to the dream of 
violence that would remake the state in the father's image at the sovereign hand of the 
filial avenger.  But as we have seen, that dream—Hamlet's recognition that the “time 
is out of joint" and that he has a responsibility “to set it right”—is diverted because 
his father and his birth make of him a continual object of suspicion within the court 
that constitutes his world.  This general condition of surveillance ("Well, we will sift 
him--Welcome, my good friends!” [2.2.58-59]), made all the more pervasive by the 
presence of the parvenu, (“What have you, my good friends, deserved at the hands of 
Fortune that she sends you to prison hither?” [2.2.239-42]), darkens the name of 
friend.  Hamlet is led to despise the world of appearances (“Seems, madam?  Nay, it 
is. I know not 'seems'” [1.2.76]) and, by fits and starts, to turn away from it, seeking 
out the warmth of intimate friendship.   
And in the moments when Hamlet seems oriented by sovereign friendship, 
finding in Horatio’s Stoic resolve an ideal friend and “other self,” his attitude to the 




the public realm, to ignore them as far as possible, or even to overleap them and, as it 
were, reach behind them—as if the world were only a façade behind which people 
could conceal themselves—in order to arrive at mutual understandings with their 
fellow men without regard for the world that lies between them” (Men in Dark Times 
11-12 ).  Within the liberal imaginary to which I have alluded, private friendship also 
appears as an exit from the disappointments, uncertainties and risks associated with 
rebuilding a public world that has become inhospitable.  As Arendt puts it, “Nothing 
in our time is more dubious, it seems to me, than our attitude toward the world…” 
(Men in Dark Times 4).  In both Hamlet’s context and our own, this proffered exit 
multiplies the dream of sovereignty, splitting it into two radically independent forms: 
the sovereign state that polices its citizens and wages war on other sovereign states 
and the individual who is free to act as sovereign within the private sphere of 
intimacy and of market transactions.   
Here we can read the mutually reinforcing dialectic between the competing 
notions of sovereignty that Hamlet is, that we are all to some extent, caught 
between—between Alexander and Plato, between mastery of others and mastery of 
self.  Hamlet cannot choose but be heir to the throne; he desires to elect (first Horatio 
as friend and later, with his dying breath, Fortinbras as king) but has been elected.  As 
the son of Denmark, Hamlet is a psyche bound by a material world of political 
sovereignty and patriarchal love, yet he still claims he would be free, “were it not that 
I have bad dreams” (2.2.256).    But exactly what it is that restricts the achievement of 
sovereign friendship has become uncertain for him.  The language of the prison 




he condemns Claudius’s external prohibition against his physical freedom as well as 
his own inability to will a mastery over himself that would make him resemble—
however misrecognized it may be—the image he has of Horatio, Hamlet remains 
unable to confront the non-sovereign quality of the human condition.  
Arendt identifies this dangerous dialectic in an 1952 entry of her 
Denktagebuch, describing the pithy apothegm supplied by The Murder of Gonzago’s  
Player King (words we might attribute to Hamlet)—“Our thoughts are ours, their 
ends none of our own” (3.2.208)—as “Die Kantsche Aporie auf die kürzeste Formel 
gebracht” ["The Kantian aporia brought to the shortest formula” (274)]: 
“Ours” sind unsere Gedanken, weil wir nur allein denken können.  Die 
amerikanische Erfahrung der  πραξις verführt dazu, die Gedanken für teilbar, 
restlos mit-teilbar zu halten und das Denken für einen Teil des handelnden 
Prozesses. Dies führt zum Konformismus, also dem Abschaffen des Denkens, 
denn Denken und Selbst-denken sind dasselbe.  Die kontinentale Erfahrung 
des Denkens verführt dazu, auch der Gedanken “ends” uns zu eigen zu 
machen — d. h. andere zu zwingen, unsere Gedanken zu denken und 
auszuführen--, also zur Alleinherrschaft.  Auf der einen Seite die 
Tyrannisierung des Denkens durch die Gesellschaft, auf der andern die 
wirkliche, politische Tyrannis.  Schliesslich treffen sie sich. (274) 
 
[Our thoughts are 'ours' because we can think only in solitude. The American 
experience of πραξις (praxis) tempts us to regard thoughts as divisible, as 




leads to conformism, meaning the abolition of thought, for thinking and self-
thinking [Selbst-denken] are the same thing. The continental experience of 
thought tempts us to appropriate also the 'ends' of thoughts--that is, to force 
others to think and execute our thoughts--in other words, [it seduces us] to 
autocracy. The tyranizing of thought through society on the one hand; and, on 
the other, the real, political tyranny. They meet at last.] 
In many respects, Arendt’s perspective on the relation of intention to ends is actually 
less akin to the Player King’s aphorism than it is to the disclosure that Hamlet makes 
to Horatio following his return to Denmark (“Our indiscretion sometimes serves us 
well, / When our deep plots do pall: and that should teach us / There's a divinity that 
shapes our ends, / Rough-hew them how we will” [5.2.8-11]), though even here this 
“divinity,” while external to the individual agent, nevertheless resembles a maker that 
does not admit of plurality or contingency.  The Player King’s private preoccupation 
with the problem of the will, and his individualist frame of reference that views the 
gap between thought and result with despairing resignation (“So think thou wilt no 
second husband wed / But die thy thoughts when thy first lord is dead” [3.2.209-10]), 
resembles the affect in Kant’s response to the aporia that he identifies between the 
autonomy of universal ethical principles, and the stubborn heteronomy of the will.
37
  
While both the Player King and Kant identify a crucial feature of action, its non-
sovereignty, their view of this characteristic remains limited; it is framed exclusively 
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as a shortcoming of the individual will rather than as the very condition of plurality 
that makes political friendship possible.   
Arendt wants instead to preserve the Player King’s/Kant’s aporia as a 
symptom not of human frailty but of plurality, privileging friendship that considers 
the experiences of others communicated through opinion as the ground of political 
thought.  In the next chapter, I will argue alongside Arendt that the very notion of 
Kant's categorical imperative in some measure facilitates the reduction of ethical 
action to obedience to universal laws.  Her focus in this entry from her Denktagebuch 
on individual thought—“Our thoughts are 'ours' because we can think only in 
solitude”—anticipates her later work in The Life of the Mind and Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, where she outlines the requirement of solitude for the type of thought, 
thinking from the perspective of others, that acts as a stay against blind obedience to 
established laws of the land as well as to the more reflective but still law-like quality 
of Kantian categorical imperatives.  When read from Arendt’s perspective, “Our 
thoughts are ours, their ends none of our own” bespeaks the condition of the lone 
actor among many others (not merely “an other self”) who is responsible for thinking 
about what it is she is about to perform and its relation to the public world she 
inhabits, even though, or precisely because, its consequences cannot be fully 
predicted.  A sense of duty to lawfulness that is independent of experience cannot 
accommodate this kind of thought or the posture toward political friends that requires 
acknowledgement of opinion before truth, experience before moral laws.  It is, then, 




accompanied, as we have seen, by a desire to eradicate all experience, all 
particularity, in service to the universal command to revenge: 
…Remember thee?  
Yea, from the table of my memory  
I’ll wipe away all trivial fond records, 
All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past 
That youth and observation copied there, 
And thy commandment all alone shall live 
Within the book and volume of my brain, 
Unmix’d with baser matter (1.5.97-104) 
Principled action emerges from the individual judgments of particular situations, 
which themselves emerge from a political thinking that, while solitary, is oriented 
toward solidarity with others, who are themselves, non-sovereign.  If Hamlet’s 
promise to his father had been one he had been able to keep entirely, he would have 
been disabled from accommodating political friendship altogether. 
Arendt loosely links the Kantian she finds in Hamlet to refer to her individual 
experience with two forms of modern political organization that had, in different 
ways, lost sight of this aporia, effectively foreclosing political friendship.  The first is 
modern liberalism, which because of the constraints it places on the scope of citizen 
action, has served thus far in this dissertation as the primary inheritance in modernity 
of an anti-political Western tradition.  Arendt here distinguishes this form of 
government as the “American experience of πραξις [praxis],” which for Arendt 




the court or salon into a nearly universal phenomenon of modern society.  In Hamlet, 
I have argued, the parvenu is exemplified by the lock-step thinking of Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern, who operate as if their thoughts indeed are “completely 
communicable,” expressing in a single voice (either’s will do), without dialogue or 
consultation (“we both obey” [2.2.29]), what they intuit that they are expected to say.  
Modern liberalism markedly expands the topos of the parvenu by creating a vast 
arena of individuals who are coerced into conformity by widespread financial 
uncertainties that threaten to render all but the very wealthy superfluous at any 
moment.  Freedom to act is defined by the individual agent who engages in market 
transactions; the accompanying bureaucratic organizational structures that 
characterize modernity further encroach upon the sphere of action and foster mass 
conformism, coordinating the activities of vast numbers of individuals in the 
production of predictable ends, offering the illusion that no one individual's acts are 
responsible for anything at all.   Together, market and bureaucratic ideologies 
encourage citizens to believe that they are at once atomized and sovereign, agents 
operating against an anonymous background structure outside their concern or, in any 
case, beyond their power to alter.  The individual parvenu is refigured into a social 
norm, and thought becomes coincident with utilitarian strategic planning that furthers 
the underlying principle of action coordination; the end result is that job security 
trumps political participation and solidarity with others.    In this context, to be a 
parvenu is thus merely to have arrived as newcomer, without feeling empowered to 
take any responsibility for the political world one inhabits, by making judgments 




acting on the basis of shared principles.  If there is a pariah who thinks quietly about 
"setting it right" at all, such thoughts are almost certain to remain the purview of the 
individual or the private friend, unsupported by the public friendship of citizens 
amidst a shared world. 
The alternate political form that Arendt identifies, totalitarianism, serves not 
so much as a foil for liberalism, as a re-contextualized and crueler manifestation of it.  
If the Jewish parvenu of the nineteenth century had tried to live as the exception to 
the rule of the Jew as pariah, statelessness and totalitarianism eliminated any 
distinction between the two: “Today the bottom has dropped out of the old ideology.  
The pariah Jew and the parvenu Jew are in the same boat, rowing desperately in the 
same angry sea” (Jew as Pariah 90).  And furthermore, the novelty of totalitarianism 
is that it mobilizes the phenomenon of statelessness to make all individuals 
superfluous; when everyone becomes a potential pariah of the state, the violence of 
conformism escalates to such a degree that virtually everyone risks losing the 
capacity to act based on principle, that is, on behalf of a common world that would 
protect all as human beings.   
With liberalism, the solitary quality of thought lends itself to the fantasy of 
private “nutshells,” a sovereignty preserved outside politics in the putatively infinite 
space afforded by private thoughts and private friends.  Under totalitarianism, as I 
will explore in much greater detail in the following chapter,  this fantasy of 
sovereignty metastasizes into the possibility that all spontaneity, both the realm of 
public action and the realm of private thought, can be mastered absolutely.  At an 




away” all “fond” considerations; in his quest to restore the world, to “set it right” 
without consulting the opinions of others, he even goes so far as attempt to 
reconstitute their thoughts.  Hamlet’s private vision of his father in Gertrude’s 
chamber is followed by Hamlet’s threat to show Gertrude her “innermost part,” a 
threat that effaces the distinction between violence and persuasion.  In Hamlet, this is 
but an ephemeral thought-train; it is not until such thought permeates the social level 
that totalitarianism is possible, deploying as it does both ideology and violence with 
the goal of completely eliminating the cornerstones of public friendship, plurality and 
spontaneity.    
 In his friendship with Horatio, Hamlet seems to pursue an escape from both 
this logic of the father that requires violent restitution of the world as well as the logic 
of the parvenu that leaves no room for friendship because the self-preservation of the 
individual rather than the common world is at stake.  Hamlet gestures toward 
friendship as an alternate private space, but in his oscillation between respecting the 
commands of his father as sovereign and admiring Horatio as an embodiment of a 
Stoic resolve impervious to the shape of the political world, he merely preserves the 
sovereign imagination that is the tragic hero’s fate.  For much of the play, it seems, 
there is no public place in which non-sovereign friendship can make an appearance. 
 
              The Abdication of Sovereignty 
  If deflecting the sovereign will of fathers means, for Montaigne, maintaining 
fidelity to a sovereign friendship once possessed in an Edenic past, and for Hamlet, 




an abdication of sovereignty look like?  Is such an achievement even possible for self-
conscious life? Is it desirable?  Or are we forever destined, to some extent at least, to 
ignore our own vulnerability and dependence upon others?  To these most difficult of 
questions, I can only offer two inconclusive suggestions, each of which is supplied by 
the fifth act of Hamlet.  First, another dead end.  Knowledge of the finitude inherent 
in mortality is not a sufficient condition to compel Hamlet to relinquish the aspiration 
toward self-mastery.  Even after Hamlet’s imagination discovers the possibility of 
tracing “the noble dust of Alexander till a find it stopping a bung-hole” (5.1.197-98), 
he is still compelled to demand public recognition for his own nobility and stakes this 
claim in a willingness to die:   
  Dost come here to whine,  
  To outface me with leaping in her grave? 
  Be buried quick with her, and so will I.   
                                                                      (5.1.272-74) 
But this offer to sacrifice the self by risking death is merely the last, desperate stand 
of an individual consciousness—the Hegelian life-and-death struggle—that, try as it 
might, cannot completely isolate itself from public life.  Identity cannot ultimately be 
founded on an inner world that precedes all forms of social engagement; at the most 
basic level, though, this is the trap set by every dream of absolute mastery.  No, if 
Hamlet finally does realize the futility lodged within every claim to sovereignty, it 
cannot be because he accepts finitude as mortality.  Rather, he must de-ontologize 
finitude and reconceive it as evidence of the non-sovereignty of intersubjectivity.  As 




impossibility of remaining unique masters of what they do . . . [this] is the price they 
pay for plurality and reality, for the joy of inhabiting together with others a world 
whose reality is guaranteed for each by the presence of all” (Human Condition 234).  
In order for Hamlet to give up the illusions of self-mastery in which sovereign 
friendship participates, he must acknowledge that others are always involved in 
defining the meaning of an individual’s life.   
It can be no coincidence that Hamlet’s fleeting encounter with the spontaneity 
of political friendship occurs when the fraternity of travelling actors arrives at court.  
Displaced as “tragedians of the city” (2.2.237) by a sudden fashion for casting plays 
with boy actors, they might represent for us the precariousness of a world where 
one’s place in it is in large measure determined by fluctuations of the market.  As 
signs of plurality, their power resides in their ability to give voice to the conditions of 
the present, as Hamlet warns Polonius: “Do you hear, let them be well used; for they 
are the abstract and brief chronicles of the time: after your death you were better have 
a bad epitaph than their ill report while you live” (2.2.519-22).  Hamlet’s greeting, 
“Welcome, good friends” (2.2.418) anticipates a moment of quasi-political solidarity, 
a spontaneous friendship that emerges when Hamlet demands that their 
accommodations not be determined by their class position: “…Use every man after 
his desert, and who should 'scape whipping?” (2.2.524-25).      
This briefest recognition of another form of friendship never reemerges in the 
play, save perhaps in its closing moments.  Having killed Claudius and said farewell 




also, perhaps, to the theatrical audience—in one last desperate attempt at sovereign 
self-representation:  
  You that look pale and tremble at the chance,  
  That are but mutes or audience to this act, 
  Had I but time—as this fell sergeant, Death, 
  Is strict in his arrest—O, I could tell you— 
  But let it be.  (5.2.340-44) 
The breath between, “O, I could tell you” and “But let it be” presents what I take to 
be a crucial interpretive crux.  Does Hamlet mean to say he really could tell us, tell us 
all, only then to pass the responsibility on to Horatio because there is not enough life 
left in him, not enough time, in which to do so?  If this is the case, then John Kerrigan 
is right to ask, with no small degree of skepticism: how “can Horatio report either 
Hamlet or his cause aright?” (Kerrigan 189).  What of all the soliloquies to which 
Horatio has not been privy, the theatrically self-conscious Hamlet might wonder?  
But if “Let it be” signals a realization, not that there aren’t enough words left in him, 
but that there could never be enough words, then the instructions to Horatio take a 
very different form.  After all, in his notoriously protracted death throes, Hamlet 
speaks for another twenty or so lines.  Is there, then, a movement toward the 
abdication of sovereign friendship, a giving up of the desire to assert total mastery 
over the self and its identity; Hamlet may now accept what we are all always 
compelled to do anyway: we must place our story, not in the hands of “another self,” 




When Hamlet forcefully denies Horatio’s movement toward suicide (“Give 
me the cup.  Let go, by Heaven I’ll ha’t”) [5.2.348]), he repudiates their friendship of 
identity, by distinguishing them as separate biological creatures (“I am dead,  / Thou 
livest”) [5.2.343-44], and by reinforcing Horatio’s individuation in urging him to 
exercise a capacity that is onamastically his (oratio).  Though Hamlet does mention 
concern regarding his “wounded name” (5.2.349), this does not lead him to attempt, 
like the ghost of Old Hamlet, to tell his own story (“List, list, oh list…”) [1.5.22].  In 
licensing Horatio to speak about him, Hamlet either knowingly or unknowingly 
invokes the paradoxical freedom that emerges from the subjection of one’s actions to 
the mythos of another who speaks, not as you would have him, but only as he will.   
If we credit Hamlet with this sort of knowledge near the end of the play, then 
the “readiness [that] is all” (5.2.218) is not merely readiness for death but also 
readiness to play a part in a play written and acted in by others besides himself 
(“They had begun the play” [5.2.31]).  Hamlet sees now that he is not sole author of 
himself, that he must play a part in a play that began even before he could attempt to 
write its “prologue” (5.2.30).  This would also represent a significant shift away from 
the posture Hamlet has had toward Horatio.  Heretofore, when Hamlet has spoken to 
Horatio, it has been as if, to quote Arendt, his words were “…not addressed to 
posterity, but to a real listener who is merely treated as if he were anonymous, as if he 
could not reply, as if he existed simply and solely to listen (Rahel Varnhagen 98).  
Hamlet is reaching toward a non-sovereign friendship if his request to “tell my story” 
(5.2.354) is not merely a replication of the ghost’s sovereign injunction to 




This potential acknowledgement on the part of Hamlet reminds us of his own 
fleeting acknowledgement of the opinions of others, when he tells Polonius that the 
players are the “abstract and brief chronicles of the time,” the power of whose “ill 
report” one should not treat lightly.  Shakespeare further underscores how our 
judgments of events in large measure constitute a shared, plural world, by the 
emphasis he places on certain elements of the dramatic genre.  The spectator's role as 
judge, as Arendt contends, is a latent feature of all dramatic action: “Only the actors 
and speakers who re-enact the story’s plot can convey the full meaning, not so much 
of the story itself, but of the “heroes” who reveal themselves in it” (187).  In Greek 
tragedy, this inter-subjective aspect of meaning-making appears by way of the chorus 
who supplies the doxa of citizens, commenting on the action as it transpires 
throughout the course of the play.  In Hamlet, by contrast, the function of something 
like a chorus gains its meaning from the peripheral position it occupies in the play.  
Hamlet’s oscillation between a sovereign father and a sovereign friend, his devotion 
to the truth of sovereignty in one form or another throughout much of the play, gives 
rise to an atomized vision of the world that hardly considers how it might appear to 
others.  As we have seen, a chorus of sorts does make a brief appearance at the start 
of the play in the form of the doxa of the citizen-soldiers noted earlier in this chapter.  
Perhaps its return is anticipated by Horatio’s metatheatrical request that the dead 
“High on a stage be placed to the view” (5.2.382-83) and Fortinbras’ agreement that 
additional audience members take part: “Let us haste to hear it, / And call the noblest 
to the audience” (5.2.391-92).  If in The Rape of Lucrece, an expanding circle of 




determined by it or by her sovereign aspirations), in Hamlet, a widening circle of 
audience members will judge the events that the friend relates to them: “And let me 
speak to th’yet unknowing world” (5.2.384).   
To re-think the concept of friendship by assuming conditions of plurality and 
the existence of a shared world requires us to abandon the sovereign friendship of the 
atomized individual who retreats from the world into private relations, seeking 
freedom in the choice of private companions whose sameness merely reinforces the 
vision of a bounded, autonomous subject.  We might note the difference between 
what the ghost calls Hamlet to do, to act on his own to take revenge, and what its 
appearance prompts the watchmen to do: namely, judge, both individually and 
together as friends, what is happening in their shared political state.  When faced with 
her own “time out of joint”—the political evil of the twentieth century—Arendt 
worried that attempts to understand it in terms of the available precedents of evil, 
even those represented in Shakespeare, would be to abdicate responsibility to think 
and judge anew, and so to fail to recognize that it was inexplicable in terms of 
available categories.  Individual thought and judgment undertaken with the context of 
plurality in mind, developing one’s own perspective while acknowledging the 
perspectives of others, offer the only possibility of preserving political freedom, 
action, and the political friendship that activates them. But as I argue with Arendt in 





Modernity and the Thoughtlessness of Political Evil 
I have been thinking about evil for many years, or to be specific thirty years, 
about the nature of evil.  And the wish to expose myself—not to the deeds, 
which, after all, were well known, but to the evildoer himself—probably was 




 Hannah Arendt, 1963 
 
 
As the world confronted for the first time the reality of what had occurred in the 
concentration camps of Nazi Germany, Hannah Arendt declared in 1945 that  “the 
problem of evil will be the fundamental question of post-war intellectual Europe” 
(Essays in Understanding, 134).   What she would discover over the next two 
decades, however, was the disturbing unwillingness of professional thinkers to 
confront the particular challenges that totalitarianism presented to moral judgment.  
These challenges arose not only for Nazi criminals but also for those who were left 
behind to attempt to understand both who was responsible and what had motivated 
them.  To Arendt, it seemed evident that these genocidal crimes represented a 
fundamental rupture with our past experiences with human evil.  As she concluded, 
they had “clearly exploded our categories of political thought and our standards for 
moral judgment” (310, Essays in Understanding).  Their very appearance had 
disinherited us of our traditional methods of coping with and of understanding evil.  It 
was in this context, and over the course of almost thirty years, that Shakespeare’s 
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representations of evil and forgiveness served for her as a recurring exemplar of this 
traditional framework.  Appearing in letters to friends, in Arendt’s private notebooks, 
lectures, and published books, they served as a foil for the distinctive forms of evil 
she ultimately concluded Shakespeare could not have prepared us to comprehend.     
Yet even as the world was faced with an urgent need to reconsider persistent 
assumptions about human agency, the use of the word “evil” remained nearly taboo 
for sociologists and critical theorists.  Following the defeat of totalitarian 
governments, leftist post-war intellectuals turned in large part to examine more 
immediate social and political questions, predominant among them, civil rights, 
imperialism, and global capitalism as well as the material ideologies that supported its 
expansion.  An understandable suspicion emerged that the use of the word “evil” 
signaled, more often than not, an ideological weapon at best apt to stifle debate 
(George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil”), at worst to demonize cultural others.  Labeling 
potential agents of revolutionary action evil, for instance, works in support of the 
status quo, naturalizing the role of historically-contingent social and economic forces.  
When we focus primarily on what Slavoj Zizek calls the “subjective violence” of 
individual actors, the structural, everyday violence that creates its conditions of 
possibility are more readily ignored (Violence 9-10).
2
   
In Shakespeare studies, fear of misusing the word “evil” has severely limited 
its viability as a category for critical thought.  About Macbeth, for instance, critics 
have expressed concern that it is widely understood as a play “about evil” (Sinfield 
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95).  Thus Alan Sinfield argues that recourse to “evil” effectively supports a 
distinction between so-called “legitimate” forms of violence that serve the interests of 
state power and those forms of violence that are “evil” precisely because they disturb 
it (95).  When Macbeth efficiently dispatches the rebel Macdonwald with “bloody 
execution” (“he unseam’d him from the nave to th’chops” [1.2.22]), his acts are 
valorized for their nobility (“O valiant cousin! worthy gentleman” [1.2.24]); when he 
kills the king, he becomes a monstrous traitor.  Undoubtedly, critics like Sinfield 
make compelling cases regarding how the word “evil” has been deployed in support 
of structures of power.
 3
  Arendt herself contributed significantly to our understanding 
of the role that twentieth century ideologies played in the exclusion of certain 
populations from the plural world of politics, effectively stripping them of their 
human rights.  But it would be unwise to conclude that an exploration of 
Shakespeare’s representation of Macbeth as an exemplary figure of evil is as 
inherently “conservative” an enterprise as Sinfield suggests.
4
 
Alongside this general discomfort with the word “evil” following Auschwitz, 
Arendt began to detect a “widespread fear of judgment” on the part of those who had 
not been present in the camps.  The common refrain, “Who am I to judge?” echoed 
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 Harry Berger’s “The Early Scenes of Macbeth” complicates dualistic interpretations of good and evil 
in the play, arguing that the normative injunctions of Scottish masculine warrior culture produce an 
image of the heroic Macbeth whose excess is exemplary.  Thus while the play may indeed represent 
the thesis that “evil naturally destroys itself” (70), this self-destructiveness is located at a structural 
rather than an individual level: it “precedes, rather than follows from, the horrors perpetrated by 
Macbeth” (75).   And Berger does approach a discussion of agency in relation to a structurally 
generated “evil” with what he terms an “existentialist emphasis on the responsibility of the characters, 
that is, on their freedom to reinforce or to oppose the structural tendencies” (72).  For a recent, self-
admittedly “orthodox” reading of the play (and one that explicitly disagrees with Berger’s on a number 
of points), see Richard Strier’s The Unrepentant Renaissance (132-49).    
4
 By attending to how state power can influence what it means to kill different types of persons based 
on their relation to law, arguments of the sort described above noticeably tend, for example, to ignore 
the murder of children in the play.  Their deaths do not fit neatly within the structural opposition 
Sinfield identifies between legitimate and illegitimate killing, suggesting that the moral questions 





the Biblical “judge not lest ye be judged”; but Arendt concluded that this was likely a 
symptom of the trauma caused by the administrative machinery of totalitarianism, 
trauma that led to the “the suspicion that no one is a free agent, and hence the doubt 
that anyone could be expected to answer for what he has done” (Responsibility and 
Judgment 19).
5
  Even if it was not openly acknowledged, the viability of moral 
responsibility itself had thus been threatened.  This suspicion has also carried over 
into the study of Shakespeare's work, where what is striking about the most 
prominent criticism produced over the past two and a half decades is that it also 
largely ignores questions of agency and of ethical action.  From the vantage of the 
early Foucauldian theory of the “subject,” for example—an entity seemingly 
determined by the historical life-world into which it emerges through micro-filiations 
of power and ideological discourse—characters in Shakespeare’s plays were stripped 
not only of their naïve sense of self-determination but also of any more carefully 
considered, historically-situated forms of human agency.
6
  Of course, Arendt, too, 
pays careful attention to socio-ideological and juridical forces that shape the identities 
and the forms of action that are more or less available to a particular group of 
persons.  Yet for all that she drew considerable attention to the determinative power 
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 Arendt is identifying a widespread tendency here but she is also almost certainly directing her 
comments at Gershom Scholem, who had responded in a letter to Arendt’s book, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem: “I do not believe that our generation is in a position to pass any kind of historical judgment.  
We lack the necessary perspective, which alone makes some sort of objectivity possible—and we 
cannot but lack it” (Jew as Pariah 241).  Arendt’s essay, cited above, “Personal Responsibility Under 
Dictatorship,” launches with commentary on the “furious controversy” that was set off in response to 
what she characterizes as (not her book but) a “book that was never written” (17).  For more on the 
reactions to her book, see note 18.   
6
 For a short discussion of the impact new historicist and cultural materialist readings have had in this 
context, see Hugh Grady’s essay “Moral Agency and Its Problems in Julius Caesar: Political Power, 
Choice, and History” from the collection in Shakespeare and Moral Agency.  In such influential 
interpretations as Catherine Belsey’s The Subject of Tragedy, Jonathan Dollimore’s Radical Tragedy, 
and Alan Sinfield’s Faultlines, dramatic characters “seemed to be products of deterministic processes 
rather than agents who defined themselves through their action...[and] were to be understood solely in 





social norms have to shape the possibilities of human action, Arendt was unwilling to 
lose sight of the human capacity to resist and refigure social norms through.  Critical 
perspectives that fail to attend to this possibility yield too much ground to the belief 
propagated precisely by totalitarian ideology, that terror and violence make all things 
possible, including the transformation of human agents into cogs in the machine of 
history.
7
  Thus while Arendt understands the culturally mediated quality of 
“choosing” one’s actions, she nevertheless retained a particular interest in drama as a 
genre about (and a genre that enables reflection on) human agency. 
As I indicated in the introduction to this dissertation and explored in the first 
three chapters, drama is for Arendt the "political art par excellence" because of its 
ability to make manifest the two-fold appearance of a hero’s actions in the political 
world, both through the mimesis of actors who perform deeds and through the chorus 
which witnesses what is performed and supplies it with meaning.  As I have argued, 
this dynamic reveals how an action erupts among a plurality of other actors and, once 
performed, can no longer be said to be in the possession of the doer (The Human 
Condition 187).  Looked at only slightly differently, however, drama also makes 
visible at least two perspectives by means of which action is related to our capacity 
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 On the ideology that all things are possible, see The Origins of Totalitarianism: “Even if we take 
totalitarian aspirations seriously and refuse to be misled by the common-sense assertion that they are 
utopian and unrealizable, it develops that the society of the dying established in the camps is the only 
form of society in which it is possible to dominate man entirely.  Those who aspire to total domination 
must liquidate all spontaneity, such as the mere existence of individuality will always engender, and 
track it down to its most private forms, regardless of how unpolitical and harmless these may seem.  
Pavlov’s dog, the human specimen reduced to the most elementary reactions, the bundle of reactions 
that can always be liquidated and replaced by other bundles of reactions that behave in exactly the 
same way, is the model of the ‘citizen’ of a totalitarian state; and such a citizen can be produced only 
imperfectly outside of the camps” (Origins 456).  See also Arendt’s comments in her essay “Some 
Questions of Moral Philosophy”: “The behavior of the individual is at stake in moral matters and this 
came out in courtroom procedures where the question was no longer, Was he a big or small cog?  But 
why did he consent to become a cog at all?  What happened to his conscience?  Why did it not 





for ethical judgment: that of the agent who judges how to act in a particular situation 
and that of the audience who witnesses as well as judges what has been done.  The 
first aspect of judging occupies Hamlet throughout Shakespeare’s play—particularly 
when he considers what it would mean if he were to kill Claudius while the king is 
confessing his sins.  The second, as I explored in the last chapter, emerges as the play 
is closing, with Horatio’s meta-theatrical appeal that the dead “High on a stage be 
placed to the view” (5.2.382-83) and then with Fortinbras’s summons for additional 
witnesses: “Let us haste to hear it, / And call the noblest to the audience” (5.2.391-
92).  This audience will be called on to come to terms with the events that have 
transpired in Denmark.   
Arendt argued that just such a responsibility existed for those who lived on 
after the Holocaust (Responsibility and Judgment 19), and she suggests how plays 
(Shakespearean plays in particular) can prepare us to make moral judgments through 
the particular cases they furnish for our consideration.  They enable us to “judge and 
tell right from wrong by having present in our mind some incident or person, absent 
in time or space, that have become examples” (145 Responsibility and Judgment).  By 
judgment, Arendt means the kind of thinking that takes into account the perspectives 
of other agents and their own subjective experiences.  For example, an actor playing 
The Merchant of Venice’s Portia offers an audience what Kant called an “enlarged 
mentality” by embodying a particular gendered identity.  When an actor delivers the 
lines,
 “
One half of me is yours, the other half yours, / Mine own, I would say; but if 
mine, then yours, / And so all yours!  Oh wicked times / Puts bars between the 





ambiguous relationship not only with Bassanio but also with her dead father and the 
constraints patriarchy puts on her possibilities for agency (Critique of Judgment Par. 
40).  For Arendt, telling right from wrong is not of matter of following a rulebook or 
a “categorical imperative”; it depends upon our habitual exposure to exemplary and 
plural bearers of moral and political qualities who “will be an outstanding example 
for my further judging of such matters” (Responsibility and Judgment 140).  Quoting 
Thomas Jefferson, Arendt agrees that the “fictitious murder of Macbeth” excites in us 
“as great a horror of villainy, as the real one of Henri IV” (Responsibility and 
Judgment 145).  Dramatic characters and dramatic performances assemble examples 
that make moral life possible in ways that rules of conduct do not.  As a particular 
agent’s perspective exceeds “all generalization and therefore all reification,” it cannot 
be subsumed by a concept but requires something much closer to an aesthetic 
judgment that “can be conveyed only through an imitation of their acting” (The 
Human Condition 187-88).   
  
 
Arendt’s engagement with some of the moral and ethical considerations that 
Shakespeare elicits in us may run contrary to many of the predominant contemporary 
critical approaches for analyzing his plays, but here Arendt should be seen as reviving 
a well-established practice rather than breaking much new ground.
8
  More recently, 
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 Indeed, the first book of criticism of the plays, Elizabeth Montagu’s Essays on the Writings and 
Genius of Shakespeare of 1769, framed them as a noteworthy product of an ethical mode of thought: 
“We are apt to think of Shakespeare only as a poet; but he is certainly one of the greatest moral 
philosophers that ever lived” (59).  A few critics since World War II have delivered a number of 
extended treatments regarding how evil is represented in Shakespeare.  Charlotte Spivak argues that 
Shakespeare channels the Augustinian tradition that understands evil as non-being;  according to 
Spivak, villains like Iago and Richard III may appear frightening at first, but upon closer inspection, 
they are found empty, even laughable (14).  Neil Forsyth, who finds that Shakespearean evil is too 
appealing to be called “nothingness,” argues that this is why Arendt seized upon Shakespearean evil as 
a foil for the form criminality took in Eichmann; the “poetic intensity, the uncanny psychological 





academic scholars have called for a return to characterological criticism of 
Shakespeare’s plays, criticism that credits human agency without, however, 
abandoning wholesale what critical theory has uncovered regarding historically 
mediated experiences of selfhood.
9
  Michael Bristol, for instance, provides a 
particularly Arendtian justification for reading the corpus from an ethical perspective 
when he suggests that Shakespeare’s characters, inhabiting “a contingent world where 
they are faced with novel, unpredictable, and unprecedented situations that require 
evaluation and judgment” and that, “make us care about such decision-making in a 
way that engages our own concern” (Shakespeare and Moral Agency 5).   
This return to ethics in Shakespeare criticism has begun to open new avenues 
of thought, and yet critics still do not appear comfortable with the word “evil” or with 
exploring Shakespeare’s representations of the concept of evil.
10
  It is thus not 
surprising that, despite Arendt’s conclusion that the experience of totalitarianism has 
deprived us of our traditional “tools” for understanding evil, tools which Arendt felt 
we inherit in large part from Shakespeare, critics have not addressed the questions 
that Arendt’s inquiries solicit us to ask: first, can Shakespeare help us to understand 
the particular forms of evil that emerged with totalitarianism?  Second, how does 
reading Shakespeare encourage us to rethink for ourselves the conceptual frameworks 
that we have inherited?  And finally, to what degree do Shakespeare’s depictions of 
                                                                                                                                           
Arendt uses his characters as the point of reference to illustrate precisely that grandeur she did not find 
in Eichmann…”  (5). 
9
 Most notable is the recent collection of essays edited by Michael Bristol, Shakespeare and Moral 
Agency.  See also Robert B. Pierce, “Being a Moral Agent in Shakespeare’s Vienna.”  Philosophy and 
Literature 33.2 (2009): 267-79.  See Richard Strier, for whom moral agency in Shakespeare has been a 
longstanding concern.  In particular, see again Chapter 3 of his book, The Unrepentant Renaissance: 
“Against Morality.”  
10
 In the Bristol collection (see footnote 9), the word evil appears (usually as a reference to a 
Shakespearean character using it) several times, but none of the dozen or so essays included makes any 





evil still provide us with insights into the difficult questions concerning moral agency 
and moral judgment in our present context?   
Certainly, the dilemma of theodicy—how to reconcile the coexistence of God 
and evil (whether human or natural)—is not something we dwell on—but then neither 
did Shakespeare.  Quite the contrary, his plays may be said to anticipate the collapse 
of inherited frameworks for understanding human suffering.  When at the end of King 
Lear we do see an attempt to yoke together god (theos) and justice (dike), the play 
reveals how this mode of meaning-making fails to account for the agonizing 
experiences we have witnessed.  More worrisomely, in representing the carelessness 
connected with the persistent deployment of habitual thought patterns, the play 
reveals our stunning inability to recognize such inadequacies.
11
  When Edgar kills 
Edmund, he offers a providential account of transgression and punishment, a version 
of theodicy, that is utterly incommensurable with the recent events he has passed 
through.  Is there any way that his “The gods are just” (5.3.160), even when it is 
coupled with Edmund’s inexplicable assent: “Th’s hast spoken right; ‘tis true. / The 
wheel is come full circle” (5.3.163-64), can assuage Gloucester’s earlier cry: “As flies 
to wanton boys are we to th’gods; / They kill us for their sport” (4.1.36-37)?  As 
Arendt suggests in The Origins of Totalitarianism, such encounters with the 
incomprehensible must be acknowledged if subsequent critical reflection and 
judgment are to be made possible:  
The conviction that everything that happens on earth must be comprehensible 
to man can lead to interpreting history by commonplaces. Comprehension 
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 Marvin Rosenberg writes of the “dark, deadly, grimly comic world of Lear” as one that engenders 
such a complex array of response that “it must defeat any attempt to enclose its meaning in limited 





does not mean denying the outrageous, deducing the unprecedented from 
precedents, or explaining phenomena by such analogies and generalities that 
the impact of reality and the shock of experience are no longer felt. It means, 
rather, examining and bearing consciously the burden that our century has 
placed on us — neither denying its existence nor submitting meekly to its 
weight. Comprehension, in short, means the unpremeditated, attentive facing 
up to, and resisting of, reality — whatever it may be. (Origins viii) 
This twofold “facing up to” and “resisting” is what I argue Shakespearean drama 
takes to be its responsibility.  From this perspective, the most shocking element in 
King Lear is not Lear’s anguished cries during the storm, the brutal mutilation of 
Gloucester’s eyes (“Out, vile jelly!” [3.7.82]), nor the humiliation of his failed suicide 
that results from this blindness, not even the unexpected death of Cordelia—although 
certainly these are terrible.  Rather, it is the moment when Edgar introduces theodicy 
as a mode of comprehension, as a way to explain the horror of what we have 
witnessed through a commonplace, that we are faced with the choice of turning away 
from the particularity of the suffering that is being acted out before us and away from 
its resistance to neat categorization.  Insofar as Shakespeare stages both the 
breakdown of explanatory frameworks as well as missed opportunities for 
understanding anew that Edgar exemplifies, he does seem to anticipate what Arendt 
discovered while attending the trial of Adolph Eichmann, the former SS 
Obersturmbannführer who was accused of organizing mass deportations to Nazi 
concentration camps.  I have in mind the connection Arendt makes between evil and 





think from the standpoint of somebody else” (Eichmann 49)
12 
 Shakespeare’s Edgar 
offers a case study of the failure to judge, to account for the particularity of our 
individual experiences and those of others when our inherited paradigms prove 
inadequate to the events of the world.  And insofar as all of us rely upon existing 
concepts as well as upon commonplaces and clichés to make sense of the world we 
inhabit, we are all potential Edgars. 
Of course, Edgar is not Eichmann.  Ultimately, Arendt concludes that 
Shakespeare’s immediate social and political horizons, while they enabled him to 
anticipate momentous crises of understanding, simply could not allow him to glimpse 
and so provide us with an account of political evil answerable to the experience of the 
Holocaust.  In the postscript to the second edition of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt 
made use of Shakespeare to explain what she had meant by the controversial subtitle 
of her book, “A Report on the Banality of Evil,” citing figures from the 
Shakespearean corpus as foils for the exemplary agent of twentieth century evil: 
“…when I speak of the banality of evil, I do so only on the strictly factual level, 
pointing to a phenomenon which stared one in the face at the trial.  Eichmann was not 
Iago and not Macbeth, and nothing would have been farther from his mind than to 
determine with Richard III ‘to prove a villain’” (287).  Here Shakespeare no longer 
appears as a pearl diver who unearths and reexamines sedimented political concepts 
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 Concluding the final chapter of Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt writes of the moment before 
Eichmann’s execution: “He began by stating emphatically that he was a Gottgläuber, to express in 
common Nazi fashion that he was no Christian and did not believe in life after death.  He then 
proceeded: ‘After a short while, gentlemen, we shall all meet again.  Such is the fate of all men.  Long 
live Germany, long live Argentina, long live Austria.  I shall not forget them.’  In the face of death, he 
had found the cliché used in funeral oratory.   Under the gallows, his memory played him the last trick; 
he was ‘elated’ and he forgot that this was his own funeral.  It was as though in those last minutes he 
was summing up the lessons that this long course in human wickedness had taught us—the lesson of 





but, quite the contrary, as the primary representative of a traditional understanding of 
moral agency that could not have anticipated, let alone understood, the forms of evil 
characteristic of totalitarian governments.  As Arendt would later write, the endurance 
of certain works of art like Shakespeare’s is not due to their “timelessness” but to 
their demonstration of the possibility for a kind of thinking that sets up a “timeless 
time” (211), a thinking that gathers together the absent tenses of past and future, the 
no more and the not yet, to discover their meaning in, and material impact upon, the 
present.  Shakespeare serves as an example to us of this particular kind of thinking, 
but he cannot do our thinking for us; it remains the responsibility of each new 
generation to “discover and ploddingly pave anew the path of thought” (Life of the 
Mind 210).   
Yet even in the aftermath of the Holocaust, which left no doubt that continuity 
with previous traditions had been shattered by the form of life modernity had ushered 
in, the past, and Shakespeare with it, continues to operate upon us, though without 
affording the same authority or meaningfulness: “What you are then left with is still 
the past, but a fragmented past, which has lost its certainty of evaluation” (212).  It 
follows that critical thought must position this tradition such that we may distinguish 
current from past horizons of possibility, and in so doing, confront and jettison 
superannuated conceptual paradigms.  
As I will argue in this chapter and explore through my own reading of 
fragments from the Shakespearean corpus, Arendt’s readings in books on 





discussions about Shakespeare, forgiveness, and punishment with W. H. Auden and 
Karl Jaspers, can enable us to better articulate what Arendt felt were the 
unprecedented characteristics of modern political evil.
13
  From her post-World War II 
perspective, she felt it necessary to reevaluate philosophical conceptions of 
transgression and punishment, conceptions that modern philosophers, and Hegel in 
particular, developed in part through encountering Shakespeare’s plays.  Robert C. 
Pirro has discussed Arendt’s critical engagement with Hegel’s theory of Greek 
tragedy (46-50), but I will show that she also adopts Hegel as a key Shakespearean 
interlocutor.  And for Hegel, Macbeth provides a dramatic representation of his 
notion of the causality of fate in which the transgressor is punished by the ethical 
world he both transgresses and deforms through his own actions, “ruining the 
friendliness of life” (Bernstein 422). Shakespeare, not Greek tragedy, underwrites 
Hegel’s notion of modern ethical life predicated on an internalization of guilt.  But 
the problem of conscience that troubled Arendt exceeds what she sees in Macbeth.  
When conscience remains resolutely silent, or worse still, commands previously 
forbidden—unconscionable—actions, Arendt can no longer take her bearings from 
Shakespeare.  Nor, as I will demonstrate, can she take comfort in the time-honored 
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 Yosal Rogat’s The Eichmann Trial and the Rule of Law, begins and ends with comparisons between 
Greek tragedy and the capture and trial of Adolph Eichmann (“just as the matricide that Orestes 
commits requires the establishment of a legal institution, namely the Areopagus, which quells the cycle 
of vengeance, so the genocide Eichmann helped carry out requires a new and now international trial 
that will fulfill a similar function on a global scale”--48). Susannah Gottlieb, however, writes about the 
“tense relation to the problem of [Greek] tragedy” in Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem.  Gottlieb argues 
that Arendt’s claim that Eichmann was unlike Shakespearean agents of evil implies that she is 
harnessing Walter Benjamin’s distinction between the tragic hero of Greek tragedy and the tyrant of 
the German trauerspiel, of which Shakespeare’s tragedies are specimens.  For Gottlieb, ancient Greek 
tragedy remains the center of Arendt’s attention, rather than Shakespeare.  Eichmann is thus “doubly 
distanced from the tragic hero: not only is he utterly unlike tragic heroes in the proper sense of the 
term; he is similarly unlike the tyrants or intriguers who appeared as a consequence of the death of 
tragedy.  Nevertheless - and this is crucial - the justification for the death sentence imposed on him 
retrieves the situation staged in the Oresteia, where ‘the earth’ or ‘the moral order’ exacts punishment 





equation between morality and obedience that she saw extending through 
Shakespeare to Kant’s categorical imperative.  Ultimately, Arendt became convinced 
that totalitarianism’s eradication of both the public spaces that make possible a shared 
world and the private spaces that permit reflection upon which conscience can operate 
requires us to confront the possibility that the forms of evil represented in 
Shakespeare only confirm the profound rupture between all previous experiences with 
evil and unprecedented twentieth-century crimes (crimes that Arendt judged beyond 
the possibility of either punishment or forgiveness).
14
   
Before Radical Evil: Shakespearean Inflections in the Private History of 
Arendt’s Thought 
  Shakespeare appears for the first time in 1946 as one of Arendt’s interlocutors 
on the question of evil in the course of her correspondence with Karl Jaspers, under 
whom she had written her dissertation on St. Augustine.  Reflecting on Jasper’s 
descriptions of Nazi criminality in his book Die Schuldfrage, Arendt contends that he 
has failed to consider how the Holocaust transcends all previous notions of 
criminality:  
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 Neil Forsyth makes precisely the mistake Arendt cautions against—ignoring the unprecedented 
characteristics of totalitarianism—when in his discussion of Shakespearean evil he reads Arendt’s 
interpretation of the evil of Eichmann as merely “a modern form of an ancient idea, that evil is simply 
the absence of something, the failure to act or to understand, in this case a failure of imagination” (1).  
J. Gregory Keller more carefully evaluates Arendt’s juxtaposition of Eichmann with Shakespearean 
villains when he sets out to undermine her claims: “Macbeth may be more like than unlike Eichmann, 
at least in the ease with which he is persuaded that the evil deed is obviously the right one” (41).  But 
Keller ignores key points raised by Arendt: unlike Eichmann, “Macbeth struggles with his ‘conscience’ 
but finally does the deed” (42).  Insofar as Macbeth reflects on what he intends, he retains a disposition 
toward ethical action that hardly resembles what Arendt observes in Eichmann (43).  Macbeth’s 
akrasia is not commensurate with Eichmann’s banality.  Furthermore, Keller picks up on precisely how 
Macbeth’s consideration of the deed follows the categorical imperative (44)—he does not face the 





Your definition of Nazi policy as a crime (“criminal guilt”) strikes me as 
questionable. The Nazi crimes, it seems to me, explode the limits of the law; 
and that is precisely what constitutes their monstrousness. For these crimes, 
no punishment is severe enough….That is, this guilt, in contrast to all criminal 
guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems….We are simply not 




To Jaspers, Arendt's claim that all existing legal concepts fail to account for the 
nature of the crimes in question attributes a sublime quality to the criminals, 
something that might be appropriate for the grandeur of villains from the 
Shakespearean corpus, but not to those who participated in the Holocaust: 
You say that the Nazis cannot be comprehended as “crime”—I’m not 
altogether comfortable with your view, because a guilt that goes beyond all 
criminal guilt inevitably takes on a streak of “greatness” – of satanic 
greatness…It seems to me that we have to see these things in their total 
banality…The way you express it, you’ve almost taken the path of poetry.  
And a Shakespeare would never be able to give adequate form to this material 
– his instinctive aesthetic sense would lead to falsification of it – and that’s 
why he couldn’t attempt it” (62).
16
 
Jaspers’ association of Nazi evil with “banality” obviously influenced Arendt’s 
subsequent thought, as did his juxtaposition of the term with Shakespeare’s aesthetic 
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 See Arendt’s letter dated August 17, 1946.  Jaspers defines guilt according to four categories, among 
them, “criminal guilt” or crimes that “are acts capable of objective proof and violate unequivocal laws. 
Jurisdiction rests with the court, which in formal proceedings can be relied upon to find the facts and 
apply the law” (Question of German Guilt 25). 
16





representations of evil.  Arendt does not respond specifically to Jasper’s use of 
Shakespeare here, but she does imply general agreement through her admission that 
perhaps she has characterized evil in terms that approach the “satanic greatness” that 
Jaspers describes, a characterization she also rejects wholesale.  At least ten years 
later, Arendt privately expresses this concern about Shakespeare in marginal notes 
that agree with what A. C. Bradley’s Shakespearean Tragedy claims about how we 
are moved by the evil of Iago: “…although in reading, of course, we do not sift it out 
and regard it separately, it inevitably affects us and mingles admiration with our 
hatred or horror” (Bradley 190).
17
  In Arendt’s letter to Jaspers, however, she remains 
unsatisfied with the available notions of criminality:   
But still, there is a difference between a man who sets to murder his old aunt 
and people who without considering the economic usefulness of their actions 
at all…built factories to produce corpses.  One thing is certain: We have to 
combat all impulses to mythologize the horrible, and to the extent that I can’t 
avoid such formulations, I haven’t understood what actually went on.  Perhaps 
what is behind it all is only that individual human beings did not kill 
individual other human beings for human reasons, but that an organized 
attempt was made to eradicate the concept of the human being. (69)   
At the same time that Arendt was corresponding with Jaspers, she was working to 
complete The Origins of Totalitarianism, the work in which she began a call that 
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 Arendt seems to have had more than a passing interest in Bradley.  In her copy of Shakespearean 
Tragedy, she responds to both Bradley and Shakespeare and it is clear that her inquiry centered on the 
topic of evil.  Her marginalia include brief notes on the representation of evil motives, comparisons 
between Iago and Stalinism, and the reactive (rather than active) quality of resentment.   Additionally, 
one of the few clippings glued into Arendt’s Denktagebuch includes a brief book review article that 
attempts to exonerate Bradley from some of the influential criticisms leveled at his work by L. C. 





would reverberate throughout her later work, a call to recognize that our existing 
political categories no longer sufficed to understand contemporary political 
experience, and to acknowledge that fundamentally new possibilities had emerged 
into the world.  Throughout her intellectual career, Arendt elaborated on the defense 
mechanisms Western political philosophy had developed against the unpredictability 
of political life, particularly in The Human Condition, where, as we saw in chapter 
two, she explored the effect that the conceptual perspective of the maker, homo faber, 
has had on our ability to recognize political action and its possibilities for new 
political formations.  But in Origins, Arendt gives voice to a particularly urgent need 
to combat these tendencies, given the novel forms of evil that we now have the 
responsibility to grapple with and attempt to understand:   
It is inherent in our entire philosophical tradition that we cannot conceive of a 
“radical evil,” and this is both true for Christian theology, which conceded 
even to the Devil himself a celestial origin, as well as for Kant, the only 
philosopher who, in the word he coined for it, at least must have suspected the 
existence of this evil even though he immediately rationalized it in the concept 
of a “perverted ill will” that could be explained by comprehensible motives.  
Therefore, we actually have nothing to fall back on in order to understand a 
phenomenon that nevertheless confronts us with its overpowering reality and 
breaks down all standards we know.  There is only one thing that seems to be 
discernible: we may say that radical evil has emerged in connection with a 
system in which all men have become equally superfluous (459).
18
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 The reader has now encountered two seemingly incongruous adjectives, radical and banal, both of 





Shakespeare does not appear in Origins, but when Arendt began her personal 
Denktagebuch in 1950, shortly after she finished the first edition of the book, she 
began to restate the relationship between modern political evil and Shakespeare’s 
representations of evil that had surfaced in her correspondence with Jaspers.  Unlike 
Jaspers, Arendt was concerned not to distinguish literary representations from actual 
experience but to confront the inadequacy of traditional conceptions of evil as they 
are represented in the Shakespearean corpus.  In an entry entitled “Das radikal Böse” 
(“The radical evil” [18]), Arendt for the first time juxtaposes specific characters from 
the Shakespearean corpus with the description of evil she had outlined in Origins:  
woher kommt es? Wo ist sein Ursprung? Was ist Grund und Boden? Es hat 
nichts zu tun mit Psychologischem-Macbeth-und nichts mit 
Charakterologischem-Richard III, der beschloss, ein Bösewicht zu werden.  
                                                                                                                                           
of evil as banal was at the center of the controversy over the publication of her book; there were, it 
should be remembered, many objections levied against Eichmann: claims of factual inaccuracy, 
outrage at her tone, including the book’s frequent use of irony, and regarding her brief discussions of 
the role of the Jewish administrative bodies, the Judenräte, in the Holocaust.  On this last charge, for 
instance, in an essay published in The Partisan Review Lionel Abel called it a “terrible charge against 
the Jewish leaders” and concluded: “One might as well accuse the people of Nagasaki and Hiroshima 
for having made their own deaths possible, since they lived in cities, and cities make the best targets” 
(228) [For a comprehensive review of the controversy, see Randolph Braham’s The Eichmann Case: A 
Sourcebook].  Nevertheless, it was the phrase the “banality of evil” that became the most recognizable 
rallying cry against her; Gershom Scholem called it a “catch-phrase,” lamenting that nothing of the 
“radical evil” she had articulated in Origins remained “but this slogan” (Jew as Pariah 245).  In 
response, Arendt explained that she had indeed changed her mind:  “It is indeed my opinion now that 
evil is never ‘radical,’ that it is only extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic 
dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole world precisely because it spreads like a fungus 
on the surface. It is ‘thought defying,’ as I said, because thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the 
roots, and the moment it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. That is its 
‘banality.’ Only the good has depth and can be radical.” (The Jew as Pariah, 250-51).  In Hannah 
Arendt and the Jewish Question, Richard Bernstein traces the transition that appears to take place 
between Origins in Totalitarianism, where evil is radical, and Eichmann in Jerusalem, where it is 
banal. Bernstein supplies considerable evidence to suggest that Arendt, her comment to Scholem 
notwithstanding, meant essentially the same thing by both, but that she became concerned that the 
word “radical” suggested a metaphor of depth inappropriate to the kind of evil she had been trying to 
understand.  Arendt’s conviction that thought is radical, that it involves a pearl-diving—which is also 
to say a “going to the root”—for sedimented political concepts, resonates with  much of what we have 






Wesentlich ist 1. der Über-Sinn und seine absolute Logik und Konsequenz.  2.  
das überflüssig machen des Menschen bei Erhaltung des 
Menschengeschlechts, von dem man Teile jederzeit eliminieren kann. 
[Where does it come from?  What is its origin?  What is its foundation?  It has 
nothing to do with the psychological—Macbeth—nothing to do with the 
characterological—Richard III—who decided to become a villain.  Essentially 
it is 1. The over-arching meaning and its absolute logic and consequence.   2. 
The making of men superfluous through the preservation of the human race, 




To better understand this summary definition of political evil—both its unflinching 
logicality and its penchant for making individuals superfluous—as well as why 
Arendt attempts to explain the break with traditional notions of evil by way of 
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 My translation of “Uber-sinn” is indebted to Ralph Bauer and Theodore Leinand, and assumes the 
distinction Frege annunciates in Über Sinn und Bedeutung (most commonly rendered as “On Sense 
and Reference” in English); this reading of “sinn” signifies a meaning without any necessary 
connection to experience; radical evil occurs when the political world of plurality is directed toward an 
end outside experience that an ideology has imbued with the appearance of necessity.  To my 
knowledge, this entry has escaped scholarly attention until now.  It makes us aware for the first time 
that following her correspondence with Jaspers, Arendt had reworked the relationship between 
Shakespearean representations of evil and the evil she was attempting to understand.  Richard 
Bernstein, who has commented on Arendt’s engagement with evil via Shakespeare, notes that “Arendt 
herself frequently refers to Shakespeare when speaking about evil, especially when she attempts to 
distinguish the banality of evil from traditional conceptions of evil” (The Jewish Question 150).  
Bernstein’s argument, noted above, suggests that Arendt maintained a fairly consistent understanding 
of the nature of the evil that manifested itself most explicitly in Nazi death camps.  But Bernstein 
encounters difficulties because, as he observes regarding Arendt’s juxtaposition of banal evil with 
Shakespearean representations of evil, “[because] her rhetorical constructions sometimes suggest that 
the alternative to the banality of evil is evil which is theologically or aesthetically categorized as 
"satanic greatness," one can easily be misled into thinking that she identifies radical evil with satanic 
greatness” (152).  The note in Arendt’s notebooks, unnoticed by Bernstein, conclusively supports his 
argument; while here her topic is radical evil, the overall judgments on modern political evil that 
Arendt makes by way of comparison with Macbeth and Richard III appear again in very similar form 
in Eichmann in Jerusalem, when she re-articulates her concept of the banality of evil.  Bernstein’s 
omission is understandable, for while the index to the published transcription of Arendt’s Dentagebuch 
lists a couple of references to Shakespeare, a number of Arendt’s notes on Shakespeare, including this 





comparison with Shakespearean villains, we first need to consider in more detail the 
definition of radical evil that Arendt had already developed in Origins, where she 
connects its novelty with the essential characteristics of totalitarianism.  In the section 
of Origins that follows the passage on radical evil cited above, aptly entitled, “A 
Novel Form of Government,” Arendt first urges her readers to acknowledge the 
unprecedented nature of totalitarianism.  For while the introduction of the word 
“totalitarian” into our language itself might suggest a degree of collective awareness 
concerning the novelty of totalitarianism, the temptation to deploy familiar categories 
as synonyms for totalitarianism overrides the power of its coinage  (Understanding 
312).  Succumbing to this temptation in the case of totalitarianism prevents us from 
recognizing that its appearance in our world disrupts the traditional opposition of 
lawful and lawless governments and thus introduces the need for a radical 
reevaluation of many of our fundamental political and juridical concepts.
 
 
Keeping in mind the six regime forms that Aristotle identified in his Politics 
(monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, republic, democracy), forms which still 
provided a comprehensive register at the time when Shakespeare was writing, we 
may briefly consider the representations of monarchy and tyranny in Measure for 
Measure as examples of lawful and lawless paradigms respectively.  Law, whether 
understood as deriving from the lumen naturale of natural law or the revelation of 
divine commandments, has generally been sharply distinguished from the individual 
actors who can never become ideal embodiments of either (Essays in Understanding 
340).  Vincentio communicates this tradition when he suggests that the Venetian 





weeds,” citizens whose actions, it is presumed, will never entirely align with the 
prescriptions of law (1.3.20-21).
20
   Moreover, although positive laws are not eternal 
and unchangeable, they do have a consistency which enables us to determine which 
individuals operate in accord with them, which in violation of them.  In Measure for 
Measure, the sudden enforcement of the statute forbidding fornication, which as 
Vincentio admits, “fourteen years we have let slip” (1.3.22), disrupts legal 
consistency (or in this instance, legal inconsistency), thereby intensifying a quality of 
arbitrariness that unsettles the citizens’ confidence about the deputy who has been left 
in charge:  
Whether the tyranny be in his place, 
Or in his eminence that fills it up, 
I stagger in:--but this new governor 
Awakes me all the enrolled penalties 
Which have, like unscour'd armour, hung by the wall 
So long that nineteen zodiacs have gone round 
And none of them been worn. (1.2.144-50) 
Tyranny emerges when the relative predictability which laws establish is eroded by 
the arbitrary will of a single individual.  Left alone following Angelo’s threat that he 
will “prove a tyrant” and go forward with her brother Claudio’s execution if she does 
not submit her body to his sexual urges, Isabella reflects on this development as a 
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 Deborah Shuger associates this element in Measure for Measure with a tradition extending to Plato’s 
Laws, where laws are imagined to produce “an ideal of individual and social excellence” (13).  
Following Karl Popper, Shuger emphasizes the anti-individualist elements of this vision, but she also 
recognizes how laws under Plato’s interpretation are posited as unrealizable ideals that represent the 





subordination of law to individual will: “Bidding the law make curtsy to their will / 
Hooking both right and wrong to the appetite / To follow as it draws” (2.4.176-68).  
     Importantly, the predominant conceptual framework here re-articulated by 
Measure for Measure holds lawful and lawless governments to be mutually exclusive 
forms of regime.  Totalitarianism, however, unravels the distinction between the two.  
Insofar as it eliminates positive law and the stable, predictable space for action that 
law makes possible, totalitarianism may be understood as lawless.  Indeed, one of the 
reasons that totalitarianism has been confused with the operation of tyranny is that 
initially it functions in a similar way, dismantling the existing structure of law and the 
public life it enables (465).  As we saw in an earlier discussion of Julius Caesar, the 
principle of fear that governs in tyranny forces the public citizen into the isolation of 
private life, leaving the tyrant alone to occupy the public space.  As Cassius 
complains: 
When could they say till now, that talked of Rome,  
That her wide walls encompassed but one man?  
Now is it Rome indeed and room enough,  
When there is in it but one only man. (1.2.154-57)   
So to isolate citizens, however, is merely pre-totalitarian:  “Political contacts between 
men are severed in tyrannical government and the human capacity for action and 
power are frustrated.  But not all contacts between men are broken and not all human 
capacities are broken” (474).  Even in instances where political action does not 
reemerge from the private, as it does when the conspirators plan their revolt inside the 





experience, fabrication, and thought are left intact” (474).  If tyranny limits the 
capacity for human action by isolating citizens so as to eliminate the public realm of 
life where political action and resistance are possible, it does not, as does 
totalitarianism, produce a loneliness that deprives human beings entirely of a world in 
which they might belong, and thereby destroy the private life of thought and everyday 
experience, in addition to the life of action (475). 
Totalitarianism performs this second operation insofar as it is also lawful, that 
is, insofar as it pursues “the sense of absolute logic and consistency” that Arendt 
mentioned as the first element of radical evil in her Denktagebuch.  Subordinating 
both the political life of plurality and the everyday life of private individuals to what 
it takes to be the laws of Nature or History, it obeys a logic of predefined ends that 
does not resemble the arbitrariness associated with the will of a tyrant (Essays In 
Understanding 339-340)
21
:   
Totalitarian lawfulness…executes the law of History or of Nature without 
translating them into standards of right and wrong for individual behavior.  It 
applies the law directly to mankind without bothering with the behavior of 
men. The law of Nature or the law of History, if properly executed, are 
expected to produce mankind as its end product…Totalitarian policy claims to 
transform the human species into an active unfailing carrier of the law to 
which human beings would only reluctantly be subjected. (462) 
Totalitarianism no longer pursues the logic of utility common to modern democratic 
states.  The ill-conceived neoliberal view that government should serve as an 
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 Arendt explicitly argues this point: “The totalitarian dictator, in sharp distinction from the tyrant, 
does not believe that he is a free agent with the power to execute his arbitrary will, but, instead, the 





administrative regulator of the life processes of individuals and as a coordinator of 
market activities may not emphasize individual or collective political action (and may 
even present significant conceptual and material obstacles to it), but neither does it 
entirely prevent action’s appearance on the public stage.
22
  Totalitarianism mobilizes 
its masses by subordinating all movement to a process of history that is independent 
of utilitarian calculation.  And as an ideology, it is fundamentally opposed to the 
capacity for action in each individual, a potentiality that both haunts and disrupts its 
drive toward absolute consistency and reliability:  "The superhuman force of Nature 
or History possesses its own beginning and its own end, so it can only be hindered by 
the new beginning and the individual end which the life of each man actually is" 
(Origins 465).  Rather than the law, as in Measure for Measure, it is the individual, 
then, that totalitarianism seeks to make “static” through a process Arendt labels “total 
terror.”  Treating the infinite variety of humanity with its capacity for spontaneous 
action as if it were a single individual, totalitarianism aligns all activity with a law 
that is external to ethical life.  Before this tribunal of terror, the meaningfulness of 
human agency is nearly lost because everyone is considered equally innocent: “the 
murdered because they did nothing against the system, and the murderers because 
they do not really murder but execute a death sentence pronounced by some higher 
tribunal…Terror is lawfulness, if law is the law of the movement of some 
suprahuman force, Nature or History” (465).  And unlike under tyranny, not merely 
the capacity for action but the capacity for independent thought that might oppose the 
cruelty of this logic is severely constrained:  “By destroying all space between men 
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and pressing men against each other, even the productive potentialities of isolation 
are annihilated; by teaching and glorifying the logical reasoning of loneliness where 
man knows he will be utterly lost if ever he lets go of the first premise from which the 
whole process is being started, even the slim chances that loneliness may be 
transformed into solitude and logic into thought are obliterated” (478). 
Supporting this first element of administrative evil that Arendt identifies in 
her Denktagebuch—the superlative logicality of totalitarianism—is the second, 
rendering individuals superfluous.  An understanding of this concept can be gleaned 
by reading Origins alongside another of Arendt’s letters in which Shakespeare 
appears as a significant interlocutor.  In 1960, a year before she attended Eichmann’s 
trial in Jerusalem and four years before she published the second edition of the book 
that contained her response to criticisms of her description of the evils of Nazism as 
“banal,” Arendt suggested to W. H. Auden her wariness with reading Shakespeare as 
a guide to understanding the present, particularly when it came to the questions about 
the nature of evil that had concerned her following the Holocaust.  Commenting on 
his essay “The Fallen City” (“I just read the Falstaff piece”), which considers 
passages from Henry IV part 1, Measure for Measure, and King Lear, Arendt writes 
that her response will be an extended one, requiring more than a single missive; she 
has several points that at some point she would “like to raise, especially about Greek 
tragedy,” but “[I] am writing now because of ‘forgiving’” (1).  Both Arendt's letter 
and the essay by Auden that prompted it can be read as part of an ongoing 
conversation on forgiveness that was set off by Arendt’s exploration of the concept in 





Arendt’s book was “one of those rare books which gives me the impression of having 
been especially written for me” (“Thinking What We Are Doing” 72), his essay offers 




In a portion of "The Fallen City," Auden explores the difficulty that 
Shakespeare must have faced (and that Greek tragedians, for instance, did not) when 
he attempted to dramatize individual subjective states, forgiveness among the most 
prominent examples.  Auden's argument is built on the claim that forgiveness is an 
interior state of regard toward a transgressor that is ultimately independent of that 
other’s way of relating to the one who is forgiving:  "The command to forgive is 
unconditional: whether my enemy harden his heart or repent and beg forgiveness is 
irrelevant" (28).  Such a freedom from inter-subjective exchange implies that there is 
no necessary connection between forgiveness and action.  Such forgiveness is an 
altogether private affair that can be enacted only under certain conditions.  Measure 
for Measure, when Isabella forgives Angelo at the end of the play, provides such an 
example:  
Again, on the stage, forgiveness requires manifestation in action, that is to say, 
the one who forgives must be in a position to do something for the other 
which, if he were not forgiving, he would not do. This means that my enemy 
must be at my mercy; but, to the spirit of charity, it is irrelevant whether I am 
at my enemy's mercy or he at mine. So long as he is at my mercy, forgiveness 
is indistinguishable from judicial pardon…One may say that Isabella forgives 
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 In his dissertation on Arendt and forgiveness, Steven Prescott Ferguson also identifies the exchange 





Angelo and the Duke pardons him.  But, on the stage, this distinction is 
invisible because, there, power, justice, and love are all on the same side. (28) 
 The simultaneity of Isabella’s forgiveness of Angelo and the Dukes’ pardon of him 
leads us to ignore certain of the distinctions between forgiveness and legal pardon of 
which Auden reminds us: "The law cannot forgive, for the law has not been wronged, 
only broken; only persons can be wronged" (28-29).  Clearly, Auden is responding to 
Arendt here, implying that she mistakes legal pardon for forgiveness in The Human 
Condition when she writes, “The alternative to forgiveness, but by no means its 
opposite, is punishment, and both have in common that they attempt to put an end to 
something that without interference could go on endlessly" (241).  But as Arendt 
takes note, when Auden distinguishes forgiveness from the act of pardon in his 
discussion of Measure for Measure, he also relegates forgiveness to the purview of 
the individual moral agent. 
Quite the contrary, Arendt finds that morality, having been derived from the 
possibility of forgiveness, depends upon experiences that can only occur in the 
presence of others.  Prior to Arendt, forgiveness had been paid scant attention by 
political theory, perhaps because its most influential articulation by Jesus of Nazareth 
is predominantly moral and religious.   Under Arendt’s theory of the political, 
however, forgiveness becomes a fundamental aspect of the political experience of 
plurality.  In The Human Condition, first published in 1958, forgiveness appears as 
the necessary counterpart to her description of promising explored in Chapter 1: "The 
two faculties belong together in so far as one of them, forgiving, serves to undo the 





generation; and the other, binding oneself through promises, serves to set up in the 
ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, islands of security without 
which not even continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be possible in the 
relationships between men" (237)  If promising is one of the preconditions for the 
possibility of a shared political world that exists by virtue of action, the inter-
subjective capacity to forgive accommodates action in a plural world where, as we 
have seen in earlier chapters, action is categorically unpredictable and routinely 
subject to misfiring.   
In her letter of response to Auden, Arendt is willing to grant Auden that she 
had indeed effaced the distinction between forgiveness and judicial pardon—"You 
are entirely right (and I was entirely wrong)"—in The Human Condition.  But 
because Auden maintains that forgiveness is an internal, individual state that holds no 
relation to action, either that of the doer or the sufferer, he overlooks its plural 
character, the “the mutuality of the whole business” that “is essential for the act of 
forgiving,” an act which is, pace Auden, always also an act of judgment (2).  Further, 
Arendt questions whether forgiveness belongs “in the same category” as charity, 
implying that Auden has conflated the two.  While caritas might be able to “carry a 
group of worldless people through the world, a group of saints or a group of 
criminals” it cannot be the basis for a world of rights and thus, unlike forgiveness, is 
not a political concept (The Human Condition 53).
24
   
This analysis of caritas can be traced to Arendt’s larger critique of the basic 
formulations of Western human rights discourse that she contends facilitated the 
creation of superfluous human beings.  Rather than deriving from the historical 
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development of political institutions that would support them, rights were understood 
to derive from the innate sovereign will of the individual, a sovereign will that is then 
supposed by consent to be transmuted into the general will of the sovereign state 
(Origins 291-99).  Public freedom is only guaranteed by the sovereignty of this 
unanimous, general will, which paradoxically requires that the atomized individuals 
who constitute it uniformly possess natural instincts for both individual freedom and 
universal pity toward others.  Such a vision of the innate dignity of natural man 
resembles something of what Lear sees in Edgar, “the thing itself” or 
“unaccommodated man” (3.4.95-96).             
Here Arendt finds a particularly virulent reincarnation of a thought-train we 
explored in Chapter 1, wherein freedom is understood primarily as freedom of the 
will.  The problem of widespread statelessness that emerged following the First 
World War, together with the terrible force with which the phenomenon deprived 
individuals of human rights, revealed that rights were anything but inalienable for 
those whom the general will does not recognize as part of the sovereign state.  This 
incarnation of superfluousness, the phenomenon of worldlessness that occurs through 
the loss of belonging to a political community, should be understood as a necessary 
though not a sufficient condition for the entrance of another form of superfluousness, 
a totalitarian version that attempts to solve the problem of statelessness by first 
stripping large portions of the population of their rights and then by eliminating these 
populations through administrative killing operations.   As if responding to King 
Lear, Arendt records that for those who had lost the protections of a common world 





camps, “the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was their greatest danger” 
(300).     
The historical experiences of banishment and slavery supply a kind of 
precedent for understanding the first kind of superfluousness, statelessness, but not 
that of the second, life in the concentration camp (Origins 444).
25
  Paul Kottman has 
suggested how banishment in Shakespeare’s As You Like It, where the possibility of a 
durable political world replete with inheritable forms of social life has been called 
into question, not only complicates the pastoral form but also anticipates questions 
Arendt would raise about statelessness in the twentieth century (23-46).  But in the 
Forest of Arden we also find a form of alternate sociality for the banished Duke and 
his former Lords, now his “co-mates and brothers in exile” (2.1.1), which recalls 
Arendt’s characterization of exile as that which “banishes only from one part of the 
world to another…also inhabited by human beings” (Origins 444).  As with 
banishment, the search for precedents in the institution of slavery fails adequately to 
account for the experience of life and death in the concentration camps.  Slavery, 
which we saw can approach the logic of the camp (in Coriolanus, when Brutus points 
to Martius’ desire to reduce the plebeian full capacity for political action to the life of 
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 There has been no shortage of sociologists and political theorists who attempt to understand what 
Arendt took to be the unprecedented characteristics in Nazi concentration camps by means of existing 
precedents like slavery.  For examples, see Bruno Bettelheim (39), Stanley Elkins (81-139), and John 
Stanley (200-3).  For a comprehensive review of this material, see Peter Baehr, who attempts to define 
from a sociological perspective the value of the unprecedented as a concept, and helpfully, recognizes 
the necessity of judgment as a capacity for determining when the concept should be applied: “If we 
translate Arendt's own philosophical formulations into a more analytical idiom, we might say that an 
event has a precedent if it is possible to identify another event that has taken place at an earlier time 
that is sufficiently similar to the later event in relevant respects. The point about invoking a preceding 
event is that it is better understood than the more recent event that has attracted our attention. An event 
is ‘unprecedented’ if it is impossible to identify an earlier event that is sufficiently comparable to the 
more recent event in relevant respects. Highlighting the term ‘sufficiently’ indicates that there will 
always be a judgment involved; highlighting the term "relevant" indicates that that judgment itself is 





labor: “…holding them / In human capacity and action / Of no more soul nor fitness 
for the world / Than camels in their war, who have their provand / Only for bearing 
burthens” (2.1.246-50), still harbors a utilitarian logic that values the slave in 
economic terms.  The inmate of the camp, however, “has no price, because he can 
always be replaced; nobody knows to whom he belongs, because he is never seen.  
From the point of view of normal society he is absolutely superfluous, although in 
times of acute labor shortage…he is used for work” (Origins 444).     
According to Arendt, widespread statelessness does, however, set the stage for 
totalitarianism; the mass, tempest-tossed populations that are thereby created develop 
a desire for consistency in the unstable political reality they inhabit, which can be 
supplied by a denial of that reality through the unthinking logicality of propaganda. 
Statelessness itself is enabled by intellectual frameworks that explicitly proclaim 
human rights founded on an unconditional, bare humanness while legally 
subordinating the possession of rights to the sovereign will of the nation state.  
Totalitarianism is made possible by such widespread anti-political thought-trains (and 
the material realities they create) that conceive of politics from the perspective of a 
single individual who, ipso facto, and paradoxically, is both the inherent possessor of 
rights and a sovereign will that can either grant or deny them to others.  Arendt’s 
concerns about Auden’s unconditional view of forgiveness, which she labels caritas, 
are prompted by the tendency to think of the individual in this way, ignoring until too 
late how the public, plural world of freedom depends upon actions that support the 
living institutions of justice and law.  Whereas charity in early Christianity signaled 





an inadequate stop-gap for the insufficiency of human rights that had been allotted 
merely by virtue of biological birth.  Preserving the lives of some who had lost their 
rights to statelessness, it could not restore their access to a public world nor prevent 
totalitarian regimes from murdering others wholesale (296).   
Arendt repeats in her letter to Auden an assertion from The Human Condition 
that directly responds to Auden's claims about forgiveness—both its independence 
from particular circumstances as well as its universal applicability: “If we are to trust 
in what ‘the Gospels assure us’ of, then the ‘command to forgive is not 
unconditional.’  Jesus said: ‘If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him; and if he 
repents, forgive him’” (1).  Arendt experiences the modern, liberal “temptation” to 
forgive, what she understands to be charity, as the corollary of the reluctance to judge 
and to understand, but it is this temptation she would “rather resist.”  As she would 
later write in Eichmann in Jerusalem: “Justice, but not mercy, is a matter of 
judgment, and about nothing does public opinion everywhere seem to be in happier 
agreement than that no one has the right to judge somebody else” (296).  
Supplementing the earlier entry in her Denktagebuch where she concluded that 
Shakespearean representations of evil seemed unable to assist us in comprehending 
the phenomenon of superflousness, Arendt again wonders if Auden’s example of 
transgression from Shakespeare—Angelo's attempt to use the power of his office to 
coerce Isabella into submitting to his sexual desire—is relevant to the forms of 
criminality she is interested in understanding: “Furthermore: the offenses which Jesus 
predicts are clearly beyond the power to forgive: ‘woe unto him through whom they 





into the sea—it were better for him that he were never born’…I was thinking of the 
absurd position of the judges during the Nuremburg trials who were confronted with 
crimes of such a magnitude that they transcended all possible punishment.   But this 
surely is another matter” (1-2).     
 
Thoughtless Evil: Macbeth and Richard III 
in Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem and The Life of the Mind 
 
  Arendt turns specifically to this other matter in Eichmann in Jersusalem, 
where she again suggests by way of Shakespeare the limits of applying existing 
conceptual frameworks to understand the unprecedented in totalitarianism.  Both here 
and elsewhere, Arendt develops strong analogies between the judgments made when 
witnessing trials and judgments made when witnessing plays.  Like trials, plays offer 
particular case studies upon which we can practice our moral judgments.
26
  Among 
the things which made it difficult to recognize what was novel about Eichmann’s 
crimes was the form the trial took, a show trial that Arendt claimed stripped the 
proceedings of the dramatic aspects inherent to criminal trials.  According to Arendt 
the accused’s ability to judge ethically and to act on the basis of such judgments is a 
longstanding assumption for the particular types of judgments that are made at 
criminal trials.  The agent as a concept is the very subject of a trial, just as the hero-
actor is the subject of a play:  “A trial resembles a play in that both begin and end 
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 In The Invention of Suspicion: Law and Mimesis in Shakespeare and Renaissance Drama, Lorna 
Hutson argues that evidence evaluation in trials required competence in probability that can tell us a lot 
about how characters judge one another.  Legal epistemology, in her telling, helped to give rise to the 





with the doer, not with the victim” (9).  Situated within the plural perspectival world 
where multiple agents are always performing individual actions, trials and their 
outcomes also retain the element of “irreducible risk” that is characteristic of political 
life (266).  But certain factions at Eichmann’s trial attempted to eliminate this 
element, turning it into a “spectacle with prearranged results” (266).  When his crimes 
were identified with the movement of a history of Jewish suffering, Eichmann failed 
to remain at “the center of the play” (266) and almost took on the appearance of an 
“innocent executor of some foreordained destiny” (19).  According to Arendt, “In the 
center of a trial can only be the one who did—in this respect he is like the hero in the 
play—and if he suffers, he must suffer for what he has done, not for what he has 
caused others to suffer” (9).  But because Eichmann’s trial did not judge his particular 
deeds, “the trial never became a play”(9).  Consequently, the legal and juridical 
concepts normally applied at criminal trials were not deployed and thus remained 
unchallenged, and the peculiar nature of Eichmann’s crimes and the difficult 
questions that totalitarianism posed for the possibility of judging moral agents were 
left largely unexplored. 
Arendt attempts to revive those dramatic aspects of Eichmann's story that 
were invisible at his trial, as well as to understand how the forms of evil he 
participated in had weakened the conceptual frameworks that normally would have 
been deployed to evaluate him as a moral agent.  Even her title, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, carries an association with the dramatic genre (i.e. Oedipus at Colonus), 
as if to frame the defendant as dramatic agent for the reader.  The challenge Arendt 





history, from a terrifying vision in which men appeared to have become mere cogs in 
the machine of history, back into a drama of individual actors, a play whose agents 
could again be judged for how they did or did not act.  The supreme difficulty was to 
do so without disregarding the fundamentally new challenges that the experiences of 
totalitarianism posed for understanding moral agency. 
Examples taken just from some of the Shakespearean criticism published 
around the time Arendt wrote Eichmann suggest that her concerns about the 
intellectual practice of “deducing the unprecedented from precedents” were still 
warranted.  If Arendt encountered Jan Kott’s Shakespeare Our Contemporary, 
released in English in 1964, she likely had sympathy for a project that sought to read 
Shakespeare with an eye to present political life; she would not, however, have been 
able to agree with Kott that Macbeth represents anything like the “Auschwitz 
experience” (82), “the huge steam-roller of history” that “has been put in motion and 
crushes everybody in turn” (77).  And certainly, Arendt would have found troubling 
what another critic wrote in Shakespeare Survey of the evil in Macbeth: “…can we 
condemn our ancestors for an over-zealous belief in spiritual evil when we have 
Eichmann’s in our midst?” (McGee 55).
 27
  As Arendt definitively concludes in the 
second edition of the book, which appeared in 1964: “Eichmann was not Iago and not 
Macbeth, and nothing would have been farther from his mind than to determine with 
Richard III ‘to prove a villain’ . . . Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking 
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 While Eichmann’s participation in mass murder was quite different from either Hitler’s or Stalin’s, 
more recent comparisons between Macbeth and these totalitarian leaders in articles like Roland Mushat 
Frye’s, “Hitler, Stalin, and Shakespeare’s Macbeth: Modern Totalitarianism and Ancient Tyranny,” 
provide evidence that similar elisions of the unprecedented, in terms both of individual participants and 
totalitarianism as a regime form, are still in play.  What Frye finds to be “Shakespeare’s profound 






out for his personal advancement, he had no motives at all.  And this diligence in 
itself was in no way criminal; he certainly would never have murdered his superior to 
inherit his post.  He merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was 
doing” (287).   
This assessment of Shakespeare’s representations of evil runs parallel to 
Arendt's criticisms of some of the basic presuppositions concerning evil that 
undergird Western legal frameworks.  First, she challenges the requirement that 
intention, the determination “to prove a villain,” is necessary for the commission of a 
crime (Eichmann 277).  Second, she complicates the role that conscience plays in 
traditional notions of evil, critiquing its trustworthiness as an instrument for guiding 
moral action, but also its reliability when it came to showing up on the scene at all.  
Finally, she calls into question the value of understanding moral acts in terms of 
obedience, and immoral ones in terms of disobedience, an analogy that Eichmann 
used in his own defense.  As he saw it: “[h]is guilt came from his obedience, and 
obedience is praised as a virtue.  His virtue had been abused by the Nazi leaders” 
(247).  This viewpoint reached a height of terrifying absurdity when Eichmann, who 
claimed to have read Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, revealed his conviction 
that while obeying Hitler’s orders he had only abided by a Kantian notion of duty and 
therefore could not have done anything wrong (136).  Arendt initially dismisses 
Eichmann’s comparison as outrageous, reminding us that Kantian practical reason 
requires every individual to make judgments consistent with the categorical 
imperative through the use of his or her own reason, rather than surrender that 





individual reason was the source of the law, but “in Eichmann’s household use of 
him, it was the will of the Fuhrer” (Eichmann 137).   
Several years later, however, in a series of lectures she gave in 1965-66 at The 
New School for Social Research and the University of Chicago, Arendt appeared 
more concerned with Kant’s use of the word “law” in defining the categorical 
imperative, and explored what it might mean for the viability of his theory of moral 
action.  Undoubtedly, the equation of morality with obedience and adherence to 
established laws has a long tradition.  Expressed by Paul in Romans (“For when the 
Gentiles which have not the Lawe, do by nature the things conteined in the Law, they 
having not the Lawe, are a Lawe unto themselves.  Which shewe the effect of the 
Lawe written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts 
accusing one another, or excusing” [Romans 2:14-15]), it could also have been found 
by Shakespeare in contemporary writings devoted entirely to the conscience.  In the 
most prominent example, Williams Perkin’s Discourse of Conscience, we find that 
“[t]he mind is the storehouse and keeper of al manner of rules and principles…It may 
be compared to a booke of law, in which are set down the penall statutes of the land.  
The dutie of it is to prefer and present to the conscience rules of divine law whereby it 
is to give judgment…” (84).   
Kant’s notion of the categorical imperative significantly reconceptualized 
ethical action in several respects, but primarily by opposing accounts of moral action 
as the pursuit of the good, whether of happiness or utility, to his formulation of a 
priori reason that, independent of experience, could immanently determine a 





particular ends.  Despite these theoretical innovations, in so categorizing ethical life 
as the subordination of individual desire to a moral "law," Arendt claims that Kant 
reintroduces "the concept of obedience, through a back door as it were” 
(Responsibility and Judgment 72).  Under Kant’s notion of the categorical imperative, 
the conscience obliges the individual to obey the law of any rule that she judges to be 
universalizable.  If one makes a promise while secretly intending to break it, for 
instance, one is depending upon the continued existence of the normative practices of 
promise-making and -keeping in order to exploit them.  Willing both that promising 
exists and that it does not exist, the individual universalizes two contradictory 
propositions: that we should keep the promises we make to others and that we should 
break those promises when they become inconvenient to keep.  If promising as a 
social practice is to exist at all, keeping promises that one makes becomes a 
categorical imperative, a universal rule that one ought to follow.    
In the figure of Macbeth, who unlike Eichmann does possess identifiable 
motives for committing murder and certainly intends the murder he commits, I would 
argue that we also find an understanding of morality as obedience to a universal law.  
Furthermore, Macbeth’s interpretation of the moral conflict he experiences near the 
beginning of the play seems to anticipate and embody Kant’s description of the 
categorical imperative.  For as he contemplates the murder of Duncan, he articulates 
the standard, or universal, against which his individual desires are opposed: 
He’s here in double trust: 
First, as I am his kinsman and his subject, 





Who should against his murderer shut the door, 
Not bear the knife myself.  (1.7.12-16) 
Here Macbeth’s judgment about the murder he intends relies on established standards 
and rules; one ought not to murder one’s king or kinsman, one ought not to murder a 
guest.  Moreover, the very idea of kingship depends upon subjects not murdering 
their king; when Macbeth pursues the crown through the murder of Duncan, he makes 
an exception in his own case regarding the institution upon which he plans to rely for 
his own future existence.  And while his individual situation may supply him with 
motives for murdering Duncan, this does not entirely eliminate the obligation he feels 
to abide by a universal moral law that commands him not to murder.
28
 
But what lies behind this form of morality that Macbeth experiences here and 
that Kant continues the tradition of describing as a “law” that compels obedience?  
Arendt suggests that the unreliability of the will as an executor of reason—the 
disjunction between knowledge of the good and the will to perform it—so disturbed 
Kant that he supplemented rational principles with an obligatory character.  Under 
this interpretation, the imperative in Kant’s moral law harbors what all forms of the 
“Thou shalt” imply: the threat of retribution, whether “by an avenging God or by the 
consent of the community, or by conscience, which is the threat of self-punishment 
which we commonly call repentance” (78).        
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 This accords with what Kant claims about the ineliminable quality of the moral law in Religion 
within the Limits of Human Reason Alone: “Man (even the most wicked) does not, under any maxim 
whatsoever, repudiate the moral law in the manner of a rebel (renouncing obedience to it). The law, 
rather, forces itself (dringt sich) upon him irresistibly by virtue of his moral predisposition; and were 
no other incentive working in opposition, he would adopt the law into his supreme maxim as the 
sufficient determining ground of his will; that is, he would be morally good. But by virtue of an 
equally innocent natural predisposition he depends upon the incentives (Triebfedern) of his sensuous 
nature and adopts them also (in accordance with the subjective principle of self-love) into his maxim” 





And judging by the emphatic underlining of a passage in Arendt’s copy of The 
Metaphysics of Morals, the juridical metaphors that Kant uses to describe the 
operation of the conscience were of particular interest to her as well: "the man who 
accuses and judges himself in conscience must think of himself as a twofold 
personage, a doubled self who, on the one hand, has to stand in fear and trembling at 
the bar of the tribunal which is yet entrusted to him, but who, on the other hand, must 
himself administer the duty of judge which he holds from inborn authority” (104, 
Arendt's copy).
29
  Macbeth describes the drama of his life in similar terms, 
anticipating the psychic punishments his conscience will levy upon him when one 
half of him stands in judgment over the actions of the other: 
…But in these cases, 
We still have judgment here; that we but teach 
Bloody instructions, which, being taught, return 
To plague th’ inventor: this even-handed Justice 
Commends th’ingredience of our poison’d chalice 
To our own lips. (1.7.7-12) 
The particular imperatives mentioned by Macbeth serve as a form of standing moral 
law that he feels bound to obey.  When he disregards what he takes for universal laws 
in favor of individual motive and desire, he appears to suffer from the impact of this 
violation.  Consequently, the play does not immediately alert us to any of the 
                                                 
29
 See also Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: “The judicial pronouncements of that wondrous power 
in us that we call conscience are also in perfect agreement with this.  Let a human being use what art 
he wants in order to paint to himself a remembered unlawful behavior as an unintentional oversight—
as a mere carelessness, which one can never avoid entirely, and thus as something which was carried 
away by the stream of natural necessity—and to declare himself innocent of it; he nonetheless finds 
that the lawyer who speaks in his favor can in no way silence the prosecutor in him, if only he is 
conscious that at the time when committed the wrong he was in his sense, i.e. had the use of his 





problems with the Kantian framework for understanding morality or with the 
traditional understanding of conscience that the case of Eichmann makes visible.
30
  
According to Arendt, the events of the Holocaust demonstrated that the notion of 
morality as grounded in rule-bound behavior but also in a duty to will the categorical 
imperative was ill-equipped to supply reliable guideposts for moral action in a 
political world where the law commanded evil rather than forbade it.  Unlike the rules 
of hospitality and respect for kingship that govern Macbeth’s conscience, in the 
totalitarian state, “there were no rules to be abided by, under which the particular 
cases with which they were confronted could be subsumed” (295).  And any reliance 
that Eichmann might have had on rule-bound behavior, his unquestioning obedience 
to the will of the Fuhrer, seems only to have freed him from the pangs of conscience 
all the more when he was ordered to participate in mass murder.
31
  In complying with 
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 As A. E. Stoll describes it, “Macbeth and Lady Macbeth take the path of willfully ignoring 
conscience as they will their sworn king, and in the aftermath of that action they experience conscience 
redounding upon them” (132).  This play’s focus on the phenomenon of conscience suggested to 
certain critics contemporary with Arendt, Eugene Waith, for example, that Macbeth’s “deliberate 
decision, against the dictates of his better judgment…is one of the most important manifestations of the 
evil which dominates the entire play” (267).  In one of the few articles that attempts to account for 
Arendt’s juxtaposition of Eichmann with Macbeth, J. Gregory Keller contends that while Macbeth 
initially exemplifies Arendt’s notion of the thinker who, in dialogue with himself, makes moral 
judgments regarding his intentions and who thereby is persuaded to refrain from murdering Duncan, 
the play ultimately reveals Macbeth to be “more like than unlike Eichmann, at least in the ease with 
which he is persuaded that the evil deed is obviously the right one,” when he leaves thinking alone to 
be swayed by the arguments of Lady Macbeth (41).  While Keller’s discussion of Macbeth is adequate 
as an illustration of Arendt’s consideration of the relation between thinking and moral judgments, it 
neglects Arendt’s articulation of what was fundamentally different about Eichmann’s case, as this 
chapter will go on to explore: namely, that he never appears to have thought about what he did, that the 
laws of conscience in the Nazi regime actually commanded murder rather than forbade it, and that the 
terror imposed by totalitarianism intruded upon precisely the private spaces of thought where such 
judgments in Macbeth take place. 
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 Arendt’s interpretation of Kant’s ethical theory has not been without influence, even among scholars 
who do not wholly agree with her assessment.  Addressing how Arendt’s Eichmann problematizes the 
equation of dutiful action with morality, Samuel Kerstein draws an example from Religion Within the 
Limits of Reason Alone, in which Kant argues that a religious inquisitor simply could not execute a 
heretic while passing his two-fold test for moral permissibility; Kant is convinced that in so doing such 
a person could neither have acted from duty (rather than individual desire), nor earnestly reflected on 
the action and judged it to have moral worth.  While Kerstein maintains, contra Arendt, that such a 





the law, Eichmann was sustained by its deadening reliability as a compass of social 




Arendt is not the first thinker to suggest by way of Shakespeare the limitations 
of Kant’s notion of the categorical imperative.  In his own reading of Macbeth, what 
Hegel objects to in Kant's moral theory is that its logic of command and obey affords 
primacy to abstract universal principles and turns other individuals into mere 
opportunities for actualizing moral dutifulness, shifting our focus away from what 
Hegel takes to be the experientially prior inter-subjective relations of communal life 
that are either upheld or disrupted by the particular actions of individuals.  Moreover, 
it preserves the master-slave political relation through yet another iteration of 
freedom as freedom of the will, internalizing with it the understanding of all moral 
action as the conquest of biological desire through a controlling rationality.  By virtue 
of this uncompromising ratiocination, the Kantian version of morality does not imply 
any need to consider the perspectives of others or to grapple with the inter-subjective 
dilemmas for moral action that human plurality presents.  In this sense, Arendt agrees 
                                                                                                                                           
to be impossible that, in performing an odious action, someone might fulfill these two conditions, 
thereby giving the action moral worth. Acknowledging the possibility of odious actions having moral 
worth is painful. Yet I see no way of avoiding it while, at the same time, defending a plausible 
reconstruction of Kant's views” (546-47). 
32
 Ultimately, Arendt identifies the recurrent analogy of moral action as obedience so that she can 
dispense with it entirely: “Even in a strictly bureaucratic organization, with its fixed hierarchical order, 
it would make much more sense to look upon the functioning of the “cogs” and wheels in terms of 
overall support for a common enterprise than in our usual terms of obedience to superiors.  If I obey 
the laws of the land, I actually support its constitution, as becomes glaringly obvious in the case of 
revolutionists and rebels who disobey because they have withdrawn this tacit consent…there is no such 
thing as obedience in political and moral matters…Thus the question that should have been addressed 
to those like Adolf Eichmann who participated in state-sanctioned genocide was not, ‘Why did you 





with Hegel: “in Kant the question What ought I to do? concerns the conduct of the 
self in its independence from others” (19 Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy).
33
   
If with Kant moral life still revolves around the cultivation of a good will, in 
Hegel there is a transition to an ethical life where the conscience, as the Spirit of the 
rational state, pursues the freedom of the community (Bates 202).  We might apply 
Hegel’s suggestion to Shakespeare’s play by observing that in addition to the 
categorical imperative which subsumes the particular case under a universal law, 
Macbeth also points to Duncan as an individual who is loved by a community, and 
whose bonds with other individuals would seem not merely to supplement a law that 




Besides, this Duncan 
Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been  
So clear in his great office, this his virtues 
Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongu’d, against 
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 Here, at least, some Arendtian scholars have taken issue with Arendt’s perspective on Kant’s 
practical philosophy.  Seyla Benhabib argues that where Arendt may be right to identify a solipsistic 
element in Kant’s theory of pure practical reason (in its reliance on individual judgment rather than the 
perspectives of others in making a determination regarding the moral worth of an action), Arendt’s 
own lectures on Kant’s Critique of Judgment promote reflective judgment’s capacity to enable an 
“enlarged mentality” that takes into consideration the subject positions of multiple persons.  For 
Benhabib, this suggests the possibility that reflective judgments could resolve Arendt’s concerns 
regarding the isolated perspective of the categorical imperative.  A connection between Kant’s second 
and third Critiques might be established, where the communicability of reflective aesthetic judgments 
would help free individuals from “subjective private conditions” that “lack all validity in the public 
realm,” acting as a deliberative supplement to the determinative judgment of the categorical imperative 
(132-40).  I must agree with Dana Villa, however, that this strategy relies on public speech as a means 
toward a more universal rationality rather than as an end in itself, thereby dispensing with the 
irreducibly plural and often agonistic perspectives inherent to Arendt’s project in favor of a more 
Habermasian one in which consensus is the end of reflective judgments (Arendt and Heidegger 70-71).     
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 J. M. Bernstein suggests that what Hegel attempts vis-à-vis his rejection of Kantian morality 
“involves a general shift of orientation, a changing of the topic of morality from the question of law 
and obedience, vertical morality, to the quality and nature of our relationship with one another, 






The deep damnation of his taking off; 
And Pity, like a naked new-born babe… 
Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye (1.7.16-24) 
In Hegel’s vision of ethical life, an individual’s self-regard is dependent upon her 
relations with others; this dependence sets in motion a causality whereby actions that 
harm or disrupt those relations redound upon victim and actor alike.  The actor suffers 
not because of a contradiction between the rules an individual judges to be 
universally valid and the actions she chooses to undertake but because the social 
fabric that binds the self to a community is the same fabric that generates the self’s 
relation to itself.  In the essay “The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,” Hegel finds 
Macbeth paradigmatic of the consciousness that, while attempting to eliminate an 
enemy by killing him, is nevertheless plagued by the memory of that other through 
the murderous model of relating to the self and to others that has thereby been 
produced: 
The illusion of trespass, its belief that it destroys the other's life and thinks 
itself enlarged thereby, is dissipated by the fact that the disembodied spirit of 
the injured life comes on the scene against the trespass, just as Banquo who 
came as a friend to Macbeth was not blotted out when he was murdered but 
immediately thereafter took his seat, not as a guest at the feast, but as an evil 
spirit. The trespasser intended to have to do with another's life, but he has only 
destroyed his own, for life is not different from life, since life dwells in the 
single Godhead.  In his arrogance he has destroyed indeed, but only the 





In defining Macbeth’s act as the willful imposition of his particular desires against the 
universal life of Spirit, Hegel seems in some measure to agree with Kant as to what 
constitutes the essence of evil.  And yet, while the abstract, universal law of 
individual morality may threaten before the act, Hegel’s vision of evil suggests that 
transgression only retroactively makes the self conscious of the universal embodied 
life of which it was a part and from which it has subsequently cut itself off.  Despite 
both Macbeth's anticipatory wish about the crime—“If it were done, when 'tis done, 
then 'twere well / It were done quickly" (1.7.1-2)—and Lady Macbeth's assertions 
once it has been committed—“Things without all remedy / Should be without regard: 
what's done is done" (3.2.11-12)—the murders Macbeth commits make the world 
permanently inhospitable for him.  “Macbeth doth murder sleep” (2.2.35), staining 
himself with the guilt of an ineradicable transgression, a guilt that seems potent 
enough to darken the natural world with the murdered’s blood: “Clean from my 
hand?  No, this my hand will rather / The multitudinous seas incarnadine, / Making 
the green one red” (2.2.60-62).  As if nostalgically recalling a time before law when 
the dead did not intimidate the living, Macbeth even seems to recognize a connection 
between the establishment of political institutions and the uncanny resurrection of the 
victims of violence through the social memory of conscience: 
Blood hath been shed ere now, i’ th’ olden time, 
Ere humane statute purg’d the gentle weal; 
Ay, and since too, murders have been perform’d 
Too terrible for the ear: the time has been, 





And there an end; but now, they rise again, 
With twenty mortal murthers on their crowns, 
And push us from our stools. (3.4.74-81) 
According to Hegel, then, there is something potentially redemptive about crime; it is 
only through transgression that self-consciousness becomes aware of its dependence 
upon others for its own identity, the knowledge of which the guilty conscience is but 
a symptom.  If knowledge of an ethical life emerges in the wake of its violation, 
crime is the progenitor of conscience and is thereby productive of an awareness of the 
primacy of political relations (J. M. Bernstein 427).  But is this necessarily so? What 
might happen when ethical norms, when Hegel’s Spirit, conditions individuals not to 
weep for the dead, but to eradicate their memory?  What happens to conscience when 
there is no longer a prohibition against murder but an injunction to carry it out on a 
massive scale?  For Arendt, totalitarianism presents a novel problem for modernity, 
for through it the normative prohibition against murder present in all previous life-
worlds was transformed into an injunction.  “Thou shalt not kill” effectively became 
“thou shalt kill” (Eichmann 150).  Hegel’s perspective on Macbeth, while it 
anticipates some of Arendt’s observations regarding the problems of relying on the 
Kantian categorical imperative in situations where no precedent exists, is of limited 
use once totalitarianism emerges.  
Just as comparisons with earlier regime forms signify a failure to recognize 
the novelty of totalitarianism, the search for precedents in one individual murdering 
another fails adequately to account for the experience of life and death in the 





direct challenge to the dialectical notion of conscience that Hegel identifies in 
Macbeth, where the limit case for evil remains the murder of one individual by 
another:  
The murderer who kills a man—a man who has to die anyway—still moves 
within the realm of life and death familiar to us; both have indeed a necessary 
connection on which the dialectic is founded, even if it is not always 
conscious of it.  The murderer leaves a corpse behind and does not pretend 
that his victim has never existed; if he wipes out any traces, they are those of 
his own identity, and not the memory and grief of the persons who loved his 
victim; he destroys a life, but he does not destroy the fact of existence itself. 
(Origins 442).   
But as Arendt goes on to ask, “What meaning has the concept of murder when we are 
confronted with the mass production of corpses?” (441).  Under the “total terror” of 
totalitarianism the eradication of the memory of victims no longer remains a mere 
desire, as it proves to be in Macbeth, but a “skillfully manufactured unreality” that 
treats the inmates of concentration camps as if they had never even been born (445).  
Here murder is transformed into a medical procedure that reduces the deliberate 
elimination of life into something resembling a “perfectly normal measure” (445).
35
   
However many deaths Macbeth accumulates responsibility for over the course 
of the play, murder never achieves the status of anything approaching normality.  One 
of the fundamental ideological preconditions for totalitarianism is a belief that, 
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 Historical studies increasingly support this assessment; in one of the first prominent histories of 
“everyday life” during the Third Reich, Christopher R. Browning focuses on a single German police 
battalion, revealing the extent to which “the criminal policies of the regime inescapably permeated 
everyday existence…mass murder and routine had become one.  Normality itself had become 





because all things are possible, the mass production of corpses can be taken for a 
natural process of history.  What Macbeth seeks to achieve seems neither possible to 
others (as Caithness puts it: "He cannot buckle his distemper’d cause / Within the belt 
of rule" [5.2.15-16]) nor natural.  Quite the contrary, the Doctor suggests it will turn 
nature itself against him:  "Unnatural deeds / Do breed unnatural troubles" (5.1.68-
69).  In Macbeth, the enduring memory of the murdered, as Hegel demonstrates, is 
never in question.  But whereas the tortured conscience of Macbeth prevents him 
from forgetting what he has done, Eichmann is among what Arendt calls the "greatest 
evildoers," "those who don’t remember because they have never given thought to the 
matter, and, without remembrance, nothing can hold them back” (95).   
One the most jarring revelations for Arendt regarding how the conscience had 
gone horribly awry as a guidepost for ethical action was that a near identity had been 
achieved between morality—understood as either obedience to duty (Kant’s 
categorical imperative) or as inter-subjective, communal practices (Hegel’s Spirit)—
and social normativity, which implied that moral life bears an uncomfortable 
resemblance to habit: 
…it was as though morality suddenly stood revealed in the original meaning 
of the word, as a set of mores, customs and manners, which could be 
exchanged for another set with hardly more trouble than it would take to 
change the table manners of an individual or a people.  How strange and 
frightening it suddenly appeared that the very terms we use to designate these 





should never have meant more than usages and habits…What had happened?  
Did we finally awake from a dream?” (50)
 36
 
Given this realization, Arendt draws the further conclusion that feelings of guilt 
cannot be relied upon as a barometer for moral conduct.
37
  While guilt is undeniable 
as a social phenomena—“people feel guilty or feel innocent”—it is most often 
aroused as the result of contradictory social practices, “between old habits and new 
commands” (Responsibility and Judgment 107): ‘once killing or whatever the “new 
morality” demands has become a habit and is accepted by everyone, the same man 
will feel guilty if he does not conform. In other words, these feelings indicate 
conformity and nonconformity, they don’t indicate morality’ (107).  Shakespeare 
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 Christopher Browning’s description of the composition of Reserve Police Battalion 101—working-
class men from Hamburg with an average age of thirty-nine, none of whom were members of the SS—
offers a case-study of this phenomenon: “By virtue of their age…[t]hese were men who had known 
political standards and moral norms other than those of the Nazis.  Most came from Hamburg, by 
reputation one of the least nazified cities in Germany, and the majority came from a social class that 
had been anti-Nazi in its political culture.  These men would not seem to have been a very promising 
group from which to recruit mass murderers on behalf of the Nazi vision of a racial utopia free of 
Jews” (48).  When offered the opportunity to decline participation in the first mass shooting, several 
men did refuse to participate, but this became more rare as time went on; in testimony given several 
decades later, many of the men seemed to struggle with the notion of choice: “It was a different time 
and place, as if they had been on another political planet, and the political values and vocabularies of 
the 1960s were useless in explaining the situation they found themselves in 1942” (72).  Supporting 
Arendt’s claim about the thoughtlessness with which the mass killings were undertaken, one 
participant testified: “Truthfully I must say that at the time we didn’t reflect about it at all.  Only years 
later did any of us become truly conscious of what had happened then…Only later did it first occur to 
me that it had not been right” (72).    
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 As a corollary, Arendt suggests that temptation is no more reliable an indicator of the morality of an 
action:  “Evil in the Third Reich had lost the quality by which most people recognize it—the quality of 
temptation.  Many Germans and many Nazis,  probably an overwhelming majority of them, must have 
been tempted not to murder, not to rob, not to let their neighbors go off to their doom…and not to 
become accomplices in all these crimes by benefitting from them.  But, God knows, they had learned 
how to resist temptation” (Eichmann 150).  This can be read as yet another criticism of Kant’s 
categorical imperative (or another example of how Macbeth does not provide us with a comprehensive 
view of the possibilities of evil), which assumes that given an opposition between a sense of duty or 
respect for the law and desire or inclination, morality will fall on the side of duty and against 
individual desire.  Arendt points out that Himmler’s Nazi propaganda specifically opposed a sense of 
dutifulness to desires that resisted killing: “…it consisted in turning these instincts around, as it were, 
in directing them toward the self. So that instead of saying: What horrible things I did to people!, the 
murderers would be able to say: What horrible things I had to watch in the pursuance of my duties, 





presents a marginal example of this type of conflict in Macbeth, when Lady Macbeth 
exploits the role that a readiness to kill plays in the masculine identity of the Scottish 
warrior culture by pitting it against the competing role of fidelity to kingship: “When 
you durst do it, then you were a man…Nor time nor place / Did then adhere, and yet 
you would make both.  / They have made themselves, and that their fitness now / 
Does unmake you” (1.7.49-54).  Under the influence of these challenges, Macbeth 
gradually shifts from refusing the enterprise wholesale (“We will proceed no further 
in this business” [1.7.31]) to defending his position as a manifestation of a proper 
form of maleness (“Pr’ythee peace. / I dare do all that may become a man; / Who 
dares do more, is none” [1.7.45-47]) to yielding to the competing claim on his 
masculinity that Lady Macbeth taunts him with (“Bring forth men-children only! / 
For thy undaunted mettle should compose / Nothing but males…I am settled, and 
bend up / Each corporal agent to this terrible feat” [1.7.73-81]).  If this evolution 
makes it plausible that Macbeth has experienced a degree of guilt for temporarily 
hesitating to kill Duncan, can we refuse to entertain the possibility that Eichmann 
anticipated a guilty conscience would result if he did not comply with the entire 
ruling regime’s demand that he support state-sanctioned murder?:  “[A]s for his 
conscience, he remembered perfectly well that he would have had a bad conscience 
only if he had not done what he had been ordered to [do]? - to ship millions of men, 
women, and children to their death with great zeal and the most meticulous care” 
(Eichmann 25).
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 Coppelia Kahn, in Man’s Estate, highlights this aspect  of Macbeth, arguing that “Macbeth’s rhetoric 
shows how desperate he is to make himself into his wife’s kind of man, if only in words, and how he 





Arendt seems to have felt the weight of her exploration of these deformations 
and inversions regarding conceptions of conscience that we inherit from Shakespeare.  
She more fully considers the activity of thinking and its relation to moral action in 
The Life of the Mind.  In the introduction, she repeats her assertion that 
Shakespearean villains represent a traditional picture of evil insofar as they 
communicate a self-awareness of the ills they pursue or imply the existence of 
individual motives—motives which may or may not be opaque to the audience or to 
the characters themselves: “Evil men, we are told, act out of envy; this may be 
resentment at not having turned out well through no fault of their own (Richard 
III)…Or they may be prompted by weakness (Macbeth).  Or, on the contrary, by the 
powerful hatred wickedness feels for sheer goodness (Iago’s ‘I hate the Moor; my 
cause is hatred’…)” (3-4).
39
  In relation to the capacity for thought, Richard III is 
most prominently set against Eichmann’s much less reflective participation in evil 
acts:   
It was this absence of thinking—which is so ordinary an experience in our 
everyday life, where we hardly have the time, let along the inclination, to stop 
and think—that awakened my interest.  Is evil-doing (the sins of omission, as 
well as the sins of commission) possible in default of not just “base motives” 
(as the law calls them) but of any motives whatever, of any particular 
prompting of interest or volition?  Is wickedness, however we may define it, 
this being “determined to prove a villain,” not a necessary condition for evil-
doing?  Might the problem of good and evil, our faculty for telling right from 
wrong, be connected with our faculty of thought? (4-5) 
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In Macbeth, we have a representation of wickedness, of the person who must 
overcome the dictates of conscience in order to accomplish what he has it in his mind 
to do.  But what of Eichmann, whom Arendt suspected of being thoughtless, of being 
unfamiliar with the “silent intercourse” of thought.  Although I agree with Arendt that 
the possibility of an Eichmann is not something for which our existing concepts have 
prepared us to comprehend—and that Macbeth and Eichmann largely represent two 
different paradigms of evil—I suggested above how Shakespeare is nevertheless able 
to provide a liminal case of morality as conformity; Macbeth is faced with two sets of 
rules which, brought into conflict with one another, almost mechanically induce guilt 
merely because both cannot simultaneously be obeyed.  And ultimately Arendt, too, 
found Shakespeare’s representations of evil to contain more than merely a distillation 
of traditional concepts.  In the conclusion to the lectures that she dedicated to Auden, 
“Thinking and Moral Considerations”—a dedication which is perhaps signaled more 
intimately by the exploration of Shakespeare that became the conclusion to the first 
volume of The Life of the Mind (“Thinking”)—Arendt ultimately credits Richard III 
with acknowledging the muted quality of the conscience that can occur when we are 
in the presence of others.
40
  First, she points to a moment in the play that seems to 
embody Kant’s vision of a self standing before its own internal tribunal.  Waking 
from dreams that have been haunted by the ghosts of his many victims, ghosts who 
remind him in turn of the particular crimes he has committed against them, Richard is 
affected by the condition of plurality of which the ghosts give testimony, by a self 
that cannot seem to escape its self-identity as murderer, and by the principled 
conviction that all murderers must be revenged:    
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What do I fear?  Myself?  There’s none else by: 
Richard loves Richard: that is, I am I. 
Is there a murderer here?  No. Yes, I am: 
Then fly: what! From myself?  Great reason, why: 
Lest I revenge.  What! myself upon myself? 
Alack!  I love myself.  Wherefore?  For any good  
That I myself have done unto myself? 
O! no: alas! I rather hate myself 
For hateful deeds committed by myself. 
I am a villain.  Yet I lie, I am not. 
Fool, of thyself speak well: fool, do not flatter. 
My conscience hath a thousand several tongues, 
And every tongue brings in a several tale, 
And every tale condemns me for a villain. 
Perjury, perjury, in the highest degree; 
Murder, stern murder, in the direst degree; 
All several sins, all used in each degree, 
Throng to the bar, crying all, ‘Guilty, guilty!’(5.3.182-99) 
While in solitude, Richard must keep company with himself; but as Arendt observes, 
this very condition can produce a memory or reminder of plurality: “[n]othing 
perhaps indicates more strongly that man exists essentially in the plural than…this 
duality in myself with myself that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am both 





political friendship that I explored in the previous chapter, we found that dialogue 
with others is logically prior to the dialogue with the self: “I first talk with others 
before I talk with myself, examining whatever the joint talk may have been about, and 
then discover that I can conduct a dialogue with myself as well” (189).  The dialogue 
that Richard has with himself reveals an inner difference, a psychic two-in-one that 
cannot live with itself because in violating the conditions of plurality it has opposed 
itself to the conditions of its own possibility, which are embodied by the dialogue of 
the self with the self.  Instead of finding “love” for the self for what the will has been 
able to achieve on behalf of itself, he finds self-loathing for “hateful deeds.”  
Yet however powerfully affected Richard seems by the experience of his self-
reflection, the sentence he passes on himself is soon forgotten.  He remains under the 
sway of his conscience only so long as he is alone.  When he returns to the company 
of others, such self-laceration comes to an end and "conscience" becomes "but a word 
that cowards use, / Devis’d at first to keep the strong in awe….” (5.3.309-10).   
Shakespeare continues to make use of the word conscience, but as Arendt 
observes, he does not in this instance “use it here in the accustomed way,” as an ever-
present influence on the moral self: “Conscience, as we understand it in legal or 
moral matters, is supposedly always present within us, just like consciousness.  And 
this conscience is supposed to tell us what to do and what to repent; before it became 
the lumen natural or Kant’s practical reason, it was the voice of God”  (190).  In 
Richard III, Shakespeare, however, disrupts the association of conscience with the 
ubiquitous subjective phenomena known as consciousness.  In making us aware of 





defines in her Denktagebuch: “All thought starts and departs from everyday speech.  
The need to think arises whenever we find that words taken in their ordinary sense are 
obscuring rather than revealing.  The process of clarification that occurs in the 
thinking process comes about through distinctions” (770).  Turning to the language of 
the murderers in the first act of the play, Arendt is struck by the way they describe 
conscience, as something absent that is feared only in anticipation of its appearance:  
“What if it come to thee again?” the First Murder asks (1.4.132).  There is, however, 
nothing necessary about this proleptic fear, dependent as it is on a habit of keeping 
company with one’s self: 
Shakespeare’s murderer says: “Every man that means to live well 
endeavors…to live without it,” and success in that comes easy because all he 
has to do is never start the soundless solitary dialogue we call “thinking,” 
never go home and examine things.  This is not a matter of wickedness or 
goodness, as it is not a matter of intelligence or stupidity.  A person who does 
not know that silent intercourse (in which we examine what we say and what 
we do) will not mind contradicting himself, and this means he will never be 
either able or willing to account for what he says or does; nor will he mind 
committing any crime, since he can count on its being forgotten the next 
moment.  Bad people—Aristotle to the contrary not withstanding—are not 
“full of regrets.” (191).
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 Marjorie Garber makes a similar observation about the meaning of the word conscience in Richard 
III: “Conscience in Richard III is predominantly a moral term, having its modern meaning of ‘sense of 
duty’ or ‘remorse.’  When Richard associates conscience with cowardice, he is talking about feelings 
of guilt and responsibility, essentially societal values internalized into a moral system.  But 







Arendt thus reads Shakespeare’s Richard III from a dual perspective.  In one sense, 
Eichmann is utterly unlike Richard.  While in the service of a political regime that 
sought to eradicate entire populations, it is entirely possible that he never intended “to 
prove a villain.”  And he need not have been a hypocrite; what he pursued was legal 
and thus there was no necessary disjunction between public appearance and private 
intent.  Insofar as he relied on the public law as a guide for moral action, he may 
never have considered the relation between his genocidal actions and the ineradicable 
fact of human plurality.    
     And yet we also find Shakespeare already disrupting the equation of conscience 
with consciousness.  What appears as a marginal case of evil in Richard III—the 
villain who at moments seems to have left behind the reflective capacity of the self 
and its side effect, conscience—becomes something much closer to the norm with 
Eichmann.  Arendt implies that Eichmann’s ability to think about what he was doing 
was further inhibited because totalitarianism reduced to the maximum extent possible 
the private space required to make thinking possible.  Rather than solitude, which 
enables the self to confront itself, totalitarianism instead produced loneliness, the 
experience of being utterly alone in the world.  Even as it isolates the self from other 
individuals and limits exposure to their unique perspectives, the physical and 
ideological violence of totalitarianism unifies the self through a relentless 
identification of the individual with the law of the land.  Ultimately, this externalized 
identity limits the self’s natural propensity to divide into the critical plurality found in 





The perspectival potential of the dramatic genre made manifest by Shakespeare has 
already been explored at length and in many forms elsewhere.  Theodore Leinwand, 
the director of my dissertation, wrote some years ago regarding the perplexities that 
emerge whenever one attempts to neatly subsume the figure of William Shakespeare 
beneath a single categorical, early modern subject position, based upon the works that 
he composed: 
Surely it has not been easy to say just what sort of agent Shakespeare 
conceived of himself as or was constituted as in his time. For every argument 
enlisting him among the subversives or anti-providentialists of the period we 
find an argument for the patriarchal bard or for the keeper of the great chain. 
Yet it seems clear that he was in many ways an interhierarchical figure: 
capitalist and artist, bourgeois and artisan, shareholder and actor, urban and 
provincial. He is perhaps less this or that than a stage for contestation and 
intermixing. A heteroglot Bottom, Falstaff, or Cleopatra better captures the 
Shakespeare function than does any univocal voicing. (“Negotiation and New 
Historicism” 487) 
 
As Leinwand here hints, heterogeneous voices ripple ever outward, from something 
inherent in the works themselves to the critical responses they elicit.  Throughout the 
writing of this dissertation, my own encounters with the infinite variety of arguments 





finitude and testament to the fact of plurality.  Indeed, some critical responses to 
Shakespeare stand as monuments to the power of young scholars in particular, those 
newcomers who (often in the face of strong opposition from more firmly established 
academics) reconsider what it means to read these plays and poems, and who in so 
doing disrupt prevailing interpretive modes by introducing novel ones that will 
coexist alongside them.  
     Had Arendt and Shakespeare recurred to the Shakespearean corpus merely as 
evidence of our experience of plurality, however, it would perhaps have been too 
obvious and commonplace a topic to alone have merited yet another extended 
treatment.  The other claim with which I began is that Shakespeare traffics not merely 
with the fact of plurality but also with some carefully crafted tools—the technologies 
of philosophical thought—that have developed, in concert with political violence, to 
suppress and deny plurality.  The chapters of this dissertation have thus drawn 
attention to the pressure Shakespeare exerts on the conceptual elisions and 
contradictions that have invaded our political language.  The very durability of terms 
like freedom, action, and friendship demonstrates their seemingly ineradicable 
significance while belying their susceptibility to deformations and conflations that our 
habitual thought-trains conceal but which critical thought, as Arendt suggests and 
Shakespeare demonstrates, can make visible.   
      Lucrece, for example, offered us a view of public freedom through a poetic 
palimpsest of political philosophy, a freedom overwritten but not completely 
obscured by freedom understood as freedom of the will.  The poem’s vision of 





non is non-sovereignty among others, into a freedom identified with sovereignty, 
whose impossible ideal is absolute control over individual soul, audience, and end 
results.  The political consequences of our substitution of making for acting are thus 
perhaps already detectable through the analogy we find between Lucrece’s Christian 
vision of freedom and Tarquin’s sovereign will.  In Coriolanus, however, these 
consequences are made explicit, with the shift from the earlier poem’s meditations on 
individual agency to a play centered on the fate of the polis.  When Menenius deploys 
political philosophy and its craftsman-like vision of the state as a made object with 
pre-defined ends, he excludes from the space of freedom a plurality, ironically 
represented in the play by the plebeian craftsmen.  Against the backdrop of the 
plebeian rebellion and its unsuccessful containment by such organic fables of the 
political, the play thinks through the fate of citizenship, as the momentary republican 
impulses of the plebeians give way to a more bourgeois-like, mercantile behavior that 
better represents the dominant practices of the modern citizen.  Hamlet tentatively 
postulates friendship both as the individual’s escape route from the interference of 
political sovereignty and as its ticket to a private sovereignty, thereby creating a kind 
of firewall that at once separates and reinforces the two forms of sovereignty that we 
found, respectively, in Lucrece and Coriolanus.  As I have demonstrated throughout 
this dissertation, these thought-trains are part of a constellation of conceptual and 
material developments that serve to de-politicize and atomize citizenries. If 
individuals are “freed” from politics by modern, representative democracy—and so 





career to pursue)—the sovereign who decides on the political is all the more “freed” 
from the meddling interference of active, publically-oriented citizens.  
     It has not been my intention here to discuss all or even most of Shakespeare’s 
works as examples of the “poetic thinking” that Arendt claims has the power to reveal 
the sedimentary conceptions of politics we have inherited and their impact on present 
political thought and action. Nevertheless, if my arguments are found persuasive, the 
notion that the corpus still serves as exemplar and testing ground for political thought 
may merit further investigation, investigation which would consider carefully our 
own rapidly evolving political reality.  My final chapter considered Arendt’s 
evaluation of a form of political evil that enabled the Holocaust, in relation to a 
cultural inheritance regarding moral agency that was significantly influenced by 
Shakespeare’s dramaturgy, and which, I have argued with Arendt, may not fully have 
prepared us to understand the unprecedented array of conceptual and material 
ideologies which insulate individuals from their responsibilities as citizens in a shared 
political world.  Because I have maintained a focus on the history of political theory 
that confronted Arendt and Shakespeare as thinkers in their own times, I have not 
attended to our own political moment in significant detail.  Here I will only offer brief 
remarks as to why the panoply of political concepts that crystallized with the material 
realities of totalitarianism have not lost their significance or danger for us.   
     It was Arendt herself who seems to have anticipated that liberalism would not turn 
out to be an antidote for the novel forms of political evil that emerged with 
totalitarianism: “It may even be that the true predicaments of our time will assume 





has become a thing of the past” (Origins 460).  Sheldon Wolin’s book Democracy 
Incorporated offers a corresponding vision of the contemporary American political 
situation, coining the term “inverted totalitarianism” to describe a regime that unlike 
totalitarianism proper—which is characterized by the perpetual mobilization of its 
citizens through continuous regime changes—relies upon a politically disengaged 
citizenry to undermine political institutions without revolution, largely through 
legislative lobbying and unlimited campaign contributions.  Under cover of furthering 
a fiscal responsibility that benefits all, for example, the New Deal’s social agenda—
which offered a vision for a more equitable economy but also set into motion an 
unprecedented apparatus of state power—is quietly being dismantled with cuts to 
programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), while the 
accrued power of the Federal government is left intact to expand the role of military 
contractors as well as the legally sanctioned leverage that multinational corporations 
hold over both “guest” workers and increasingly vulnerable citizens (x-xv). 
These strategies recall my discussion of the moment in Coriolanus when the 
citizens question whether they have indeed been awarded “voices” in the marketplace 
ritual.  If there is revolutionary power in holding public institutions to their promises 
when they do not transform those promises into political realities, as the citizens do 
when they claim their right to refuse Martius their voices for consul, so too there is 
counter-revolutionary violence in undermining political principles (by exerting undue 
influence over legislative and regulatory activities) without overturning entire legal 
structures or implementing an abrupt regime change.  In contrast with totalitarianism, 





constitution that promises to protect individual liberties and rights, while actively 
undermining the institutions that afford those same protections. 
     Widespread indifference to the political world almost certainly has been shaped by 
the dominant, individualistic theories of the political which I explored in detail 
throughout this dissertation, but apathy is also, increasingly, a despairing response to 
the commonplace awareness that voting, the signature political act of representative 
democracy, has become almost meaningless amid the overwhelming influence that 
corporate lobbyists and media conglomerates exert on the legislative process,  
metastasizing inequalities of power and widening the gap between elected 
representatives and ordinary citizens.  The opening scene of Ralph Fiennes’s 2011 
film version of Coriolanus refigures elements of the play to illustrate the widespread 
alienation from political participation that coordinated networks of technology, 
corporate capital, and state powers actively enforce today.  The symbiosis of the 
corporate media, the affluent and the state is signaled by the appearance of Senator 
Menenius, who no longer visits the plebeians in person and who instead delivers his 
arguments from a Fidelis TV studio.  As several plebeians watch from a private 
meeting space they have managed to procure for their own internal deliberations, the 
opportunity for dissenting voices publically to be heard has disappeared from the 
play.  The sound-bite quality of the news segment cannot admit the elaboration of a 
lengthy fable on political theory, and all that remains of Menenius’ original rhetorical 
set-piece are the brief epithets “friends” and “good neighbors” (which one hears as 
something akin to “My fellow Americans”): the speech itself is boiled down to its 





threat is carried out in the scene that follows, when tanks and police in riot gear 
mechanically beat back the citizens who quite obviously cannot offer any 
“impediment” (1.1.71).  It would be difficult to deny that public protests are 
increasingly treated by elected government officials today as a vestigial form of 
carnival, an almost superfluous release valve, rather than as a serious form of political 
participation.  And given the array of forces that are now aligned to manipulate public 
response to dissent, it is understandably difficult to maintain any faith in the capacity 
to act with which we are all endowed.  When Martius emerges from amid the 
phalanx-like formation of riot police to address the atomized crowd, we now cannot 
but agree with his description of the citizens as “fragments” (1.1.221). 
     Neither Shakespeare nor Arendt could anticipate the novel political challenges that 
confront us today, and neither therefore can offer us a blueprint for the future.  As I 
have demonstrated, however, they can both offer significant aid in tracing the history 
of the shared conceptions we have regarding politics, thereby enabling us to subject 
those conceptions to increased scrutiny and in the process, re-introduce into our 
political imaginary a more expansive definition of fundamental concepts like 
freedom.  The political questions I have re-examined here from the perspective of 
plurality must therefore remain merely a propaedeutic for thinking about politics 
today.  It seems certain, however, that as long as special interests remain content to 
focus on specific social issues rather than on the primacy of a common, political 
world—rather than on discussing in public the marked absence of a public venue for 
political participation that safeguards the integrity of fundamental political principles 





produce the necessary forms of active citizenship that have been occluded by political 
theory. 
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